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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of the thesis was to investigate the factors that determine capital 
structures of financial firms using two separate samples of banks and insurance companies. 
In the first instance, the results of the study showed that the financing behaviour of banks 
mirrors that of non-financial firms. It was also observed bank financing behaviour can be best 
explained by the pecking order theory. Risk and size variables were observed to be 
negatively related to the Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio, whereas the dividend variable was 
positively related. Similarly, risk and size were found to be negatively associated with buffer 
capital, while dividends were positively related. The 2007–2009 global financial crisis (GFC) 
was found to have negatively affected the financial structures of banks. Consistent with 
similar studies, it was observed that banks have a target capital structure, and adjust to this 
target at an adjustment speed of 44%.  
 
With regard to insurance companies, it was observed that the firm-level determinants of 
capital structure explain insurer leveraging. Unlike banks, the 2007–2009 GFC positively 
affected the capital structure of insurance companies. Similar to banks, results showed that 
insurers have target capital structures which they seek to achieve in their financing and 
adjust to such targets at a rate of 21%, which is lower than that of banks. 
 
The study contributes to the body of knowledge in four major ways. Firstly, it adds to the 
literature on the capital structure of financial firms, which area has not been extensively and 
conclusively studied. Using a different environment, it validates the ‘standard corporate 
finance view’ as has been observed in the few studies on financial firms. Secondly, it 
validates the ‘buffer view’ and ‘regulatory view’ of capital structures of financial firms that 
have taken prominence since the last GFC. Thirdly, the study recognises that banks and 
insurance companies are fundamentally different with regard to capital structure and 
regulation and therefore warranted separate treatment in studies. This is in contrast with 
recent studies that do not recognise the heterogeneity of the two types of firms. Fourthly, to 
the researcher’s knowledge this study is the first to examine the impact of business 
cycles/financial crises on the financing patterns of financial firms. Confirming the fundamental 
differences between banks and insurance companies, the study observed that financial 
crises have a negative impact on capital structures of banks (meaning that they deleverage 
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during crises). In contrast, financial crises have a positive impact on capital structures of 
insurance companies (meaning, unlike banks, they leverage during crises). 
 
Keywords: bank, insurance, capital structure, firm level, buffer, leverage, target, South 
Africa 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
The 2007–2009 global financial crisis (GFC) brought to the fore the importance of 
financial sector stability for the general well-being of economies. The failure of 
financial institutions in the developed world came at a huge cost to the taxpayer. The 
International Monetary Fund estimates that between 2007 and 2010, $5.5 trillion of 
bank assets were written down (IMF, 2009: 53). Governments have provided the 
bulk of the funds needed by banks to recapitalise (Goddard, Molyneux & Wilson, 
2009: 363). Although the South African banking industry was largely unscathed, the 
GFC mutated into a recession and South Africa entered a period of recession in 
2009 with the gross domestic product (GDP) contracting by minus 1.8%. It is 
estimated that close to one million jobs were lost (National Treasury, 2011: 4). 
According to the same report by National Treasury, the financial sector in South 
Africa comprises over R6 trillion in assets (of which roughly R4.5 trillion belong to 
banks and insurance companies), contributes 10.5% of the GDP per year, employs 
3.9% of the employed and contributes at least 15% of corporate income tax. As 
such, securing the financial sector – particularly the banking and insurance sectors – 
has become a policy imperative now more than ever before. 
The costs of the financial crisis will continue to be quantified long into the future. 
What continues to seize the minds of regulators and academics alike is the question: 
What caused the financial crisis? Scholars have advanced several explanations, the 
chief ones being risk taking, financial innovation, securitisation and leverage (Affinito 
& Tagliaferri, 2010; Casu, Clare, Sarkisyan & Thomas, 2011; Hyun & Rhee, 2011; 
Nijskens & Wagner, 2011; Shleifer & Vishny, 2010; Wilson, Casu, Girardone & 
Molyneux, 2010). As such, the financing (capital structure) of financial institutions is 
a core challenge that needs to be addressed to safeguard the financial sector. The 
monetary authorities have attempted to safeguard the health of the financial sector 
by re-regulating the sector.  
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Bank regulators are grappling with the implementation of the Basel III guidelines, 
which prescribe the level of debt-to-equity (leverage) to which banks must conform. 
Hitherto, banking regulation was largely premised on the Basel I and subsequently 
Basel II guidelines developed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). These 
guidelines prescribed the amount of capital banks must keep to safeguard against 
financial and operational risks. The efficacy of banking regulation will largely be 
underpinned by resolving the capital structure conundrum – that is, determining the 
factors that affect the financing decision of banks.  
Similarly, insurance regulators are preoccupied with the strengthening of solvency 
regulations for the insurance sector. In the European Union (EU), a Solvency II 
legislative framework was promulgated in 2009. It replaced the Solvency I framework 
for the regulation of insurance business in the EU. The main objectives of the 
Solvency II framework are to increase consumer protection, modernise supervision, 
deepen EU market integration and increase international competitiveness of EU 
insurers. In South Africa, the Solvency Assessment and Management (SAM) 
framework for the regulation of insurance companies was developed by the Financial 
Services Board (FSB) in response to the financial crisis. It is largely based on the 
Solvency II guidelines. SAM is a risk-based supervisory framework that seeks to 
improve policyholder protection and contribute to financial stability through aligning 
insurers’ regulatory capital requirements with the underlying risks of the insurer. 
The foregoing compels that a study focusing on the financing policies of financial 
firms be conducted. The present study lends empirical evidence to help resolve the 
capital structure ‘puzzle’ associated with the financing behaviour of financial firms. 
Suffice to highlight that the capital structure debate continues unabated since the 
pioneering work of Modigliani and Miller (M&M) (1958), who argued that the value of 
a firm is invariant to its capital structure. Subsequent research has proven the 
contrary (see for example Berger, Herring & Szegö 1995; Inderst & Muller, 2008). It 
has subsequently been demonstrated that capital structure choices have a bearing 
on firm value. Early scholars such as Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009) isolated the firm-level determinants that 
affect capital structure choices of non-financial firms. These are size, profitability, 
market-to-book value, collateral, debt tax shield, non-debt tax shield, dividends, risk 
and age, among the more ‘reliably important’ factors. 
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Extant studies have been conducted to unravel the capital structure policies of non-
financial firms. Notwithstanding, empirical studies to investigate the determinants of 
capital structures of financial firms are scant. Financial firms have been excluded 
from most studies of a panel nature. This has largely been based on two premises. 
Firstly, there is a notion that because financial firms are regulated, their financing 
behaviour will be anomalous. Secondly, the exclusion criterion has been founded on 
the fact that financial firms could have an additional source of income, ordinarily not 
available to other firms by dint of the business they conduct. The additional source of 
financing for banking institutions is in the form of deposits, while for insurance 
companies it is in the form of premiums.  
There is scant research on the factors that determine the capital structures of 
financial firms. Among other studies that have been conducted, Gropp and Heider 
(2010) were the first to probe whether the standard determinants of leverage in non-
financial firms carry over to banking institutions by employing a sample of large US 
and European banks. Their results were in the affirmative. Subsequently, Fiordelisi, 
Marques-Ibanez and Molyneux (2011) investigated the relationship between bank 
risk and capital for European banks. They found that the levels of bank capital 
increase bank efficiency. Several studies have since been conducted to examine the 
financing behaviour of banks (see for instance, in the context of China (Lim, 2012), 
Nigeria (Ukaegbu and Oino, 2014) and Turkey (Baltaci and Ayaydin, 2014). This 
research effort sought to complement such studies on capital structure by specifically 
focusing on financial firms within a developing economy setting.  
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows: Section 1.2 gives an overview of the 
financial sector with special focus on the banking and insurance sectors in South 
Africa. Section 1.3 synthesises the research problem. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 outline 
the significance of the study and the conceptual framework underpinning this study. 
Section 1.6 outlines the aim and states the research questions and objectives 
guiding this study. Section 1.7 gives an overview of the delimitations of this study, 
and Section 1.8 concludes the chapter by presenting the thesis outline. 
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1.2  THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The South African financial sector has grown in leaps and bounds over the years. 
This could be attributed to several reasons, chief among them being financial 
liberalisation, globalisation, technological enhancements and economic growth. 
According to Akinboade and Makina (2006: 106), there are two levels of the formal 
financial sector in South Africa. These are the institutional and market levels. At the 
institutional level are the banking and non-banking financial intermediaries, whereas 
at the market level are the stock market, the bond market, the money market and the 
foreign exchange market. For the purposes of this study, the institutional level that 
was considered is that of the banking and insurance sectors. An overview of these 
institutions is presented in turn. 
1.2.1  An overview of the banking sector in South Africa 
The profile of the South African banking sector is presented in Table 1.1 below.   
 
Table 1.1: A profile of the banking sector in South Africa 
Type of Bank Number 
 
Registered banks  17 
 
Mutual banks  3 
 
Co-operative banks  2 
 
Local branches of foreign banks  15 
 
Foreign banks with approved local 
representative offices  
31 
Source: SARB (2017) 
The other important metrics for this sector that were considered are the capital and 
total assets ratios. These are profiled in figures 1.1 and 1.2 respectively. These data 
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show that the banking sector has grown greatly over the years. In addition, it would 
seem that the capital ratios have improved over the years in the aftermath of the 
GFC. 
 
Figure 1.1: Trends in capital ratios of South Africa banks 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation – adapted from SARB (2017) 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Trends in total assets of the South African banking industry 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation – adapted from SARB (2017) 
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1.2.2  An overview of the insurance sector in South Africa 
The insurance sector in South Africa comprises of 73 long-term insurers and 7 long-
term reinsurers, 93 short-term insurance companies and 7 short-term reinsurance 
companies (FSB, 2014a & 2014b). In South Africa the insurance companies that 
transact life insurance business are referred to as long-term insurers. Similarly, the 
companies that transact non-life (property) insurance are referred to as short-term 
insurers (Sibindi & Godi, 2014). 
The key metrics of the insurance companies for the period 2011–2015 are given in 
Table 1.2. The gross premiums of long-term insurance companies show a 
remarkable growth of 53% from approximately R301 billion registered in 2011 to 
roughly R461 billion registered in 2015. On the other hand, the premiums of short-
term insurance companies show a growth of 40% from approximately R81 billion 
registered in 2011 to the levels of roughly R114 billion registered in 2015. 
A similar trend is observed when evaluating the total assets with the long-term 
insurance industry, registering a phenomenon growth in total assets of 54% from 
roughly R1.7 trillion in 2011 to R2.7 trillion in 2015. Comparatively, the short-term 
insurance industry experienced total assets growth of approximately 49.6% from 
roughly R90 billion in 2011 to R135 billion in 2015.  
Table 1.2 Gross premiums and total assets of insurance companies in South 
Africa 
   
YEAR 2011 2013 2015 
Long-
term 
insurers 
Short-
term 
insurers 
Long-
term 
insurers 
Short-
term 
insurers 
Long-
term 
insurers 
Short-term 
insurers 
Gross 
premiums  
/ R’mil 
300 650 80 951 429 703 96 178 461 160 113 909 
Total assets 
 / R’mil 1 722 777 90 472 2 278 148 111 686 2 660 938 135 363 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation – adapted from FSB (2011a, 2011b, 2015b & 
2015c) reports 
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1.3  SYNTHESIS OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The GFC heightened and brought to the fore the inadequacies of capital structure 
policies of financial institutions. High levels of leverage and an insatiable appetite for 
risk on the part of banks have been isolated as two of the proximate causes of the 
financial crisis. Further, regulatory forbearance has also been blamed for the 
financial crisis. In the aftermath of the 2007–2009 GFC, it has become a regulatory 
imperative to strengthen the capital regulations of financial firms among a cocktail of 
regulatory measures introduced.  
The financing decisions of financial firms remain an enigma, increasingly attracting 
the attention of regulators and corporate finance scholars alike. Hitherto, financial 
firms have been excluded from extant studies on capital structure. Extant studies 
have focused nearly exclusively on non-financial firms (see for instance Flannery & 
Rangan, 2006; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Lemmon & Zender, 2010 and Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995). Financial firms are different from other firms by their very nature, in 
that they could have an additional source of financing in the form of deposits or 
premiums. Over and above this, they are regulated in their capital structure policy 
formulation.  
While most non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms choose their optimal capital ratios primarily in 
response to market constraints, regulated ﬁnancial institutions must also heed their 
supervisors’ capital adequacy requirements (Flannery & Rangan, 2008: 395). On the 
one hand, banking institutions must conform to the prescribed bank capital ratios. On 
the other hand, insurance companies must abide by the solvency ratios that are set 
by regulatory authorities. Notwithstanding, Gropp and Heider (2010) found evidence 
that the financing behaviour of large US banking institutions mirrors that of industrial 
firms. Moreover, they found that regulation is not a first-order determinant of the 
capital structures of banking institutions. 
Subsequently, there are three schools of thought that have emerged on bank capital 
structure. The first viewpoint is the ‘standard corporate finance view’, which contends 
that bank capital structure is determined in the same manner as those of non-
financial firms. The second school of thought is the ‘regulatory view’ of bank capital, 
which contends that regulation is binding and solely determines bank capital 
structure. The third school of thought is the ‘buffer view’ of bank capital, which is 
8 
 
premised on the notion that banks keep capital in excess of the regulatory 
requirements in line with bank-specific factors. Similarly, for the insurance sector 
there has been a growth in empirical work to test the standard corporate finance 
view and regulatory view.   
The present study sought to establish the factors that are important in the 
determination of the capital structures of financial firms. This study was four-pronged 
in nature. Firstly, it tested the standard corporate finance view and disentangled the 
factors that determine a financial firm’s capital structure. Secondly, it tested the 
regulatory view of capital. Thirdly, it tested the buffer view of bank capital. Lastly, it 
sought to establish whether financial firms have a target capital structure and if so, at 
what speed they adjust towards this target. 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY 
The significance of the study is mainly fourfold. Firstly, previous studies that sought 
to test the theories of capital structure and establish the determinants of capital 
structure have nearly exclusively focused on non-financial firms (see for instance 
Fama & French, 1998; Frank & Goyal, 2003, 2009; Graham & Harvey, 2001 and 
Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999). The justification for the exclusion of financial firms 
from studies on capital structure has either been that they are regulated entities or as 
a consequence of their intrinsic firm-level characteristics (such as having premiums 
or deposits as another source of capital). 
Secondly, the status quo has been challenged and it has subsequently been proven, 
starting with Gropp and Heider (2010), that notwithstanding regulation, the 
determinants of capital structure of banking institutions are largely the same as those 
of non-financial firms. The caveat is that their study was based on large US banks. 
As such it is open to conjecture – whether their results could be replicated across the 
financial sector as well across financial firms of different sizes.  
The present study sought to increase the scope of research by focusing on two 
important sectors of the financial sector, namely the insurance and banking sectors. 
Unlike some recent studies, this study recognised the heterogeneity of banks and 
insurance companies and did not pool them together, but studies their financing 
behaviour in separate panels. Moreover, such studies have not factored into account 
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the spill-over effects of financial firm financing. Banks and insurance companies are 
dependent on one another for financing through their interactions in the interbank 
market for the former and in their dealings in the reinsurance markets for the latter. 
As such, previous studies have not corrected for cross-sectional dependence, hence 
the reliability of their results is questionable. In this study, tests for cross-sectional 
dependence were conducted. Where cross-sectional dependence was detected, it 
was corrected for. Furthermore, the sample for this study was drawn from the 
population of all South African banks and insurance companies, regardless of size. 
Thirdly, this research effort was conducted in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 GFC. 
As such, this presented a window of opportunity for the investigation of the impact of 
the GFC on financial firm capital structures. As such this study sought to add to the 
growing body of literature which has sought to examine the impact of the GFC on 
firm leveraging (see for instance Ariff & Hassan, 2008; Harrison & Widjaja, 2014; 
Leitner & Stehrer, 2013; Morri & Artegiani, 2015; Zarebski & Dimovski, 2012   and 
Zeitun, Temimi & Mimouni, 2017). 
Lastly, financial sector stability is a policy imperative that has preoccupied monetary 
and fiscal authorities alike (National Treasury, 2011). The reforms that are gaining 
impetus are largely anchored on the strengthening of the capital requirements of 
financial firms. Therefore, this research effort offers insights into the efficacy of 
capital regulation of financial firms in South Africa. 
1.5  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework that guided this research was multifaceted and comprised 
of three layers (refer to Figure 1.3). The first layer comprised of the determinants of 
capital structure. This was further broken down into two constituents, namely 
standard firm-level determinants of capital structure as well as financial firms’ fixed 
effects (FE). In the first instance, it was established which standard firm-level 
determinants of capital structure as well as financial firm intrinsic factors determine 
the capital structures of financial firms.  
The second layer comprised of the observed capital structure. In the second 
instance, the study examined whether the observed capital structures of financial 
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firms could be explained using existing capital structure theories. This analysis 
mainly relied on the pecking order and the trade-off theories of capital structure.  
For the third layer, this study determined whether capital regulation is a first-order 
determinant of capital structure. It sought to determine whether the observed capital 
structures of financial firms exhibit some form of seeking ‘optimal’ financing 
behaviour or achieving target capital structures by financial managers, in which case 
the study sought to establish the speed of adjustment towards the target capital 
structures. This is an imperative that needs to be considered closely in light of the 
cycles that beset the financial sector from time to time. 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Conceptual framework 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
1.6 AIM OF THE STUDY 
The primary aim of the study was to establish the factors that are important in the 
determination of the capital structures of South African financial firms, in order to 
evaluate the efficacy of capital regulation. 
DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Standard firm-
level 
determinants 
of capital 
structure 
 
Financial 
firms' fixed 
effects 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Theories of 
capital 
structure 
Efficacy of 
capital 
regulation 
DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Target capital structure Speed of adjustment 
11 
 
1.6.1 Research questions 
To guide this study, the following research questions were set: 
1. Do the standard firm-level determinants of capital structure explain the 
financial leveraging of financial firms in South Africa? 
2. Are the financing patterns of South African banks consistent with the buffer 
view of bank capital structure? 
3. Is capital regulation of first-order importance in the determination of the capital 
structures of financial firms in South Africa? 
4.  Do South African financial firms seek to achieve a target capital structure in 
their financing behaviour? 
5.  What is the speed of adjustment towards the target capital structure by South 
African financial firms? 
 
1.6.2 Research objectives 
The following research objectives were central to this study: 
1. To establish whether the standard firm-level determinants of capital structure 
explain the financial leveraging of South African financial firms 
2. To determine whether South African bank financing conforms to the buffer 
view of bank capital structure 
3.  To evaluate whether capital regulation is of first-order importance in the 
determination of the capital structure of financial firms in South Africa 
4. To determine whether South African financial firms seek to achieve a target 
capital structure in their financing behaviour  
5. To determine the speed of adjustment towards the target capital structure by 
South African financial firms. 
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1.7  DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study was based on the financial sector within a developing country setting. 
South Africa was chosen as the case study for this research for two reasons. Firstly, 
studies that have been conducted to probe what determines the capital structure of 
firms using South Africa as the single country of focus are very scant. Secondly, 
notwithstanding that South Africa is a developing country, its level of development 
and sophistication of the financial sector is nearly at par with developed economies, 
thereby making it an interesting proposition as a test case. For the purposes of this 
study, the segments of the financial sector under consideration were limited to the 
banking and insurance sectors in South Africa. As such, the words ‘financial sector’ 
bears reference to the banking and the insurance sectors. 
 
1.8 THESIS OUTLINE    
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2: Capital structure: Theory and empirical issues  
This chapter reviews both theoretical and empirical literature on capital structure. It 
begins by tracing the evolution of capital structure theory from the seminal works of 
M&M (1958) and the more prominent theories of capital structure, such as the trade-
off and pecking order theories, are considered. Further, the firm-level determinants 
of capital structure that are reliably important are also considered. The chapter ends 
by reviewing empirical studies on capital structure from both developed and 
developing country perspectives.   
Chapter 3: Financial firm-specific determinants of capital structure and 
hypotheses development  
This chapter begins by examining bank regulation with special focus on the bank 
capital standards as enshrined in the Basel accords. An appraisal of deposit 
insurance schemes as a method of safeguarding the banking sector is also 
conducted. The chapter then reviews the bank-specific determinants of capital 
structure. Further, in this chapter insurer capital regulation is considered. The focus 
is on solvency regulations that insurance companies conform to. In addition, insurer-
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specific determinants of capital structure are considered. The chapter progresses to 
examine the capital regulation in place in South Africa to which financial firms must 
conform. The chapter ends by developing the research hypotheses tested in this 
study. 
Chapter 4: Research methodology 
This chapter begins by outlining the empirical framework underpinning this study. In 
particular, it pays regard to methodological issues by reviewing methodologies that 
have been employed in previous studies to examine the financing behaviour of firms. 
It also reviews the proxies that have been used for the leverage variable. The 
chapter evolves to consider the data and research design for this study. It 
progresses to discuss the panel data estimation techniques employed in the study. It 
also considers the formal tests of specification as well as robustness checks. 
Chapter 5: Empirical results of the banking sector 
In this chapter, the empirical results of the banking sector are presented and 
analysed. The chapter starts with the presentation of summary statistics for the 
banking sector. It progresses to present the empirical results. Firstly, the empirical 
results for testing the relationship between the firm-level determinants of capital 
structure and leverage are presented and discussed. Robustness checks were 
performed on the leverage variable. Secondly, the empirical results for testing the 
regulatory view of bank capital are presented. Thirdly, the empirical results of testing 
the buffer view of bank capital are presented and discussed. Lastly, the results for 
testing for the existence of a target capital structure are presented and analysed.  
Chapter 6: Empirical results of the insurance sector 
In this chapter, the empirical results of the insurance sector are presented and 
analysed. The chapter begins by presenting and discussing the summary statistics 
for the insurance panel of companies. It progresses to present and analyse the 
empirical results of testing whether the firm-level determinants of capital structure 
predict insurer leveraging. The chapter develops to present and analyse the results 
for testing the relationship between the solvency variable and the firm-level 
determinants of capital structure. Lastly, the chapter presents the empirical results of 
testing for the existence of a target capital structure for insurance companies. 
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Chapter 7: Summary of results, conclusions and directions for future research 
This chapter begins by summarising the main findings of the thesis. This draws from 
both the literature review that has been conducted and the findings of this study. The 
chapter evolves to draw conclusions by identifying the contribution of this study to fill 
in the research gaps. The chapter concludes by giving recommendations and 
suggestions for future research drawing from the limitations of this study. 
 
 
  
15 
 
CHAPTER 2 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The financing decision is a critical concept in corporate finance. This chapter traces 
the evolution of the capital structure concept from theoretical as well as empirical 
perspectives. In essence, the issues that are discussed in detail are the factors that 
a firm takes into account when making its financing decision. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 chronicles the evolution 
of capital structure theory by examining the main theories of capital structure and 
proffering their major predictions. Section 2.3 examines the firm-level determinants 
of capital structure. Section 2.4 reviews the empirical studies that have been 
conducted to establish the existence of a target capital structure as well to test the 
theories of capital structure in both developed and developing countries. Section 2.5 
concludes the chapter. 
2.2 THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORY 
Capital structure theory is firmly founded upon the pioneering work of M&M (1958: 
268). They posit that in a frictionless, efficient markets’ world with no taxes or 
bankruptcy, the value of the firm is invariant to its capital structure. Put in other 
words, what they meant is that the value of the firm is not influenced by its financing 
decision, that is, its selection of debt and equity mix. However, what is implausible 
about their theory is the existence of a ‘frictionless market’. Such a market is only an 
ideal environment and does not exist. Suffice to say that the environment that 
characterises the financial markets is one where the risk of bankruptcy is a reality 
and where firms have to pay corporate taxes. As such, in the absence of a 
frictionless market, the capital structure choices might have an influence on firm 
value and M&M’s propositions will no longer hold. 
M&M (1963: 438) later relaxed the proposition of perfect markets and incorporated 
corporate tax into their models. The rationale for doing so was the realisation that 
debt is tax-deductible and therefore, a firm that utilises debt is bound to enjoy an 
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interest tax shield. As such, as increasingly more debt is used, the market value of 
the firm would increase by the present value of the interest tax shield. However, they 
also caution that notwithstanding the existence of a tax advantage for debt financing, 
it does not necessarily mean that corporations should at all times seek to use the 
maximum possible amount of debt in their capital structures. For one thing, other 
forms of financing, notably retained earnings, may in some circumstances be 
cheaper still when the tax status of investors under personal income tax is taken into 
account (Modigliani & Miller, 1963: 442).     
In the real-word scenario, their propositions hardly hold and have subsequently been 
challenged by several scholars. Subsequent departures have proven that such an 
ideal world does not exist and that there are imperfections such as taxes, costs of 
financial distress and especially regulation in the case of financial institutions (see for 
instance Berger et al., 1995; DeMarzo & Duffie, 1995; Froot & Stein, 1998; Miller, 
1995 and Smith & Stulz, 1985). Among the early scholars, Robichek and Myers 
(1966: 2) argue that, on one hand, in the absence of taxes, the value of the firm will 
not change for moderate amounts of leverage, but will decline with high degrees of 
leverage, and on the other hand, in the presence of taxes an optimal degree of 
leverage will exist. Borch (1969: 1) demonstrates that the earnings of a firm are 
represented by a discrete stochastic process, in which the terms can take negative 
values. As such, earnings can be added to the firm’s working capital, or paid out as 
dividends. If a firm has debt, part of the earnings must be set aside to service the 
debt. As a consequence, a firm is ruined and has to cease its operations if the 
working capital becomes negative. This is contrary to the M&M irrelevance 
proposition. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976: 40) postulate that in their financing decisions, firms 
would aim to minimise agency costs due to the conflict that may exist between 
shareholders and debtholders. They define the parties to this relationship as the 
managers (agent) and the bondholders as well as the shareholders, being the 
principals. Furthermore, they define agency costs as (1) the monitoring expenditures 
by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent and (3) the residual loss. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976: 54) proved that an optimal capital structure can be 
obtained by trading off the agency cost of debt against the benefit of debt. 
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Miller (1977: 262) rebuts the optimal capital structure school of thought by factoring 
in personal income taxes into the M&M irrelevance proposition. He argues that even 
in a world in which interest payments are fully deductible in computing corporate 
income taxes, the value of the firm, in equilibrium, will still be independent of its 
capital structure. The major limitations of Miller’s proposition would seem to be his 
implausible assumptions of the absence of capital gains tax and the risk of 
bankruptcy. Subsequently, Schneller (1980: 127) investigated the impact of taxation 
on the optimal capital structure of the firm when all investors belong to the same tax 
brackets. He demonstrated that, in the presence of capital gains tax and the 
possibility of bankruptcy, for the dividend-paying firm, interior solutions for the capital 
structure decision are possible due to the disparity between the capital gains and 
dividend income tax rates and the possibility of illiquidity. Schneller (1980: 127) 
contends that Miller’s proposition only holds in situations whereby the dividend-
paying firm is always liquid. 
It is trite to highlight that capital structure theory has evolved from the M&M (1958: 
268) capital structure irrelevance proposition. Notwithstanding that they were 
premised on the existence of perfect markets, the propositions have become the 
building blocks upon which capital structure is anchored. However, what has been 
unravelled by empirical studies is that firm value varies with debt-equity mix. The 
questions that remain intriguing and preoccupy the minds of scholars to this day are: 
Is there an optimal capital structure? What firm-specific factors are reliably important 
in determining firm leverage? The following sections consider the main theories of 
capital structure. 
2.2.1  Trade-off theory 
In a world where capital market behaviour departs from the M&M setting, Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973: 911), in their study that would later on become the theoretical 
foundation of the static trade-off theory, found that optimal leverage reflects a trade-
off between the tax benefits of debt and the deadweight costs of bankruptcy. This 
was aptly formalised by Myers (1984: 576) in his static trade-off framework, which 
postulates that firms set a target debt-to-value ratio and gradually move towards it, 
the same way that firms adjust dividends to move towards a target dividend payout 
ratio. In essence, the trade-off theory is a capital structure theory that focuses on the 
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balance between the benefits of an interest tax shield and the costs of issuing debts 
to determine the optimum level of debts that a firm ought to issue to maximise its 
interests (Rasiah & Kim, 2011: 150).  
 
The optimum point of the trade-off can be achieved when the marginal value of 
benefits, including the tax shield from debt financing, just equalises the incremental 
present value of costs associated with issuing more debts. Figure 2.1 summarises 
the static trade-off theory. The horizontal base line expresses M&M’s idea that V, the 
market value of the firm – the aggregate market value of all its outstanding securities 
– should not depend on leverage when assets, earnings and future investment 
opportunities are held constant. However, the tax-deductibility of interest payments 
induces the firm to borrow to the margin where the present value of interest tax 
shields is just offset by the value loss due to agency costs of debt and the possibility 
of financial distress (Myers, 1993: 5). In essence, what is encapsulated in Figure 2.1 
is that an all-equity financing firm will have a constant market value, as compared to 
a firm that is funded out of both equity and debt. A firm that is also financed by debt 
will enjoy debt tax shield benefits up to an optimum point where the present value of 
interest tax shields equates to the present value of financial distress (bankruptcy 
costs). Beyond this point it will no longer be optimum for the firm to finance its 
operations out of more debts, as it will risk choking from interest payments and, 
worst, risks going bankrupt. 
The static trade-off theory is premised on firms choosing a financial policy that 
predicates upon comparing the costs and benefits of debt that are derived from the 
optimal capital structure, such as the tax advantage of debt, the alleviation of free 
cash flow agency costs, the costs of financial distress as well as the agency costs of 
stakeholders (Rasiah & Kim, 2011: 153). In essence, the static trade-off theory 
determines an optimal capital structure by adding various imperfections, including 
taxes, costs of financial distress and agency costs, but retains the assumptions of 
market efficiency and symmetric information (Baker & Wurgler, 2002: 25). This view 
is also buttressed by Carpentier (2006: 5), who contends that the static trade-off 
theory maintains that ﬁrms select an optimal capital structure by trading off the 
advantages of debt ﬁnancing against its cost. The optimum debt level maximises ﬁrm 
value and should become a target debt level. 
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Figure 2.1: The static trade-off theory of capital structure 
Source: Myers (1993: 5) 
According to Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008: 64), the trade-off theory implies 
that a major borrowing incentive is the tax advantage of interest payment. To the 
contrary, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980: 4) postulate that tax deductions for 
depreciation and investment tax credits can be considered as substitutes for the tax 
benefits of debt financing. These features can lead to market equilibrium, where 
each firm has an interior optimal leverage. Accordingly, firms with higher amounts of 
non-debt tax shields will have lower debt levels. Therefore, a firm’s motivation to 
borrow declines with an increase in non-debt tax shields. The other limitation of the 
static trade-off was aptly put by Myers (2001: 89), who observes as follows:  
[T]he trade-off theory is in immediate trouble on the tax front, because it 
seems to rule out conservative debt ratios by tax paying firms. If the theory is 
right, a value-maximising firm should never pass up interest shields when the 
probability of financial distress is remotely low. Yet there are many 
established profitable companies with superior credit ratings operating for 
years at low debt ratios … 
The dynamic trade-off theory developed as a corollary to the static trade-off theory. 
Its proponents aver that the capital structure decision is a continuous one and that 
different firms allow the actual leverage ratio to deviate from the target ratio by 
different amounts (Fischer, Heinkel & Zechner, 1989). Put more formally, Fischer et 
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al. (1989: 33) hypothesise that firms that allow wide swings in their debt ratios, for 
instance firms with large debt ratio ranges, have a low effective corporate tax rate, a 
high variance of underlying asset value, a small asset base (for instance small firms) 
and low bankruptcy costs. Dangl and Zechner (2004) and Frank and Goyal (2009), 
among other scholars, provide empirical support for the dynamic trade-off theory.  
The dynamic version of the trade-off theory implies that ﬁrms passively accumulate 
earnings and losses, letting their debt ratios deviate from the target as long as the 
costs of adjusting the debt ratio exceed the costs of having a suboptimal capital 
structure (Hovakimian, Hovakimian & Tehranian, 2004: 523). Firms wait to adjust 
their leverage until the costs of debt recapitalisation are offset by the benefits, either 
an increased tax advantage or decreased expected bankruptcy cost, depending on 
whether the firm decides to increase or decrease leverage (Leary & Roberts, 2005: 
2577). The size and frequency of the recapitalisation depend, in large part, upon the 
structure of the adjustment cost function. Barclay and Smith (2005: 15) corroborate 
this view and assert that even if managers set target leverage ratios, unexpected 
increases or shortfalls in proﬁtability, along with occasional attempts to exploit 
ﬁnancing ‘windows of opportunity’, can cause companies to deviate from their 
targets. In such cases there will be what amounts to an optimal deviation from those 
targets – one that depends on the transaction costs associated with adjusting back 
to the target relative to the (opportunity) costs of deviating from the target. What is 
instructive is that firms will continuously rebalance their capital structures to their 
target ranges as long as the costs of adjustments do not deter them from doing so. 
In contrast to the static trade-off strategy, a dynamic capital structure strategy initially 
uses much less debt (Dangl & Zechner, 2004: 12). These authors further propound 
that a dynamic recapitalisation strategy anticipates the fact that debt will be 
increased if the ﬁrm value increases by a sufﬁcient amount. Hovakimian et al. (2004: 
523) contend that ﬁrms that were highly proﬁtable in the past are likely to be 
underleveraged, while ﬁrms that experienced losses are likely to be overleveraged. 
Furthermore, this implies that proﬁtability will be negatively related to observed debt 
ratios in samples dominated by ﬁrms that do not issue, but will have a positive effect 
on the probability of debt versus equity issuance.  
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The major predictions of the trade-off theories can be enumerated as follows: Firstly, 
in the absence of adjustment costs, the dynamic trade-off theory predicts that firms 
continuously adjust their capital structures to maintain the value-maximising leverage 
ratio (Leary & Roberts, 2005: 2576). In essence, this means that firms have an 
optimal capital structure and will gravitate towards this target capital structure.  
 
Secondly, on one hand, the static trade-off theory predicts firm leverage to be 
positively associated with profitability (Leary & Roberts, 2005; Myers, 2001; Rasiah & 
Kim, 2011) and on the other hand, the dynamic trade-off theory predicts an inverse 
relationship (Frank & Goyal, 2009; Hovakimian et al., 2004; Lemma & Negash, 2014; 
Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999). 
Thirdly, the static trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage 
and asset tangibility. This is confirmed by Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984: 874), Harris 
and Raviv (1991: 323), Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1455) and Frank and Goyal 
(2009: 3). The reasoning is that firms with tangible fixed assets are able to offer 
collateral for debt.  
Fourthly, a negative association between leverage and growth is to be expected. 
According to the static trade-off theory, the cost of financial distress increases with 
expected growth, forcing managers to reduce the debt in their capital structure 
(Antoniou et al., 2008: 62). Empirical support of this notion is found from Hovakimian, 
Opler and Titman (2001: 22) and Barclay and Smith (2005: 14), among other 
scholars.  
Fifthly, the static trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage 
and the effective tax rate. As such, firms with a higher taxable income should borrow 
more debt to take advantage of the interest tax shield (Rasiah & Kim, 2011: 157). 
This prediction is corroborated by Fischer et al. (1989: 33) and Graham (1996: 41). 
Sixthly, the static trade-off theory predicts a positive association between leverage 
and firm size. According to Frank and Goyal (2009: 7), large, more diversified firms 
face lower default risk. In addition, older firms with better reputations in debt markets 
face lower debt-related agency costs. It is generally accepted that firm size is an 
inverse proxy of the probability of bankruptcy and, hence, larger firms have higher 
debt capacity and may borrow more to maximise their tax benefits (Antoniou et al., 
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2008: 64). Due to lower information asymmetry, larger firms are likely to have easier 
access to debt markets, and able to borrow at lower cost. As such, the trade-off 
theory predicts larger, more mature firms to have relatively more debt. This 
prediction is corroborated by the findings of Antoniou et al. (2008: 80), Frank and 
Goyal (2009: 26), Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011: 334), Lim (2012: 197) and Lemma 
and Negash (2014: 81), among other scholars. 
Lastly, the trade-off theory predicts a negative association between leverage and 
non-debt tax shield. Non-debt tax shields include investment tax credits and 
depreciation. According to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980: 4), tax deductions for 
depreciation and investment tax credits can be considered as substitutes for the tax 
benefits of debt financing. As such, firms with higher amounts of non-debt tax shields 
will have lower debt levels. Therefore, a firm’s motivation to borrow declines with an 
increase in non-debt tax shields (Antoniou et al., 2008: 64). 
In evaluating the trade-off theory on the basis of the empirical studies conducted, it 
would seem that, overall, it is plausible in explaining the financing behaviour of firms. 
Its predictions relating to the relationship between leverage and asset tangibility or 
leverage and growth are highly supported by empirical studies. On the contrary, its 
prediction regarding the relationship between leverage and profitability seems to be 
anomalous to the financing behaviour of firms. 
2.2.2  Pecking order theory 
The pecking order theory of capital structure was proposed by Myers and Majluf 
(1984: 219), who reason that it is generally better to issue safe securities than risky 
ones. Firms should go to bond markets for external capital, but raise equity by 
retention if possible. That is, external financing using debt is better than financing by 
equity. This view is also espoused by Myers (1984: 581), who proffers that there is a 
pecking order in which firms arrange their financing. Therefore, a firm would prefer 
internal to external financing and debt to equity if it has the capacity to issue the 
securities. In essence, in this pecking order model, a financial hierarchy descends 
from internal funds, to debt, to external equity (Chirinko & Singha, 2000: 418). Put in 
other words, managers will tend to have the priority to fund projects by using 
retained earnings, and issue debts when the retained earnings are exhausted, and 
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lastly will only turn to the issuance of equity when it is not sensible to issue any more 
debts (Rasiah & Kim, 2011: 151).  
Within a pecking order framework, the firm has no well-defined target debt-to-equity 
ratio (Myers, 1984: 576). This theory implies that corporate managers making 
financing decisions are not really thinking about a long-run target debt-to-equity ratio. 
Instead, they take the path of least resistance and choose what at the time appears 
to be the lowest-cost ﬁnancing vehicle – generally debt – with little thought to the 
future consequences of these choices (Barclay & Smith, 2005: 8). 
The pecking order theory is classified as an information cost theory. Implicit in the 
pecking order theory is information asymmetry. Information asymmetry arises as a 
result of managers (insiders) having more information than investors (outsiders), 
which they use to their advantage. Information asymmetry epitomises itself as the 
likelihood that a firm’s managers know more about the firm’s financial condition and 
future growth opportunities than do outside investors (Rasiah & Kim, 2011: 153). The 
pecking order theory is based on a difference of information between corporate 
insiders and the market. The driving force is adverse selection (Frank & Goyal, 2003: 
237). The implication of the pecking order theory is that there is no optimal capital 
structure (Baker & Wurgler, 2002: 26; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999: 220). 
Nonetheless, if there is an optimum, the cost of deviating from it is insignificant in 
comparison to the cost of raising external finance. Raising external finance is costly, 
because managers have more information about the firm’s prospects than outside 
investors, and because investors know this. 
The discussion now turns to the main predictions of the pecking order theory. Firstly, 
the pecking order theory predicts a negative relationship between leverage and 
profitability (Antoniou et al., 2008: 67; Baker & Wurgler, 2002: 7; Myers, 2001: 93). 
Intuitively, firms that are profitable are more inclined to tap into retained earnings to 
fund their investment requirements than to seek recourse to debt markets. This 
prediction is consistent with the findings of Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2001: 117), Antoniou et al. (2008: 73), Ahmad and Abbas (2011: 211), 
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011: 334), Bartoloni (2013: 114) and Elsas, Flannery and 
Garfinkel (2014: 4), among other scholars. 
24 
 
Secondly, the pecking order theory predicts that firm leverage is negatively related to 
asset tangibility. The rationale behind this prediction is aptly explained by Frank and 
Goyal (2009: 9), who observed that there is low information asymmetry associated 
with tangible assets, which makes equity issuances less costly. Therefore, leverage 
ratios should be lower for firms with higher tangibility. Empirical support for this 
prediction is provided by Ahmad and Abbas (2011: 211), Al-Najjar and Hussainey 
(2011: 334) and Ahmed and Shabbir (2014: 172). 
Thirdly, the pecking order theory predicts that firm leverage is positively related to 
growth. The pecking order theory implies that firms with more investments, holding 
profitability fixed, should accumulate more debt over time (Frank & Goyal, 2009: 8). 
This prediction is consistent with the evidence of Ahmed, Ahmed and Ahmed (2010: 
10). 
Fourthly, the pecking order theory predicts that firm leverage is inversely related to 
the size of the firm. According to Frank and Goyal (2009: 8), the pecking order theory 
is usually interpreted as predicting an inverse relation between leverage and firm 
size. This is due to the fact that large firms are less subject to manager–investor 
information asymmetry and therefore borrow at a lower cost (Rasiah & Kim, 2011: 
157). 
To sum up: The pecking order theory is one of the most plausible information 
asymmetry theories that have been put forth to explain the financing decisions of 
firms. The pecking order theory derives much of its inﬂuence from a view that it ﬁts 
naturally with a number of facts about how companies use external ﬁnance (Frank & 
Goyal, 2003: 218). There is strong empirical support for its predictions relating to 
profitability and asset tangibility. However, its prediction relating to size and growth is 
moderately supported. Moreover, it seems that its predictions become more robust 
for large firms. It could be conjectured that the pecking order theory complements 
rather than outperforms the static trade-off theory.  
2.2.3  Signalling theory 
The signalling theory is another strand of the information asymmetry theories, of 
which the origins can be traced to the work of Ross (1977). He posits that if 
managers possess inside information, then the choice of a managerial incentive 
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schedule and of a financial structure signals information to the market, and in 
competitive equilibrium the inferences drawn from the signals will be validated (Ross, 
1977: 23). He maintains that the one empirical implication of the theory is that in a 
cross-section, the values of firms will rise with leverage, as increasing leverage 
increases the market’s perception of value. A signal is an action taken by a firm’s 
management that provides clues to investors about how management views the 
firm’s prospects (Besley, Brigham & Sibindi, 2015: 268). Therefore, managers, in 
exercising their choice of capital structure, will send out a signal to the market. For 
instance, if managers believe that their firms have favourable prospects and are 
undervalued, they will try to avoid selling shares and issue debt instead. This will 
avoid the dilution of ownership and the share of the ‘spoils’ with new shareholders. 
To the contrary, if managers believe that their firms are overvalued and prospects 
are bleak, they will issue shares rather than issue debt. This would mean bringing in 
new investors to share the losses. 
According to Barclay and Smith (2005: 11), the signalling model assumes that 
corporate ﬁnancing decisions are designed primarily to communicate managers’ 
conﬁdence in the ﬁrm’s prospects and, in cases where management thinks the ﬁrm 
is undervalued, to increase the value of shares. With better information about their 
companies than outside investors, managers who think their ﬁrms are undervalued 
might attempt to raise their share prices simply by communicating this information to 
the market. Barclay and Smith (2005) further contend that as management is often 
reluctant to issue forecasts or release strategic information, and the mere 
announcement that their firm is undervalued generally is not enough, the challenge 
for managers therefore is to ﬁnd a credible signalling mechanism.  
There are various ways with which management can send signals to the market. 
Firstly, increasing leverage has been suggested as one such potentially effective 
signalling device (Barclay & Smith, 2005: 12). The rationale behind this is explicable 
as follows: Debt obligates the ﬁrm to make a ﬁxed set of cash payments over the 
term of the debt security; if these payments are missed, there are potentially serious 
consequences, including bankruptcy. Further, Barclay and Smith (2005) observe that 
equity is more forgiving. Although stockholders also typically expect cash payouts, 
managers have more discretion over these payments and can reduce or omit them 
in times of ﬁnancial distress. For this reason, adding more debt to the firm’s capital 
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structure can serve as a credible signal of higher expected future cash ﬂows. 
Increases in the debt ratio also signal quality and that lenders are prepared to lend 
(Antoniou et al., 2008: 62). Because lower-quality firms have higher marginal 
expected bankruptcy costs for any debt level, managers of low-quality firms do not 
imitate higher-quality firms by issuing more debt (Harris & Raviv, 1991: 311). 
Secondly, managers can send a signal to the market by dint of their dividend policy. 
According to Antoniou et al. (2008: 64), increased dividends signal increased future 
earnings, upon which the firm’s cost of equity will be lower, favouring equity to debt. 
Further, dividend payments signal a firm’s future performance, and therefore high 
dividend-paying firms benefit from a lower equity cost of capital. Myers and Majluf 
(1984: 220) contend that a firm should not pay a dividend if it has to recoup the cash 
by selling stock or some other risky security. Therefore, dividends could help convey 
managers’ superior information to the market. However, Miller (1995: 484) suggests 
that the dividend-cutting route to boost equity capital instead of issuing shares might 
also send the wrong signal to the market, resulting in the fall of the firm’s share price. 
Antoniou et al. (2008: 59) are among the scholars who found evidence in support of 
the signalling theory. They investigated how firms operating in capital market-
oriented economies (the UK and the USA) and bank-oriented economies (France, 
Germany and Japan) determine their capital structure by using panel data and a two-
step system generalised method of moments (syst-GMM) procedure. They report an 
inverse relation between leverage and dividends in the USA, which supports the 
view that dividend payments signal a firm’s future performance, and therefore high 
dividend-paying firms benefit from a lower equity cost of capital. 
The inherent limitation of the signalling theory is that it suggests that managers’ 
private information about the firm’s prospects plays an important role in both their 
ﬁnancing choices and how the market responds to such choices. However, as it is 
difﬁcult to identify when managers have such proprietary information, it is not easy to 
test this proposition (Barclay & Smith, 2005: 9). 
2.2.4  Market timing theory 
The marketing timing theory is an information asymmetry theory that developed as a 
corollary to the signalling theory and was proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2002). 
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They postulate that capital structure evolves as the cumulative outcome of past 
attempts to time the equity market. In other words, managers only discern between 
issuing equity and debt as a result of market conditions. On the one hand, if the 
conditions are favourable for the issuance of equity over debt, they will float shares, 
and on the other hand, if the conditions favour the debt market, they will borrow to 
meet the funding requirements of the firm. Baker and Wurgler (2002: 4) contend that 
there are two scenarios of market timing. In the first instance, firms tend to announce 
equity issues following the release of information, which may reduce information 
asymmetry. The second instance involves irrational investors or managers and time-
varying mispricing or perceptions of mispricing. Managers issue equity when they 
believe its cost is irrationally low and repurchase equity when they believe its cost is 
irrationally high. When investors are overly bullish, managers issue shares, and 
relatively bearish investors lead managers to issue debt (Elsas et al., 2014: 2). 
Therefore, a firm’s leverage at any point in time therefore reflects the correlation 
between historical security mispricing and new investment opportunities. 
Barclay and Smith (2005: 11) buttressed the phenomenon of market timing and 
observed that if management has favourable information that is not yet reﬂected in 
market prices, the release of such information will cause a larger increase in stock 
than in bond prices, and so the current stock price will appear more undervalued to 
managers than current bond prices. As such, to avoid diluting the value of existing 
shareholder claims, companies that have proﬁtable uses for more capital but believe 
their shares to be undervalued will generally choose to issue debt rather than equity. 
Conversely, managers who think their companies are overvalued are more likely to 
issue equity. What stands out is that the market timing hypothesis asserts that 
managers routinely exploit information asymmetries to beneﬁt current shareholders 
(Flannery & Rangan, 2006: 470). 
The major predictions of the market timing theory of capital structure are now 
discussed. Firstly, firms that time the market have no optimal capital structure. This 
view is posited by Baker and Wurgler (2002: 29), who observed that there is no 
optimal capital structure, so market timing financing decisions simply accumulates 
over time into the capital structure outcome. There is no reversion to a target capital 
ratio if market timing is the dominant inﬂuence on ﬁrm leverage (Flannery & Rangan, 
2006: 470). Secondly, the market timing theory suggests a positive relation between 
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leverage ratio and the market equity premium (Antoniou et al., 2008: 65). Therefore, 
if a firm requires external capital at the time of a high market equity premium, 
managers are likely to opt for debt. Thirdly, the market timing theory suggests a 
negative relationship between firm leverage and the market-to-book asset ratio. 
Managers tend to issue shares when the ﬁrm’s market-to-book ratio is high (Flannery 
& Rangan, 2006: 470). 
The market timing theory seems to be a plausible firm financing theory from the 
perspective that it pays regard to the dynamic state of financial markets. Among 
other scholars, Hovakimian et al. (2004: 520), Leary and Roberts (2005: 29), 
Flannery and Rangan (2006: 471) and Elsas et al. (2014: 29) lend empirical support 
to this theory. Frank and Goyal (2009: 27), however, point out that its limitation is 
that by itself, market timing does not make any predictions for many of the patterns 
in the data that are accounted for by the trade-off theory.  
2.2.5  Agency cost theory 
The agency cost theory was advanced by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They reason 
that an agency conflict between the owner-manager and outside shareholders 
derives from the manager’s tendency to appropriate perquisites out of the firm’s 
resources for his/her own consumption (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 313). As such, 
agency costs are borne by a firm to align the interests of the agents (managers) to 
those of their principals (shareholders). They contend that these agency costs are 
the sum of the monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by 
the agent and the residual loss. Agency costs represent important problems in 
corporate governance in both financial and non-financial industries. The separation 
of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managers 
exerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs 
that suit their own preferences, or otherwise failing to maximise firm value (Berger & 
Di Patti, 2006: 1066).  
In essence, managers do not always behave in the best interests of their investors 
and therefore need to be disciplined. Debt serves as a disciplining device because 
default allows creditors the option to force the firm into liquidation. Moreover, debt 
also generates information that can be used by investors to evaluate major operating 
decisions, including liquidation (Harris & Raviv, 1990: 321). Jensen and Meckling 
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(1976: 343) argue that notwithstanding the absence of tax benefits, debt would be 
utilised if the ability to exploit potentially profitable investment opportunities is limited 
by the resources of the owner. If the owners of a project cannot raise capital, they 
will suffer an opportunity loss, represented by the increment in value offered to them 
by the additional investment opportunities. Therefore, even though they will bear the 
agency costs from selling debt, they will find it desirable to incur them to obtain 
additional capital as long as the marginal wealth increments from the new 
investments projects outweigh the marginal agency costs of debt. The agency cost 
hypothesis argues that shortening the effective maturity of debt can mitigate conﬂicts 
of interest (Jun & Jen, 2003: 6). They reason that using shorter-term debt forces 
managers to periodically generate information for investors to evaluate return and 
risk of major operating decisions. Investors will therefore reprice the debt upon 
maturity based on new information. This approach mitigates asset substitution and 
underinvestment problems. 
Conflict also manifests itself between debtholders and equityholders. As such, 
agency costs can be triggered by the conflicts between debt and equity investors 
(Myers, 2001: 96). Harris and Raviv (1991: 301) contend that conflicts between 
debtholders and equityholders arise because the debt contract gives equityholders 
an incentive to invest suboptimally. Further, they argue that the cost of the incentive 
to invest in value-decreasing projects created by debt is borne by the equityholders 
who issue the debt. This phenomenon is referred to as the ‘asset substitution effect’ 
and is an agency cost of debt financing.  
The agency costs theory of capital structure states that an optimal capital structure 
will be determined by minimising the costs arising from conflicts between the parties 
involved (Rasiah & Kim, 2011: 151). Under the agency costs hypothesis, high 
leverage or a low equity-asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity and 
increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the 
interests of shareholders (Berger & Di Patti, 2006: 1066). Therefore, greater financial 
leverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of 
liquidation. According to Baker and Wurgler (2002: 25), agency problems can call for 
more or less debt. On the one hand, too much equity can lead to free cash flow and 
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, and on the other hand, too 
much debt can lead to asset substitution and conflicts of interest between managers 
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and bondholders. Notwithstanding that the use of debt controls the agency costs of 
managerial discretion, it also generates its own agency costs (Booth et al., 2001: 
100). A highly debt-financed firm might forgo good investment opportunities due to 
the debt overhang problem.  
The main predictions of the agency cost theory are now discussed. Firstly, the 
agency cost theory predicts an optimal capital structure. An optimal capital structure 
can be obtained by trading of the agency cost of debt against the benefit of debt 
(Harris & Raviv, 1991: 301). Secondly, the agency cost theory predicts that leverage 
is positively related to profitability. More proﬁtable ﬁrms tend to use more debt due to 
the disciplining role that debt has on managers (Teixeira, Silva, Fernandes & Alves, 
2014: 37). Thirdly, the theory predicts that leverage is positively associated with 
efficiency. In other words, the agency costs hypothesis predicts that an increase in 
leverage raises efficiency (Berger & Di Patti, 2006: 1074). 
The agency cost theory, although theoretical plausible, has posed considerable 
challenges to test empirically. The absence of clear-cut evidence could be partly 
explained by the intrinsic difficulty in defining a measure of performance that is close 
to the theoretical definition of agency costs (Berger & Di Patti, 2006: 1067). There 
are, for instance, numerous metrics that can be used to measure firm efficiency. As 
such, analysing the relationship between leverage and efficiency becomes a hit-and-
miss affair. It is trite to highlight that the agency cost theory is more applicable to 
mature firms and hence falls short when it comes to explaining the financing 
behaviour of small firms. Therefore, the empirical support for this theory is mixed. 
Among the scholars who found evidence in support of the agency cost theory are 
Jun and Jen (2003) and De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015). To the contrary, Al-Najjar 
and Hussainey (2011) did not find evidence to support this theory. 
2.2.6  Free cash flow theory 
Jensen (1986) takes the argument about agency costs further by advancing the free 
cash flow theory of debt. He premises this on the ‘control hypothesis’ notion – that 
debt can be beneficial in motivating managers and their organisations to be efficient. 
Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have 
positive net present values (NPVs) when discounted at the relevant cost of capital. 
Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over payout policies are 
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especially severe when the organisation generates substantial free cash flow 
(Jensen, 1986: 323). According to Rasiah and Kim (2011: 152), corporate managers 
have the incentive to misuse free cash flow on perquisites and bad investment. Debt 
financing confines the free cash flow available to managers and thereby means to 
control these firms’ difficulties. Therefore, debt can be utilised in reducing agency 
costs of free cash flows. The threat caused by failure to make debt service payments 
serves as an effective motivating force to make such organisations more efficient 
(Jensen, 1986: 324).  
Barclay and Smith (2005: 10) aver that the natural inclination of corporate managers 
is to use excess cash to sustain growth at the expense of proﬁtability, either by 
overinvesting in their core businesses or, perhaps worse, by diversifying through 
acquisition into unfamiliar ones. In addition, unless management ﬁnds another way 
to assure investors that it will resist this tendency, companies that aim to maximise 
ﬁrm value should distribute their free cash ﬂow to investors. According to Antoniou et 
al. (2008: 62), increases in the debt ratio also signal quality and that lenders are 
prepared to lend. However, Jensen (1986: 324) cautions that increased leverage 
also comes at a cost. As leverage increases, the usual agency costs of debt rise, 
including bankruptcy costs. The optimal debt-equity ratio is the point at which firm 
value is maximised; the point where the marginal costs of debt just offset the 
marginal benefit. 
The major predictions of the free cash flow theory are the following: Firstly, the free 
cash flow theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage and profitability. In 
other words, profitable firms are likely to utilise more and more debt in their 
financing. Secondly, the theory predicts is that it reveals which mergers and 
takeovers are more likely to destroy, rather than create, value; it shows how 
takeovers are both evidence of the conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
managers and a solution to the problem (Jensen, 1986: 328). Acquisitions are one 
way managers spend cash instead of paying it out to shareholders. Therefore, the 
theory implies that managers of firms with unused borrowing power and large free 
cash flows are more likely to undertake low-benefit or even value-destroying 
mergers. 
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2.2.7  Contracting costs theory 
The contracting cost theory was advanced by Myers (1977: 147). He reasoned that a 
firm with risky debt outstanding, and which acts in its shareholders’ interest, will 
follow a different decision rule than one that can issue risk-free debt or issues no 
debt at all (Myers, 1977: 149). He proffers that the firm financed with risky debt will, 
in some states of nature, pass up valuable investment opportunities – opportunities 
that could make a positive net contribution to the market value of the firm. Issuing 
risky debt reduces the present market value of the firm by inducing a future strategy 
that is suboptimal. The loss in market value is absorbed by the firm’s current 
shareholders. Therefore, in the absence of taxes, the optimal strategy is to issue no 
risky debt. If there is a tax advantage to corporate borrowing, the optimal strategy 
involves a trade-off between the tax advantages of debt and the costs of the 
suboptimal future investment strategy. Therefore, the suboptimal investment policy is 
an agency cost induced by risky debt.  
Implicit in Myers’s (1977) hypothesis is the underinvestment problem. At worst, this 
agency cost is borne by firms whereby their managers pass on positive NPV projects 
as a consequence of being highly geared. The antithesis to this problem is that of 
overinvestment. This was aptly expressed by Barclay and Smith (2005: 10), who 
observed that if too much debt can lead to underinvestment (and more demanding 
stakeholders), too little can lead to overinvestment. 
According to Barclay and Smith (2005: 12), the contracting cost hypothesis predicts 
that the greater the growth opportunities (relative to the size of the firm), the greater 
the potential underinvestment problem associated with debt ﬁnancing and hence the 
lower the firm’s leverage ratio. Conversely, the more limited a firm’s growth 
opportunities, the greater the potential overinvestment problem and therefore the 
higher the firm’s leverage. 
According to Barclay, Smith and Watts (1997: 5), to attenuate the problem of 
underinvestment, firms can make use of short-term debt with a view to rolling it 
forward or issue no debt. To the contrary, to mitigate the problem of overinvestment, 
firms can pay higher dividends or offer share repurchases to their shareholders as a 
way of dealing with the free cash flow problem. Barkley et al. (1997) observed that 
the natural inclination of many corporate managers is to use such free cash flow to 
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sustain growth at the expense of profitability through their misguided efforts to gain 
market share in mature businesses, or perhaps worse, through diversifying 
acquisitions. They suggest that to maximise firm value, such managers must 
distribute corporate free cash flow to investors. This can be done by paying higher 
dividends or by major substitutions of debt for equity, for instance in the form of 
leveraged share repurchases. 
Empirical support for the contracting cost theory is found from Barclay et al. (1997: 
12) and Barclay and Smith (2005: 14), among other scholars. Using an entire sample 
of 6 700 industrial companies in the USA available on the Compustat database over 
a 30-year period, Barclay et al. (1997: 12) found that the most important systematic 
determinant of a firm’s leverage ratio and dividend yield would appear to be the 
extent of its investment opportunities. Companies whose value consisted largely of 
intangible growth options had significantly lower leverage ratios and dividend yields, 
on average, than companies whose value was represented primarily by tangible 
assets. They reason that this pattern of financing and dividend choices can be 
explained by the fact that on the one hand, for high-growth firms, the 
underinvestment problem associated with heavy debt financing and the flotation 
costs of high dividends make both policies potentially very costly. However, on the 
other hand, for mature firms with limited growth opportunities, high leverage and 
dividends can have substantial benefits in controlling the free cash flow problem 
(Barclay et al., 1997: 12). To the contrary, Graham and Harvey (2001: 236) did not 
find empirical support for the contracting costs theory. 
 
2.2.8  A synopsis of the main theories of capital structure 
A primer of the literature tracing the origins of the major capital structure theories as 
well as evidence in support of and against the theories is presented in Table 2.1. The 
next section offers a consideration of the firm-level factors that determine the choice 
of capital structures.
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Table 2.1: A synopsis of the main theories of capital structure 
Theory Origins of the theory Evidence in support of theory Evidence against theory 
Trade-off 
theory 
Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1973: 911); formalised 
by Myers (1984: 576) 
Fischer et al. (1989: 33); Graham (1996: 41); 
Dangl and Zechner (2004); Antoniou et al. (2008: 80); 
Frank and Goyal (2009: 26); Babatunde (2016: 79) 
 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980: 
4); Fama and French (1998: 
841) 
Pecking 
order theory 
Myers and Majluf 
(1984: 219)   
Booth et al. (2001: 117); Graham and Harvey (2001: 
234); Antoniou et al. (2008: 73); Ahmad and Abbas 
(2011: 211); Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011: 334); 
Bartoloni (2013: 114); Lim (2016: 9); Singh (2016:1650); 
Prędkiewicz and Prędkiewicz (2017:631) 
Helwege and Liang (1996: 
431); Frank and Goyal (2003: 
241) 
Signalling 
theory 
Ross (1977: 23) Harris and Raviv (1991: 311); Welch (1996: 267);  
Antoniou et al. (2008: 59) 
 
Norton (1991: 173); Barclay 
and Smith (1995: 609); 
Barclay et al. (1997: 11); 
Barclay and Smith (2005: 15) 
Market timing 
theory 
Baker and Wurgler 
(2002: 4) 
Hovakimian et al. (2004: 520); Barclay and Smith (2005: 
14); Leary and Roberts (2005: 29); Flannery and Rangan 
(2006: 471); Elsas et al. (2014: 29) 
Hovakimian (2006: 222); 
Frank and Goyal (2009: 27) 
Agency costs 
theory 
Jensen and Meckling 
(1976: 313) 
Jun and Jen (2003); De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) Norton (1991: 173); Graham 
and Harvey (2001: 235) 
Free cash 
flow theory 
Jensen (1986: 323) Opler and Titman (1993: 1996); Agrawal and Jayaraman 
(1994: 140); Barclay et al. (1997: 12); Carroll and Grifith 
(2001: 152); Zhang, Cao, Dickinson and Kutan (2016: 
116) 
 
Howe, He and Kao (1992: 
1965); Graham and Harvey 
(2001: 236) 
Contracting 
cost theory 
Myers (1977: 147) Barclay et al. (1997: 12); Barclay and Smith (2005: 12) 
 
 
Graham and Harvey (2001: 
236) 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
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2.3  THE FIRM-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
There are reliably important firm-level determinants that usually turn up in extant 
literature and have a demonstrable effect on the capital structure choices of firms. In 
this section these firm-level determinants are discussed with a view to providing insight 
into what the major theories of capital structure predict about them.  
2.3.1  Size 
It is expected that as firms grow, they become more profitable and also accumulate 
more tangible assets along their growth trajectory (Sibindi, 2016:228). As a 
consequence thereof, it would seem as though such firms will have a considerable 
amount of free cash flows. The a priori expectation from a pecking order theory 
perspective is that as firms grow, they generate more profits and hence can make use 
of internally generated resources as opposed to seeking recourse from the debt market. 
As such, large firms are expected to be lowly geared as opposed to small firms. 
Contrary to this prediction by the pecking order theory, the expectation from both the 
trade-off and market timing models is that large firms should be highly leveraged as 
compared to small firms by reason of the ensuing debt interest tax shields they stand to 
enjoy. Moreover, the dictate of the free cash flow theory is that the use of debt will 
mitigate the agency costs brought about by the abundance of free cash flows in large 
firms. In addition, firm size is arguably an inverse proxy of the probability of bankruptcy 
(Antoniou et al., 2008:64; Frank & Goyal, 2009: 8; Rajan & Zingales, 1995: 1456). As 
such, due to lower information asymmetry, larger firms are likely to have easier access 
to debt markets and hence are able to borrow at lower cost. 
In sync with the foregoing, the empirical evidence is mixed. Notwithstanding, by and 
large the scale tilts in favour of the positive association between leverage and firm size 
prediction. The empirical evidence to support the positive leverage-firm size nexus 
prediction can be found in the studies by Antoniou et al. (2008: 73), Ahmed et al. (2010: 
9), Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011: 334), Lim (2012: 197), Bartoloni (2013: 142) and 
Lemma and Negash (2014 :81), among other scholars. 
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To the contrary, Titman and Wessels (1988: 6) lend support to the inverse leverage-firm 
size relationship. They contend that the cost of issuing debt and equity securities is also 
related to firm size. In particular, small firms pay much more than large firms to issue 
new equity and also somewhat more to issue long-term debt. This suggests that small 
firms may be more leveraged than large firms and may prefer to borrow short-term 
(through bank loans) rather than issue long-term debt because of the lower fixed costs 
associated with this alternative. 
However, Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1451) aptly observed that the effect of size on 
equilibrium leverage is more ambiguous. Larger firms tend to be more diversified and 
fail less often, so size (computed as the logarithm of net sales) may be an inverse proxy 
for the probability of bankruptcy. If so, size should have a positive impact on the supply 
of debt. However, size may also be a proxy for the information outside investors have, 
which should increase their preference for equity relative to debt. This aberrant 
behaviour of firms is evidenced in Faulkender and Petersen (2006: 58). They argue that 
larger firms are less risky and more diversified, and therefore the probability of distress 
and the expected costs of financial distress are lower. They may also have lower issue 
costs (owing to economies of scale), which would suggest that they have higher 
leverage. However, in their study Faulkender and Petersen (2006) found that larger 
firms are less leveraged, and that the magnitude of this effect is not small. 
To summarise the empirical evidence, it would seem that large firms are more inclined 
to issue debt as opposed to small firms. Notwithstanding this prediction, it could be 
conjectured that capital structure decisions are not cast in stone. As such, the 
aberration in the behaviour of large firms in crafting their financing policy can be 
explicable in terms of the abundance of capital structure choices with which they find 
themselves.  
2.3.2  Asset tangibility 
As companies grow, they accumulate more and more tangible assets. Tangible assets, 
such as property, plant and equipment, are easier for outsiders to value than 
intangibles, such as the value of goodwill from an acquisition, and this lowers expected 
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distress costs (Frank & Goyal, 2009: 9). Further, according to Rajan and Zingales 
(1995: 1451), if a large fraction of a firm’s assets is tangible, assets should serve as 
collateral, diminishing the risk of the lender suffering the agency costs of debt (such as 
risk shifting). Assets should also retain more value in liquidation. Therefore, the greater 
the proportion of tangible assets on the balance sheet (fixed assets divided by total 
assets), the more willing lenders should be to supply loans, and the higher leverage 
should be. In addition, tangibility makes it difficult for shareholders to substitute high-risk 
assets for low-risk ones. The lower expected costs of distress and fewer debt-related 
agency problems predict a positive relation between tangibility and leverage. Moreover, 
these tangible assets can be pledged as collateral when borrowing from financial 
institutions.  
As such, it is expected from a trade-off theory perspective that as companies grow, they 
will borrow more by dint of having more tangible assets to pledge as collateral, in order 
to enjoy the debt interest tax shield. This view is espoused by Antoniou et al. (2008: 63), 
who contend that in the case of bankruptcy, tangible assets are more likely to have a 
market value, while intangible assets will lose their value. Therefore, the risk of lending 
to firms with higher tangible assets is lower and, hence, lenders will demand a lower risk 
premium. Therefore, there is presumed to be a positive relationship between leverage 
and asset tangibility. In addition, Harris and Raviv (1990: 323) contend that firms with 
higher liquidation value, for example those with tangible assets, will have more debt, will 
have a higher-yield debt and will be more likely to default, but will have higher market 
value than similar firms with lower liquidation value, whereas the pecking order theory 
predicts an inverse relationship between firm leverage and asset tangibility. This can be 
attributed to low information asymmetry associated with tangible assets, making equity 
issuances less costly. Therefore, leverage ratios should be lower for firms with higher 
tangibility (Frank & Goyal, 2009: 9). 
On the one hand, the positive firm leverage-asset tangibility prediction finds empirical 
support from Faulkender and Petersen (2006: 57) and Antoniou et al. (2008: 73), 
among other scholars. On the other hand, Bradley et al. (1984: 874), Ahmad and Abbas 
(2011: 208) and Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011: 333) report an inverse relationship 
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between firm leverage and asset tangibility. The dichotomy in the predictions can 
perhaps be explained by the observation that the determination of the capital structure 
of a firm is as a result of the interplay of many factors that are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. 
 
2.3.3  Profitability 
From the pecking order theory vantage point, highly profitable firms are expected to 
employ more and more internal resources to finance the firms at the expense of using 
debt or floating shares. Profitability is associated with the availability of internal funds 
and therefore may be associated with less leverage in terms of the pecking order theory 
(Baker & Wurgler, 2002: 7). Therefore, firm leverage is negatively associated with 
profitability.   
Bartoloni (2013) found evidence to lend credence to the inverse firm leverage-
profitability nexus. He found that more proﬁtable ﬁrms tend to use internal ﬁnance more, 
as implied by the negative relationship linking a ﬁrm’s debt ratio and return on sales. In 
addition, he reasons that the role of a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability in reducing the need for external 
ﬁnance characterises all ﬁrms, regardless of size as measured by employment, 
although large ﬁrms show a lower sensitivity of leverage to proﬁt variations. This 
prediction is also supported by the empirical evidence found by Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1991: 221), Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1457), Booth et al. (2001: 117), 
Hovakimian et al. (2001: 3), Faulkender and Petersen (2006: 57), Utrero-González 
(2007: 22), Antoniou et al. (2008: 67), Frank and Goyal (2009: 26), Ahmed et al. (2010: 
10), Ahmad and Abbas (2011: 209), Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011: 334) and Lemma 
and Negash (2014: 81), among other scholars. 
Contrarily, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between firm leverage 
and profitability. From the trade-off vantage point, highly profitable firms are expected to 
make use of more and more debt in order to benefit from the debt interest tax shield and 
maximise the value of the firm. According to Hovakimian et al. (2004: 523), the positive 
firm leverage-profitability association may arise for a number of reasons. For example, 
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other things being equal, higher proﬁtability implies potentially higher tax savings from 
debt, lower probability of bankruptcy and potentially higher overinvestment, all of which 
imply a higher target debt ratio. This view is buttressed by Myers (2001: 89), who 
asserts that high profitability means that the firm has more taxable income to shield and 
that the firm can service more debt without risking financial distress. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is plausible to conjecture that both predictions of the 
pecking order and trade-off theories are admissible, as they have been supported by 
empirical findings by equal measure. However, it is instructive to posit that the 
predictions complement rather than outwit each other. This was perhaps demonstrable 
in the study by Hovakimian et al. (2004: 534), who suggest that their results on 
proﬁtability could be reﬂecting an interaction of trade-off and pecking order 
considerations. They observed that speciﬁcally, if ﬁrms have target debt ratios but also 
prefer internal funds to external ﬁnancing, the tendency to issue debt when operating 
performance is high, as implied by the target leverage hypothesis, will be tempered by 
the preference for (and availability of) internal ﬁnancing. The tendency to issue equity 
when operating performance is poor will be reinforced by the lack of internal funds, 
forcing the ﬁrm to seek external equity ﬁnancing. 
2.3.4  Growth 
Frank and Goyal (2009: 8) contend that growth increases the costs of financial distress, 
reduces free cash flow problems and exacerbates debt-related agency problems. 
Growing firms place a greater value on stakeholder co-investment. Therefore, the trade-
off theory predicts that growth reduces leverage. Antoniou et al. (2008: 62) posit that a 
negative relation is expected between growth opportunities and leverage for two main 
reasons. Firstly, according to the trade-off theory, the cost of financial distress increases 
with expected growth, forcing managers to reduce the debt in their capital structure. 
Secondly, in the presence of information asymmetries, firms issue equity instead of debt 
when overvaluation leads to higher expected growth. Antoniou et al. (2008) further 
observed, however, that internal resources of growing firms may not be sufficient to 
finance their positive NPV investment opportunities and, hence, they may have to raise 
external capital. In essence, if firms require external finance, they issue debt before 
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equity according to the pecking order theory. Therefore, growth opportunities and 
leverage are positively related in terms of the pecking order theory.  
Empirical support in favour of the negative firm leverage-growth prediction is found in 
the studies by Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1455), Hovakimian et al. (2001: 22), Barclay 
and Smith (2005: 13) and Antoniou et al. (2008: 86), among other studies. However, 
empirical support for the positive firm leverage-growth prediction is found in the studies 
by Ahmed et al. (2010: 10), Ahmad and Abbas (2011: 208) and Al-Najjar and Hussainey 
(2011: 333). 
2.3.5  Debt tax shield 
Taxes and the costs of financial distress were the first major frictions considered in 
determining optimal capital ratios (Berger et al., 1995: 395). Berger et al. (1995) also 
contend that because interest payments are tax-deductible, but dividends are not, 
substituting debt for equity enables firms to pass greater returns to investors by 
reducing payments to the government. The trade-off theory predicts a positive 
relationship between firm leverage and effective tax rate. As such, high tax rates 
increase the interest tax benefits of debt.  
The trade-off theory predicts that to take advantage of higher interest tax shields, firms 
will issue more debt when tax rates are higher (Frank & Goyal, 2009: 9). Debt is 
advantageous for tax reasons. The net tax advantage of debt is the difference between 
the corporate tax advantage of debt (interest is corporate tax-deductible) and the 
personal tax disadvantage of debt (Dangl & Zechner, 2004: 184). 
According to Rasiah and Kim (2011: 154), the most significant reason that prompt firms 
to raise debts are due to the tax shield that results from the tax savings generated by 
making interest payments on debt. They suggest that as a result, by using debt, the 
estimated tax liability of firms could be deducted, thereby increasing their after-tax cash 
flow, causing more lucrative firms to utilise higher levels of debt for the sake of 
increasing their debt tax shield. The firm’s tax shield from debt is the present value of 
tax savings created by paying tax-deductible interest payments on debt instead of 
dividend payments made to shareholders. As such, Faulkender and Petersen (2006: 
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60) argue that firms with higher marginal tax rates prior to the deduction of interest 
expenditures should have higher interest tax shields and therefore more leverage. 
From the pecking order theory vantage point, a negative relationship is expected to 
subsist between firm leverage and the effective tax rate. All things being equal, a higher 
effective tax rate also reduces the internal funds of profitable firms, and subsequently 
increases the cost of capital (Rasiah & Kim, 2011: 157). As a result, an expectation for 
the negative relationship between the effective tax rate and leverage ratio is created 
within the framework of the pecking order model. 
The empirical evidence that lends credence to the positive firm leverage-effective tax 
rate prediction can be found in the study by Booth et al. (2001: 97), among other 
studies. However, Fama and French (1998: 841) did no find evidence that debt has any 
net tax advantage. Notwithstanding, when they included the simulated marginal (pre-
interest income) tax rates, they found a negative and not a positive coefficient. They 
reason that this could be as a result of employing a different proxy for the debt ratio. For 
instance, when they employed an alternative proxy for leverage and made use of the 
long-term debt-to-market value of assets, the coefficient becomes positive. Suffice to 
highlight that the empirical results may not conform to a priori expectations as a result of 
the sensitivity of the regression to the proxy chosen to represent either the debt or the 
tax variables. 
2.3.6  Non-debt tax shield 
The non-debt tax shield prediction is principally a departure from the trade-off theory 
view of firm leverage. It was advanced by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980: 27) based on 
the model advanced by Miller (1977), which incorporated personal income tax as a 
determinant of capital structure. They conjecture that tax deductions for depreciation 
and investment tax credits can be considered as substitutes for the tax benefits of debt 
financing. These features can lead to market equilibrium, where each firm has an 
interior optimal leverage (Antoniou et al., 2008: 64). Therefore, it seems that firm 
leverage is also determined by intangible assets such as depreciation, which substitute 
the benefits derived from debt interest tax shield. 
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The a priori expectation from a trade-off theory premise therefore is that firm leverage is 
inversely associated with non-debt tax shield. Non-debt tax shield proxies – that is, net 
operating loss carried forward, depreciation expense and investment tax credits – 
should be negatively related to leverage (Frank & Goyal, 2009: 9). Accordingly, firms 
with higher amounts of non-debt tax shields will have lower debt levels. Moreover, it 
would seem that higher corporate tax levels tend to favour the use of debt, while non-
debt tax shields such as depreciation deductions can be used as substitutes for debt tax 
advantage and therefore reduce the leverage level of firms (Utrero-González, 2007: 
483). Therefore, a firm’s motivation to borrow declines with an increase in non-debt tax 
shields (Antoniou et al., 2008: 64).  
The empirical results in support of the inverse firm leverage non-debt tax shield 
prediction are somewhat mixed. Empirical support for this prediction is found in the 
studies by Antoniou et al. (2008: 80) and Lim (2012: 198), among other studies. To the 
contrary, according to Barclay and Smith (2005: 15), studies that examine the effect of 
non-debt tax shields (depreciation, tax loss carried forward and investment tax credits) 
on corporate leverage have found that companies with more non-debt tax shields 
appear to have, if anything, more debt in their capital structures. For instance, such 
anomalous behaviour of firms is reported by Bradley et al. (1984: 877). They found 
evidence of a strong direct relation between firm leverage and the relative amount of 
non-debt tax shields. This contradicts the theory that focuses on the substitutability 
between non-debt and debt tax shields. In addition, they reason that a possible 
explanation is that non-debt tax shields are an instrumental variable for the securability 
of the firm’s assets, with more securable assets leading to higher leverage ratios. 
2.3.7  Age 
Age is one of the most important factors that determine the capital structure of firms. 
The age of a firm is intricately linked to other determinants of capital structure as well. 
For instance, on one hand, older firms are expected to be profitable and hence have 
more internal resources at their disposal. The dictate would therefore be to follow the 
financial hierarchy and finance out of retained earnings first. On the other hand, older 
firms are expected to have generated a reputation in the debt market and hence can be 
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evaluated favourably. Notwithstanding the abundance of free cash flow, conventional 
wisdom dictates that older firms seek financing from the debt markets first. Therefore, 
the prediction is that firm leverage is positively related to age. 
Proponents of the ‘reputational view’ include Harris and Raviv (1991: 305). They assert 
that the longer the firm’s history of repaying its debt, the better its reputation and the 
lower its borrowing cost. Older, more established firms find it optimal to choose the safe 
project, that is, to not engage in asset substitution to avoid losing a valuable reputation. 
Young firms with little reputation may choose the risky project. If they survive without a 
default, they will eventually switch to the safe project. As a result, firms with long track 
records will have lower default rates and lower costs of debt than firms with brief 
histories.   
Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012: 61) espouse the foregoing. They contend that there is no 
agreement on the impact of age on leverage in the literature. For example, age can be 
used as a proxy for reputation. In this reputational role, older ﬁrms tend to have 
acquired sufﬁcient reputation to access debt markets; therefore, one would expect a 
positive relationship between age and leverage. However, it may also be the case that 
ﬁrms that survive are those that are more proﬁtable. In line with the pecking order 
theory, older, more proﬁtable ﬁrms tend to use internal funds rather than debt; therefore, 
in this case, one can expect a negative relationship between age and leverage. 
The empirical evidence regarding the firm leverage-age prediction appears to be mixed. 
Among other scholars, Johnson’s (1997: 58) results conform to the a priori expectation 
of a positive relationship between firm leverage and the age variable. To the contrary, 
Ahmed et al. (2010: 10), Huynh and Petrunia (2010: 1007) and Ramjee and Gwatidzo 
(2012: 61), among other scholars, report a negative relationship. 
2.3.8  Risk 
In finance parlance, risk is defined as the probability of a loss occurring, resulting in the 
impairment of earnings. In the context of firm financing, risk measures the volatility of 
the cash flows or earning prospects of a firm. The trade-off theory predicts a negative 
relationship between firm leverage and risk. In other words, a firm that has highly 
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volatile cash flows must avoid debt financing. The intuition behind this is that highly 
volatile cash flows could result in financial distress. As such, to avoid going bankrupt, 
firms with high levels of volatile cash flows must desist from debt financing. 
According to Antoniou et al. (2008: 64), firms with high earnings volatility carry a risk of 
the earnings level dropping below their debt-servicing commitments. Such an 
eventuality may result in rearranging the funds at a high cost or facing the risk of 
bankruptcy. Therefore, firms with highly volatile earnings should have lower debt capital. 
This view is bolstered by Frank and Goyal (2009: 9). They postulate that firms with more 
volatile cash flows face higher expected costs of financial distress and should use less 
debt. More volatile cash flows reduce the probability that tax shields will be fully utilised. 
The pecking order theory, however, predicts a positive relationship between firm 
leverage and risk. This ought to be premised on the notion that the volatility of cash 
flows implies the volatility of earnings. As such, the firm becomes constrained to finance 
out of retained earnings. It would therefore have to seek funding from the external 
markets, starting off with the debt market, to avoid the problem of adverse selection. In 
synch with this view, Frank and Goyal (2009: 9) assert that firms with volatile shares are 
expected to be those about which beliefs are quite volatile. It would seem plausible that 
such firms suffer more from adverse selection. If so, the pecking order theory would 
predict that riskier firms have higher leverage. Frank and Goyal (2009) further suggest 
that firms with volatile cash flows might need to periodically access the external capital 
markets. 
Ahmed et al. (2010: 10) found a positive relationship between capital structure and risk 
of insurance companies. They contend that the debt ratio increases with the increase of 
claim ratio of Pakistan insurance companies, while Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011: 335) 
report a negative relationship between firm leverage and risk. They studied a sample of 
UK firms and their results show that there is a negative relationship between ﬁrms’ risk 
and capital structure. They aver that ﬁrms with high risk will tend to have a higher risk of 
default and less access to debt ﬁnancing. 
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2.3.9  Dividend policy 
The interaction of dividend policy and firm leverage can be explained in two ways. 
Firstly, signalling is one mechanism by which dividend policy filters into the capital 
structure decision. Increased dividends signal increased future earnings, and so the 
firm’s cost of equity will be lower, favouring equity to debt. To the contrary, a dividend 
cut might signal financial distress and send out a negative sentiment to the equity 
market. Therefore, from the signalling theory perspective, firm leverage is anticipated to 
be inversely related to the dividend payout ratio. 
Secondly, from the premise of the contracting cost theory, one way to attenuate the free 
cash flow problem of overinvestment is to increase the dividend payout ratio. Similarly, 
to mitigate the problem of suboptimal investment, the firm can pursue a restrictive 
dividend policy and thereby reduce its dividend payout ratio. In the former case, the firm 
is constrained to access more debt and in the latter case the firm is liberated to seek 
more debt.  
Antoniou et al. (2008: 80) report an inverse relation between leverage and dividends in 
the USA. They assert that this supports the view that dividend payments signal a firm’s 
future performance, and therefore high dividend-paying firms benefit from a lower equity 
cost of capital. Lemma and Negash (2014: 81) also found an inverse relationship 
between firm leverage and dividend payout ratio based on a study of firms drawn from 
nine developing economies in Africa, namely Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia. 
 
2.3.10 The major predictions of trade-off theory versus the pecking order theory 
A summary of the major predictions by the two ‘contestant’ theories, namely the pecking 
order and trade-off theories, is given in Table 2.2. Suffice to highlight that the 
predictions are divergent. In the next section the empirical studies that have been 
conducted to test the capital structure theories are considered. 
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Table 2.2: The predictions of the pecking order theory versus the trade-off theory 
 
          
Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theory 
 
Size 
 
Profitability 
 
Asset 
tangibility 
 
Growth 
 
Debt tax 
shield 
 
Non-debt 
tax shield 
 
Risk 
 
Pecking 
order 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
No 
prediction 
 
Positive 
 
Trade-off 
 
Positive 
 
Positive 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Negative  
Source: Sibindi (2016:232) 
 
2.4  EMPIRICAL STUDIES   
Extant empirical studies on capital structure focus on (1) whether firms have a target 
capital structure, (2) evidence of capital structures of firms in developed countries and 
(3) evidence of capital structures in developing countries. These are considered in turn.  
2.4.1  Do firms have a target capital structure? 
The static trade-off theory has managers seeking optimal capital structure (Shyam-
Sunder & Myers, 1999: 226). These scholars posit that random events would cause 
managers to drift away from the optimal capital structure, and they would then have to 
work back gradually. If the optimum debt ratio is stable, a mean-reverting behaviour 
towards this target capital structure would be expected. The first caveat was perhaps 
aptly put by Flannery and Rangan (2008: 407), who observed that in a frictionless world, 
ﬁrms would always maintain their target leverage. However, transaction costs may 
prevent immediate adjustment to a ﬁrm’s target, as the ﬁrm trades off adjustment costs 
against the costs of operating with a suboptimal debt ratio. The second caveat is 
enunciated by Barclay and Smith (2005: 15). They contend that even if managers set 
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target leverage ratios, unexpected increases or shortfalls in proﬁtability, along with 
occasional attempts to exploit ﬁnancing ‘windows of opportunity’, can cause companies 
to deviate from their targets. In such cases, there will be what amounts to an optimal 
deviation from those targets – one that depends on the transaction costs associated 
with adjusting back to the target relative to the (opportunity) costs of deviating from the 
target. 
This section first delves into empirical studies on the existence of a target capital 
structure before it considers the empirical evidence of the determinants of the speed of 
adjustment towards the target capital structure. Firstly, Elsas et al. (2014: 1380) 
evaluated US firms’ leverage determinants by studying how firms paid for 2 073 very 
large investments between 1989 and 2006. They found strong evidence consistent with 
target adjustment behaviour for their sample firms. First, they found that the type of 
securities issued to finance a large investment significantly depends on the deviation 
between a firm’s target and actual leverage. Overleveraged firms issue less debt and 
more equity when financing large projects, and vice versa. This result holds for a variety 
of methods for estimating leverage targets. Second, they demonstrated that firms 
making large investments converge unusually rapidly towards target leverage ratio. 
Secondly, Flannery and Rangan (2006: 471) employed a sample of US ﬁrms (excluding 
financial firms and regulated utilities) included in the Compustat industrial annual tapes 
between the years 1965 and 2001. Their evidence indicates that ﬁrms do target a long-
run capital structure, and that the typical ﬁrm converges towards its long-run target at a 
rate of more than 30% per year. In addition, they aver that this adjustment speed is 
roughly three times faster than many existing estimates in the literature, and affords 
targeting behaviour an empirically important effect on ﬁrms’ observed capital structures. 
They also contend that target debt ratios depend on well-accepted ﬁrm characteristics. 
Firms that are underleveraged or overleveraged by this measure soon adjust their debt 
ratios to offset the observed gap. 
Thirdly, Leary and Roberts (2005: 2577), by utilising a sample of non-financial and non-
utility firms listed on the annual Compustat files for the years 1984 to 2001, performed a 
non-parametric analysis of the leverage response of equity-issuing firms, and also 
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examined the impact of introducing adjustment costs into their empirical framework. 
They found that firms are significantly more likely to increase (decrease) leverage if their 
leverage is relatively low (high), if their leverage has been decreasing (accumulating), or 
if they have recently decreased (increased) their leverage through past financing 
decisions. This is consistent with the existence of a target range for leverage, as in the 
dynamic trade-off model. 
Fourthly, Hovakimian et al. (2004: 520), using annual ﬁrm-level data from the 
Compustat industrial, full coverage and research ﬁles for all US firms (and also 
excluding financial firms) for the years 1982 to 2000, found evidence consistent with a 
hybrid hypothesis that ﬁrms have target debt ratios but also prefer internal ﬁnancing to 
external funds. They also found that proﬁtability has no effect on target leverage. 
Fifthly, Hovakimian et al. (2001) tested for the existence of a target debt level by 
employing firm-level data of US firms from the 1997 Standard and Poor’s Compustat 
annual files (including the research file) for the 1979–1997 period. They also excluded 
financial firms. They found that specifically, when firms either raise or retire significant 
amounts of new capital, their choices move them towards the target capital structures 
suggested by the static trade-off models, often more than offsetting the effects of 
accumulated profits and losses (Hovakimian et al., 2001: 22). They further suggest that 
the tendency of firms to make financial choices that move them towards a target debt 
ratio appears to be more important when they choose between equity repurchases and 
debt retirements than when they choose between equity and debt issuances. 
From the foregoing it is impelling to suggest that there exists a target capital structure 
that each firm seeks to achieve. It would seem that it is a target range and firms seek to 
operate within this target range. The attainment of this target is also dependent on firm-
level characteristics. Having established that there is compelling evidence for the 
existence of a target capital structure, the main focus of empirical studies on firm 
leverage has changed to investigating the determinants of the speed of adjustment 
towards the target debt ratio. The main determinants of the speed of adjustment that 
have been cited in literature are size, the cost of adjustment, the distance between 
observed leverage and target leverage and growth. 
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Antoniou et al. (2008: 83) employed a sample comprising of all non-financial firms, 
traded in the major stock exchanges of the five major economies of the world – France, 
Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA – from 1987 to 2000. Using dynamic models of 
estimation, such as a two-step syst-GMM procedure, they found evidence that reveals 
the presence of dynamism in the capital structure decisions of firms operating in the 
Group of 5 countries. They contend that managers assess the trade-off between the 
cost of adjustment and the cost of being off target. Therefore, the speed at which they 
adjust their capital structure may crucially depend on the financial systems and 
corporate governance traditions of each country. 
Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010: 261) studied the dynamics of capital structure in the 
context of Indian manufacturing companies in a partial-adjustment framework during the 
period 1993/1994–2007/2008. They considered all the companies available in the 
PROWESS database. They found strong evidence of a positive relationship between 
the speed of adjustment and the distance variable. They reason that this result confirms 
the idea that the firm’s cost of maintaining a suboptimal debt ratio is higher than the cost 
of adjustment and that the fixed costs of adjustments are not significant. Therefore, the 
firms that are sufficiently away from their target leverage always want to reach the 
optimal very quickly. A positive relationship was also found between size of the firm and 
the adjustment speed. They contend that this result lends support to the hypothesis that 
for large firms the adjustment costs are relatively lesser than for small firms due to the 
less asymmetric information. Therefore, the adjustment speed to the target leverage 
ratio has been more for large firms than small firms. Furthermore, they also found 
evidence that firms with higher growth opportunities adjust faster towards their target 
leverage. This confirms the a priori expectation that a growing firm may find it easier to 
change its capital structure by altering the composition of new issuances. 
Lastly, Öztekin and Flannery (2012:108) estimated a standard partial adjustment model 
of leverage for ﬁrms in 37 countries during the period 1991–2006. They found that the 
mean adjustment speed is approximately 21% per year with a half-life of three and two 
years for book and market leverage, respectively, but that the estimated adjustment 
speeds vary from 4% (in Columbia) to 41% (in New Zealand) per year. In terms of the 
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half-life of adjustment, the mean speed implies three years, and the range varies 
between one and a half and 17 years. As such, they reject the constraint that ﬁrms in all 
countries have the same adjustment speed. They reason that variation in leverage 
adjustment speeds must reﬂect something about the costs and beneﬁts of moving 
towards target leverage. They further conjecture that the effectiveness of a country’s 
legal, ﬁnancial and political institutions is systematically related to cross-country 
differences in adjustment speeds. Moreover, their results suggest that higher aggregate 
adjustment costs reduce estimated adjustment speed by roughly 12% of the average 
country’s adjustment speed, even after they account for adaptations to ﬁrm 
characteristics that tend to raise adjustment speeds. As such, they contend that 
evidence that adjustment speeds vary plausibly with international differences in 
important ﬁnancial system features provides support for the applicability of a partial 
adjustment model of leverage adjustment to private ﬁrms. 
In the final analysis it would seem that firms set a target debt ratio. They gravitate 
towards this target ratio. It could be that they operate within a target range of this ratio. 
Notwithstanding the quest to operate within this target range, there are some factors 
that can aid or militate against this objective. For instance, the prohibitive adjustment 
costs can hinder firms from rebalancing their debt ratio should it fall outside the optimum 
range. In the next section the empirical studies that have been conducted on the 
determinants of capital structure in the developed world are considered. 
2.4.2  Empirical evidence of capital structures of firms in developed countries 
Extant studies conducted on capital structure policies of firms have sought to test the 
practical efficacy of capital structure theories – the main ‘contestants’ being the pecking 
order theory and the trade-off theory. These studies have further sought to establish the 
firm-level determinants of capital structure. It is trite to highlight that there is every 
reason to discern between developed countries and developing countries in a review of 
empirical studies on firm financing behaviour, as it is believed that the nature of frictions 
in developing countries is dissimilar to those found in developing markets. 
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Titman and Wessels (1988: 2) employed a sample of manufacturing firms in the USA 
found on the Compustat database for the period 1974–1982. Their results suggest that 
firms with unique or specialised products have relatively low debt ratios. The proxies 
they employed for uniqueness are the firms’ expenditures on research and 
development, selling expenses and the rate at which employees voluntarily leave their 
jobs. They also found that smaller firms tend to use significantly more short-term debt 
than larger firms. However, they aver that their model explains virtually none of the 
variation in convertible debt ratios across firms and they found no evidence to support 
theoretical work that predicts that debt ratios are related to a firm’s expected growth, 
non-debt tax shields, volatility or the collateral value of its assets. Notwithstanding, they 
found some support for the proposition that profitable firms have less debt relative to the 
market value of their equity. 
Using international data from Group of 7 (G7) countries for the period 1987–1991, 
Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1421) investigated the determinants of capital structure 
choice by analysing the financing decisions of public firms in the major industrialised 
countries. They found that at an aggregate level, firm leverage is fairly similar across the 
G7 countries. In addition, they found that factors identified by previous studies, as 
correlated in the cross-section with firm leverage in the USA, are similarly correlated in 
other countries as well. Specifically, they found that profitability and market-to-book 
value have a negative impact on capital structure, whereas asset tangibility and firm 
size have a positive effect on capital structure. 
The reliability of the pecking order theory, among other theories, was tested by Frank 
and Goyal (2003: 217). Their test was conducted on a broad cross-section of publicly 
traded US ﬁrms for the period 1971–1998. They report that, contrary to the pecking 
order theory, net equity issues track the ﬁnancing deﬁcit more closely than do net debt 
issues. While large ﬁrms exhibit some aspects of pecking order behaviour, the evidence 
is neither robust to the inclusion of conventional leverage factors, nor to the analysis of 
evidence from the 1990s. Financing deﬁcit is less important in explaining net debt 
issues over time for ﬁrms of all sizes. They also contend that in contrast to what is often 
suggested, internal ﬁnancing is not sufﬁcient to cover investment spending on average. 
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Instead, they found that external ﬁnancing is heavily used. They also found evidence 
that debt ﬁnancing does not dominate equity ﬁnancing in magnitude. 
The two ‘contestant’ theories of capital structure (pecking order theory and trade-off 
theory) were pitied against each other by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999: 221). They 
examined the financing behaviour of 157 US firms listed on the Compustat database 
(excluding financial firms and regulated utilities) for the period 1971–1989. They found 
that a simple pecking order model explains much more of the time-series variance in 
actual debt ratios than a target adjustment model based on the static trade-off theory. 
Moreover, they demonstrate that the pecking order hypothesis can be rejected if actual 
financing follows the target-adjustment specification. They further assert that on the 
other hand, this specification of the static trade-off hypothesis will appear to work when 
financing follows the pecking order. They reason that this false positive results from time 
patterns of capital expenditures and operating income, which create mean-reverting 
debt ratios even under the pecking order. As such, they posit that they have grounds to 
reject the pecking order, but not the static trade-off specification. Finally, they conclude 
that the pecking order is a much better first-cut explanation of the debt-equity choice, at 
least for the mature, public firms in their sample. 
Frank and Goyal (2009: 1) examined the relative importance of many factors in the 
capital structure decisions of publicly traded US firms from 1950 to 2003. They found 
that the most reliable factors for explaining market leverage are median industry 
leverage, market-to-book assets ratio, tangibility, profits, log of assets and expected 
inflation. Market-book-value (the growth variable) and profitability were found to be 
inversely related to leverage. On the other hand, tangibility, median industry leverage, 
log of assets (size variable) and inflation were found to be directly (positively) 
associated with firm leverage. Further, they found that dividend-paying firms tend to 
have lower leverage. When considering book leverage, somewhat similar effects are 
found. However, for book leverage, the impact of firm size, the market-to-book ratio and 
the effect of inflation were found not to be reliable. They assert that their empirical 
evidence seems reasonably consistent with some versions of the trade-off theory of 
capital structure. 
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More recently, the profit-leverage conundrum has been revisited by Frank and Goyal 
(2015: 1448). The evidence they lead tilt the scale in favour of the trade-off theory. 
Following from other studies on capital structure, they made use of a sample of non-
financial firms found on the Compustat database for the period 1971–2009. Their results 
suggest that more profitable firms really do borrow more and not less. Further, their 
evidence points to more profitable firms repurchasing their own equity. They experience 
an increase in both the book value of equity and the market value of equity. Less 
profitable firms tend to reduce their debt and to issue equity. They also found evidence 
that firm size and market conditions also matter. Larger firms tend to be more active in 
the debt markets, while smaller firms tend to be relatively more active in the equity 
markets. During good times there is more use of external financing.  
Frank and Goyal (2015: 1448) further posit that the usual profits-leverage puzzle result 
is primarily driven by the increase in equity that is experienced by the more profitable 
firms. They reason that the puzzle should be restated as asking: Why do firms not take 
sufficiently large offsetting actions to fully undo the change in equity? What limits the 
magnitudes of the typical leverage response to profit shocks? They assert that in a 
frictionless model the partial response appears puzzling. They contend that there is 
good empirical reason to believe that rebalancing entails both fixed and variable costs 
and that firm size matters. The rebalancing costs can be fully avoided by doing nothing. 
Accordingly, the firm must decide whether any given shock is big enough to be worth 
responding to. If it is, then the firm must decide how big a response is called for.  
The empirical evidence on the capital structures of firms in the developed countries that 
was reviewed in this section was inconclusive. Notwithstanding, the trade-off and 
pecking order theories have been demonstrated to be reliable in explaining firm 
financing behaviour in the developed countries. 
2.4.3  Empirical evidence of capital structures of firms in developing countries 
Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009:1) investigated corporate capital structure in Africa by 
employing a panel of listed non-financial firms in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe.  They paid particular regard to the extent to which firm characteristics 
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and cross country institutional differences determine the way firm raise capital. Their 
results indicated that African firms are as about leveraged as firms in emerging 
economies such as Mexico, Thailand, Brazil, South Korea, Malaysia and Turkey. They 
also found evidence supportive of the pecking order theory among Africa’s listed firms, 
with most of them relying heavily on internal finance. Further, their results also 
documented that country-specific factors play a role in determining corporate leverage. 
Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010: 250) investigated the dynamics of capital structure in 
the context of Indian manufacturing companies in a partial-adjustment framework during 
the period 1993/1994–2007/2008. They applied a partial-adjustment model and used 
the generalised method of moments (GMM) technique to determine the variables that 
affect the target capital structure and the factors affecting the adjustment speed to 
target capital structure. They found firm-specific variables such as size, tangibility, 
profitability and market-to-book ratio to be the most important variables that determine 
the target capital structure across the book and market leverage. Further, they found 
that factors such as size of the firm, growth opportunity and the distance between the 
target and observed leverage determine the speed of adjustment to target leverage for 
these Indian manufacturing companies. They argue that their overall results are 
consistent with the dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure. 
Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012: 52) employed a dynamic model to investigate the capital 
structure determinants for 178 ﬁrms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
for the period 1998–2008. The sample of ﬁrms was also used to examine the cost and 
speed of adjustment towards a target debt ratio. They analysed the speed of adjustment 
towards the target debt ratio by estimating a system of GMM. Further, they also 
examined the determinants of target capital structure for South African listed ﬁrms. Their 
results suggest that a target debt-equity ratio does exist for South African ﬁrms. In 
addition, they also found that these ﬁrms bear greater transaction costs when adjusting 
to a target debt ratio than to a target long-term debt ratio. However, they do adjust to 
their target ratios relatively quickly.  
Their study also reveals that ﬁrms with a larger proportion of tangible assets have 
higher debt ratios, more proﬁtable ﬁrms operate at lower levels of leverage, larger ﬁrms 
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operate at higher levels leverage, and fast-growing ﬁrms prefer debt to equity when 
raising funds. Further, they found that when ﬁrms require ﬁnance, they prefer internal to 
external sources of ﬁnance. They reason that these ﬁrms seem to take into account the 
trade-off between the costs and beneﬁts of debt when making ﬁnancing decisions. The 
evidence that they lead suggests that the capital structure decisions of South African 
listed ﬁrms follow both the pecking order and the trade-off theories of capital structure. 
Chipeta, Wolmarans and Vermaak (2012: 171) investigated the dynamics of firm 
leverage within the context of a transition economy of South Africa. They employed a 
sample consisting of non-financial firms that were listed on the JSE before and after the 
financial liberalisation phase. They utilised the I-Net Bridge database to source audited 
income statements, balance sheets and financial ratios for a sample of firms that 
operated from 1989 to 2007. Their data were split between the two regimes, namely the 
pre-liberalisation period (1989–1994) and the post-liberalisation period (1995–2007). 
Their results confirm the predictions of most the theories of capital structure.  
For the pre-liberalisation period, on the one hand, they report an inverse relationship 
between firm leverage and the profitability and size variables. On the other hand, they 
found a positive relationship between firm leverage and the tax variable. Further, for the 
post-liberalisation period they found that on the one hand, firm leverage is positively 
associated with the size, growth and dividend payout variables. On the other hand, firm 
leverage was found to be negatively related to the profitability, tax and asset tangibility 
variables. Moreover, they found that the empirical relationship between the firm-specific 
determinants of capital structure and leverage is statistically stronger for the post- 
liberalised regime than the pre-liberalised era. The same holds for the coefficient on the 
target leverage. They reason that this confirms their conjecture that transaction costs 
are lower in a post-liberalised regime.  
The dynamics of capital structure adjustment speeds for financially constrained and 
unconstrained South African listed non-financial firms across the business cycle were 
examined by Auret, Chipeta and Krishna (2013:75). They established that 
macroeconomic conditions affect the speed at which South African firms adjust toward 
their target capital structures. Their results documented evidence that although not 
56 
 
overwhelming, firms adjust faster in unfavourable macroeconomic states, suggesting 
that the cost of deviating from optimum leverage are higher in such conditions and that 
firms adjust faster in order to avoid such costs. Their results were also indicative that 
financial constraints affect adjustment behaviour as adjustment speeds for the 
constrained and unconstrained samples differed in several aspects. 
Lemma and Negash (2013b:1081) examined the role of institutions, macroeconomic 
conditions, industry and firm characteristics on firm’s capital structure decision within the 
context of nine select African countries (Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia). They utilised a sample of 986 firms over 
the period 1999 to 2008 and applied a series of models that link institutional, 
macroeconomic, industry and firm-specific characteristics on the one hand and 
measures of capital structure on the other. The syst-GMM and seemingly unrelated 
regression were used to estimate the models. They established that the legal and 
financial institutions, income level of the country in which a firm operates, the growth 
rate of the economy and inflation matter in capital structure choices of firms. Their 
results also suggested that probability of default, agency cost, market timing, financing 
needs and access to finance, firm’s investment opportunities and quality of law 
enforcement have a central role in the determination of capital structure of firms. 
Lemma and Negash (2014: 64) also examined the role of institutional, macro-economic, 
industry and firm characteristics on the adjustment speed of corporate capital structure 
within the context of developing countries. They utilised a sample of 986 firms drawn 
from nine developing countries in Africa (as mentioned in Section 2.3.9) over a period of 
ten years (1999–2008). Their study applied a dynamic partial adjustment model that 
links capital structure adjustment speed and institutional, macro-economic and firm 
characteristics. Their analysis was carried out using syst-GMM. They found evidence 
that firms in developing countries temporarily deviate from (and partially adjust to) their 
target capital structures. Their results also indicate that more profitable firms tend to 
rapidly adjust their capital structures than less profitable firms. They also found that the 
effects of firm size, growth opportunities and the gap between observed and target 
leverage ratios on adjustment speed are functions of how one measures capital 
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structure. Further, they also established that adjustment speed tends to be faster for 
firms in industries that have relatively higher risk and countries with common-law 
tradition, less developed stock markets, lower income and weaker creditor rights 
protection. They reason that their evidence reveals that the capital structure of firms in 
developing countries not only converges to a target, but also faces varying degrees of 
adjustment costs and/or benefits in doing so. This suggests not only that dynamic trade-
off theory explains capital structure decisions of firms, but also rules out the dominance 
of information asymmetry-based theories within the context of firms in developing 
countries. 
Empirical work on firm financing behaviour within the context of South Africa has 
increased tremendously over the years. Other such studies that have examined the 
capital structure phenomena include: Chipeta (2016); Chipeta and Mbululu (2013); 
Chipeta, Wolmarans and Vermaak (2013); Gwatidzo and Ojah (2014); Lemma (2015); 
Lemma and Negash (2011, 2012, 2013a) and Marandu and Sibindi (2016). 
On the balance of evidence that was presented in this section, arguably the trade-off 
and pecking order theories can best predict firm financing in the developing countries. 
The two theories complement each other in explaining the capital structures of firms in 
the developing countries. 
2.5  CONCLUSION 
The discussions in this chapter have been anchored on capital structure theory and a 
review of the empirical studies that have been conducted to interpret firm financing 
behaviour. The starting point was to review the MM irrelevance propositions. These 
were subsequently demonstrated not to hold in a world with frictions such as taxes and 
transactions costs. Further, the main theories of capital structure were considered. 
These are the trade-off, pecking order, signalling, market timing, agency cost, free cash 
flow and contracting cost theories. The major predictions as well as the limitations of 
these theories were articulated.  
The firm-level determinants of capital structure that usually come to the fore in extant 
studies were documented. These are size, profitability, growth, asset tangibility 
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(collateral), debt tax shield, non-debt tax shield, risk, dividend policy and age. Their 
interaction with firm leverage was demonstrated. Suffice to highlight that in some 
instances, there is a dichotomy in the predictions by the major theories of capital 
structure. The ‘horse race’ is usually between the pecking order theory and the trade-off 
theory. To reconcile the predictions, it is imperative to highlight that the aforementioned 
theories complement rather than substitute one another in explaining the financing 
behaviour of firms. As such, the financing behaviour of firms reveals some element of 
dynamism.  
A review of empirical studies on the existence of a target capital structure was 
conducted. In the main it was demonstrated that firms set a target ratio and actively 
seek to achieve it. There are a number of factors that might promote or deter firms from 
achieving this target. These are size, adjustment costs and the distance between the 
observed and target leverage.   
Lastly, the financing behaviour of firms in both developed and developing countries was 
considered. Notwithstanding that the results are mixed, it seems that in the main firm 
financing behaviour is best explained by the pecking order and trade-off theories in both 
categories of countries.  
The empirical studies that have been considered in this chapter have excluded financial 
firms from their analysis. The reasons that have been advanced are that financial firms 
are peculiar in the sense that they are regulated. As such, regulation is another friction 
that curtails firms in crafting their financial policy. The next chapter focuses on financial 
firm-specific determinants of capital structure and capital regulation. The hypotheses for 
this study are also developed in the next chapter. 
 
 
  
59 
 
CHAPTER 3 
FINANCIAL FIRM-SPECIFIC DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The regulation of the financial sector is crucial to securing the sector and instilling 
discipline among the market participants. This is essential in fostering a financially 
sound and secure financial market. Reregulating the financial sector has become a 
policy imperative now more than ever before, in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 GFC. 
The questions that boggle the mind are: Is capital regulation effective? and Does 
financial regulation influence the capital structure choices of financial firms? This 
chapter seeks to probe and help resolve these central questions and stipulates the 
hypotheses that were developed for this study. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the regulation of 
banks, paying particular regard to capital regulation and deposit insurance schemes. 
Section 3.3 discusses the regulation of insurance companies. Section 3.4 outlines 
financial regulation in South Africa. Section 3.5 considers the bank-specific 
determinants of capital structure. Section 3.6 reviews the determinants of capital 
structure of insurance companies. Section 3.7 develops the hypotheses for this study. 
Section 3.8 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 THE REGULATION OF BANKS 
The banking sector is critical to any economy by reason of its performance of the 
intermediation role. The main thrust of the financial regulation of banks is to ensure the 
safety and financial soundness of the banking sector. At worst, the financial problems 
bedevilling a banking institution could precipitate a bank run. The failure of a large bank, 
then, can cause psychological contagion, leading depositors to start runs on other 
banks (Hart & Zingales, 2011: 3). This is a situation whereby the depositors will ‘panic’ 
and withdraw their funds in anticipation of the bankruptcy and demise of their banking 
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institution. As the banking institutions are interconnected, the demise of one banking 
institution can result in a contagion effect, resulting in the distress of other banking 
institutions. Bank runs cause real economic problems because even ‘healthy’ banks can 
fail, causing the recall of loans and the termination of productive investment (Diamond & 
Dybvig, 1983: 402). Suffice to highlight that there is systemic risk posed by the failure of 
one banking institution. As such, monetary authorities have a vested interest in 
regulating the banking sector. Therefore, the attainment of a safe and financially sound 
banking sector is predicated on the establishment of an effective financial regulatory 
regime. The two approaches that are at the disposal of monetary authorities are the 
micro-prudential and the macro-prudential regulatory regimes. The former regime 
involves the bank regulator specifically tailoring an individualistic regulatory response for 
each banking firm, while the latter regime involves the bank regulator taking a holistic 
view of banking regulation and promulgating standardised regulations for the entire 
industry.  
 
It is imperative to highlight that in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 GFC, monetary 
authorities have leaned towards the macro-prudential regime. Hanson, Kashyap and 
Stein (2011: 5) aver that in the simplest terms, one can characterise the macro-
prudential approach to financial regulation as an effort to control the social costs 
associated with excessive balance sheet shrinkage on the part of multiple financial 
institutions hit with a common shock. This variant of macro-prudential regulation model 
focuses on two facets, namely financial soundness (prudential) and market conduct, 
hence it has become known as the ‘twin-peaks’ regulatory model. In essence, the GFC 
have led to a re-examination of risk-assessment practices and regulation of the financial 
system, with a renewed interest in systemic fragility and macro-prudential regulation. 
This requires a focus not on the risk of individual financial institutions, but on an 
individual bank’s contribution to the risk of the financial system as a whole (Anginer, 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Zhu, 2014: 312).  
 
Over the years, financial regulation of the banking sector has mainly been anchored on 
the twin pillars of capital regulation and the creation of a bank ‘safety net’, such as the 
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introduction of compulsory deposit insurance schemes. Various other instruments have 
been adopted for the regulation of the banking sector, including the government safety 
net, restrictions on asset holdings, capital requirements, chartering and bank 
examination, disclosure requirements, consumer protection and various remedies to 
promote competition (Jokipii & Milne, 2008: 1440). Traditionally, bank capital regulation 
has been thought of as a corollary to the introduction of deposit insurance (Hart & 
Zingales, 2011). The existence of this insurance makes debt a cheap source of 
financing for banks. Further, Hart and Zingales (2011) contend that depositors and other 
creditors will lend at low interest rates because they know that their debts are secure: 
They will be repaid by the bank if things go well and by the government if things go 
badly. Therefore, the standard view of capital regulation is that it offsets the risk-taking 
incentives provided by deposit insurance (Allen, Carletti & Marquez, 2011). Capital 
requirements, then, are a necessary evil to prevent banks from abusing the ability to 
borrow cheaply, dumping large losses onto taxpayers. Against this backdrop, bank 
capital regulation and deposit insurance are considered next in turn.  
 
3.2.1  Bank capital regulation 
The primary reason why banks hold capital is to absorb risk, including the risk of 
liquidity crunches, and to protect against bank runs and various other risks, most 
importantly credit risk (Berger & Bouwman, 2009: 3786). Capital is the main line of 
defence against negative shocks. For small banks, capital is important at all times 
because they face shocks more often than medium and large banks, and they have 
limited (and relatively costly) access to the ﬁnancial market in the event of unanticipated 
needs (Berger & Bouwman, 2013: 155). As such, it is imperative that bank regulators 
ensure that the banks hold sufficient levels of capital by enacting bank capital 
regulations. According to Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2008: 444), the traditional view of 
bank capital regulation rests on four premises. The first premise is that it is essential to 
protect the deposit insurer (and society) from losses due to bank failures given the 
existence of deposit insurance; when a bank defaults on its obligations, losses are 
incurred that are not borne by either the bank’s shareholders or any of its other financial 
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claimholders. Therefore, Kashyap et al. (2008) reason that bank failures are bad for 
society, and that the overarching goal of capital regulation – and the associated 
principle of prompt corrective action – is to ensure that such failures are avoided.  
The second premise is that of incentive alignment. Simply put, by increasing the 
economic exposure of bank shareholders, capital regulation boosts their incentives to 
monitor management and to ensure that the bank is not taking excessively risky or 
otherwise value-destroying actions. A corollary is that any policy action that reduces the 
losses of shareholders in a bad state is undesirable from an ex ante incentive 
perspective – this is the usual moral hazard problem.  
The third premise is that of imposing higher capital charges for riskier assets to the 
extent that banks view equity capital as more expensive than other forms of financing. A 
regime with ‘flat’ (non-risk-based) capital regulation inevitably brings with it the potential 
for distortion, because it imposes the same cost-of-capital mark-up on all types of 
assets. For example, relatively safe borrowers may be driven out of the banking sector 
and forced into the bond market, even in cases where a bank would be the 
economically more efficient provider of finance. The response to this problem is to tie 
the capital requirement to some observable proxy for an asset’s risk.  
The last premise is that of seeking the license to do business. In essence, capital 
regulation compels troubled banks to seek re-authorisation from the capital market in 
order to continue operating. In other words, if a bank suffers an adverse shock to its 
capital, and it cannot convince the equity market to contribute new financing, a binding 
capital requirement will necessarily compel it to shrink. As such, capital requirements 
can be said to impose a type of market discipline on banks. 
The foregoing is supported by Morrison and White (2005: 1548), who contend that two 
main theories predominate as to the role played by capital requirements. The ﬁrst of 
these, which they call the ‘moral hazard’ theory, is most closely associated with 
economic theorists as well as public-choice economists. They assert that if banks do not 
have sufficient equity ‘at stake’ when they make their investment decisions, they may 
make decisions that, although optimal for equityholders, are suboptimal from the point 
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of view of society as a whole. For example, banks may be tempted to make excessively 
risky and even negative NPV investments that maximise the returns to equity at the 
expense of debtholders or the deposit insurance fund. The second theory, which they 
refer to as the ‘safety net’ theory, conjectures that a bank’s capital forms a kind of 
cushion against losses for depositors. As such, they reason that if the bank starts to 
lose money, equity value must fall to zero before debtholders start to lose, so depositors 
cannot lose out if regulation ensures that the bank must be closed or recapitalised 
before this occurs. 
Notwithstanding the compelling case for capital regulation, several scholars have 
highlighted the shortcomings of regulations. According to Naceur and Kandil (2009: 71), 
excessive regulations may increase the cost of intermediation and reduce the 
proﬁtability of the banking industry. Simultaneously, as banks become more 
constrained, their ability to expand credit and contribute to economic growth will be 
hampered during normal times. This view is also espoused by Instefjord (2005: 343), 
who observed that any regulation that is aimed to minimise the costs associated with 
systemic risk in the banking sector runs the risk of ignoring potential beneﬁts to 
consumers of credit. Moreover, restricting bank activities through a higher capital 
requirements ratio could be negatively associated with bank development, adversely 
affecting credit expansion and credit growth. Hanson et al. (2011: 25) surmise that the 
most glaring weak spot in financial reform thus far – one that cuts across both the 
Dodd–Frank legislation and the Basel III process – is the failure to fully come to grips 
with the shadow banking system. They reason that if one takes a macro-prudential 
view, the overarching goal of financial regulation must go beyond protecting insured 
depositories and even beyond dealing with the problems created by ‘too-big-to-fail’ non-
bank intermediaries. Notwithstanding that higher capital and liquidity requirements on 
banks will no doubt help to insulate banks from the consequences of large shocks, the 
danger is that, given the intensity of competition in financial services, they will also drive 
a larger share of intermediation into the shadow banking realm. 
Hart and Zingales (2011: 483) cast aspersions on financial regulators’ exercise of 
power. They liken this to empowering a regulator with the right to life and death. On the 
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one hand, the regulator can arbitrarily close down perfectly functioning financial 
institutions for political reasons. On the other hand, the regulator, under intense 
lobbying by the regulated, can be too soft, a phenomenon known in the banking 
literature as ‘regulatory forbearance’. This view is also espoused by Kim and Santomero 
(1988: 1230), who contend that to the extent that there exist other financial institutions 
that offer close substitutes for bank products but that are not subject to the same capital 
(and other bank) regulation, the banking industry will be adversely affected by the 
regulators’ safety goal.   
A corollary to regulatory forbearance is regulatory arbitrage. Regulatory arbitrage exists 
when there are loopholes in the regulation that can be exploited by the financial 
institutions. According to Petitjean (2013: 17), regulatory arbitrage is also likely to keep 
generating costly negative spill-over effects on the whole economy because of the ever 
more complex set of future regulatory constraints. On the one hand, a regulation-free 
banking system is certainly not an option. On the other hand, while preventive 
measures such as the micro-prudential rules aimed at lowering the probability of bank 
failure are probably unavoidable as part of an overall regulatory regime, they face 
strong limitations as a large part of banks’ business is devoted to exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities and loopholes created by regulatory innovations. Further, Petitjean (2013: 
18) contends that given the enormity of the financial crisis, there clearly were serious 
fault lines in regulatory and supervisory arrangements. As such, the rules enshrined in 
thousands of pages behind the Basel II Accord did not prevent the crisis, the reason 
being that regulatory arbitrage always ﬁnds routes around particular regulatory rules. 
Bank capital regulation has evolved over the years. Perhaps the most formal attempt to 
come up with universal bank regulation underpinned by best practices came to being in 
1988 when the Group of 10 central banks’ working group under the auspices of the BIS 
crafted the framework titled “International convergence of capital measurement and 
capital standards”, which set out a corset of rules that were intended to ensure financial 
stability and a level playing field among international banks. This would then form the 
basis of the Basel Capital Accords. These are now considered in turn. 
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(a)  Basel I 
The Basel I Accord was the outcome of the working Group of 12 countries’ central bank 
representatives. Its two focal objectives were to strengthen the soundness and stability 
of the international banking system as well as to diminish existing sources of 
competitive inequality among international banks (Balthazar, 2006: 17). The Basel I 
Accord placed emphasis on reducing credit risk. Although the Basel I Accord was 
supposed to be applied to internationally active banks, many countries applied it also at 
national bank level. The salient feature of the accord was that it was anchored on a 
minimum capital level to which banks were to conform. The main principle of the 
solvency rule was to assign to both on-balance and off-balance sheet items a weight 
that was a function of their estimated risk level, and to require a capital level equivalent 
to 8% of those weighted assets. The accord set out to define capital and the structure of 
risk weights. Specifically, it categorised capital into Tier 1 and Tier 2, as set out in Table 
3.1. Tier 2 capital was limited to a maximum of 100% of Tier 1 capital. The risk weights 
are set out in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.1: A definition of capital 
Tier 1                   – Paid-up capital 
                             – Disclosed reserves (retained proﬁts, legal reserves) 
 
Tier 2                    – Undisclosed reserves 
                              – Asset revaluation reserves 
                              – General provisions 
                              – Hybrid instruments (must be unsecured, fully paid-up) 
                              – Subordinated debt (max. 50% Tier 1, min. 5 years – discount factor for  
                                  shorter maturities) 
Deductions           – Goodwill (from Tier 1) 
                               – Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries (from Tier 1 and Tier 2) 
Source: Balthazar (2006: 18) 
A portfolio approach is taken to the measure of risk, with assets classified into four 
buckets (0%, 20%, 50% and 100%) according to the debtor category. This means that 
some assets (essentially bank holdings of government assets such as treasury bills and 
bonds) have no capital requirement, while claims on banks have a 20% weight, which 
translates into a capital charge of the value of the claim. Similarly, the Basel I Accord 
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also proposed weights to be charged on off-balance sheet items, as set out in Table 3.3 
These are derivatives, namely interest rates, foreign exchange, equity derivatives and 
commodities. 
 
Table 3.2: Risk weights assigned to assets 
%                             Item 
0                                – Cash 
                                  – Claims on OECD central governments 
                                  – Claims on other central governments if they are denominated and  
                                     funded in the national currency (to avoid  
                                      country transfer risk) 
 
20                              – Claims on OECD banks and multilateral development banks 
                                  – Claims on banks outside OECD with residual maturity <1 year 
                                  – Claims on public sector entities (PSE) of OECD countries 
 
50                              – Mortgage loans 
100                            – All other claims: claims on corporate, claims on banks outside    
                                     OECD with a maturity >1 year, fixed assets, all other assets. 
Source: Balthazar (2006: 18) 
 
Table 3.3 Credit-conversion factors 
%                                Item 
0                    – Undrawn commitments with an original maturity of max. 1 year 
 
20                  – Short-term self-liquidating trade-related contingencies (e.g. a documentary 
                         credit collateralised by the underlying goods) 
 
50                      – Transaction-related contingencies (e.g. performance bonds) 
                          – Undrawn commitments with an original maturity >1 year 
100                    – Direct credit substitutes (e.g. general guarantees of indebtedness) 
                          – Sale and repurchase agreements 
                          – Forward purchased assets 
Source: Balthazar (2006: 19) 
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The main advantages of the Basel 1 Accord can be enumerated as follows: 
• It revolutionised banking regulation, as it became the yardstick for international best 
practice in addressing risk management from a bank’s capital adequacy perspective. 
• Arguably, it could have resulted in the increase in the observed bank capital ratios in 
the 1990s with banks achieving capital ratios in excess of the 8% threshold 
stipulated by the accord. Since the introduction of the Basel Accord in 1988, the risk-
based capital ratios in developed economies have increased significantly (BIS, 1999: 
6). 
• Moreover, it was simple to apply the Basel I Accord, as it clearly discerned between 
the types of capital as well as the risk weights to apply on assets. In other words, it 
proposed simple tier calculations: Tier 1 capital ratio of 4% and total capital ratio 
(tiers 1 and 2) of 8%. 
 
On the other hand, the major limitations of the accord are as follows: 
• It exclusively focused on credit risk and other risks, such as market risk, operational 
risk and strategic risk, among others, were outside its purview. 
• There exists the notion that fixed minimum capital requirements can affect the real 
economy through reductions in lending when banks are capital-constrained. 
Evidence in support of this notion can be found in a study by BIS (1999: 27), 
whereby in certain countries in some periods banks may have cut back lending to 
achieve higher capital requirements or maintain existing requirements.  
• There was a ‘one-size-fits all’ approach to capital regulation. The requirements were 
virtually the same, whatever the risk level, sophistication and activity type of the 
bank (Balthazar, 2006: 36). 
• It was backward-looking and hence focused on existing assets rather than the future 
composition of a bank’s portfolio. 
• The accord was not as ‘risk-sensitive’, for instance, a corporate loan to a highly 
geared small firm attracted the same capital as a loan to an AAA-rated large 
corporate of 8% because they are both risk-weighted at 100%. 
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• An arbitrary measure of 8% total capital ratio was applied. Suffice to say that this 
was not based on any explicit solvency target. 
• It is possible that the introduction of minimum regulatory capital requirements may 
have harmed the competitiveness of the banking industry. If capital standards 
require a bank to maintain an equity position in excess of what it would hold 
voluntarily, or in response to market pressure, then these standards constitute an 
external constraint on a bank’s operations. In theory, any kind of external 
interference with the activities of a business firm could harm its short-run profitability 
or growth and possibly undercut its long-run viability (BIS, 1999: 37). 
 
In view of the above limitations of the Basel I Accord, it became necessary to review the 
accord in order to strengthen the regulatory framework. These efforts gave birth to the 
Basel II Accord. 
(b) Basel II  
The Basel II Accord was conceived in 2007 after a culmination of years of extensive 
work to revise the Basel I Accord. The objectives of this accord were to increase the 
quality and the stability of the international banking system, to create and maintain a 
level playing field for internationally active banks and to promote the adoption of 
stronger risk-management practices by the banking industry (BIS, 2004:2). The accord 
was anchored on three pillars, namely minimum capital requirements, supervisory 
review and market discipline. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
The first pillar, of minimum capital requirements, set out the amount of capital that 
banks must hold with the 8% threshold remaining the reference value. Further, the 
Basel II Accord Pillar 1 widened the scope of coverage of risks to also cater for market 
and operational risks. The accord also afforded banks the latitude to develop their own 
internal models specific to their portfolios under the advanced approaches. In other 
words, capital requirements now became more closely aligned to internal economic 
capital estimates (the adequate capital level estimated by the bank itself, through its 
internal models). 
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Figure 3.1: The three pillars of Basel II 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
The second pillar consisted of the internal controls and supervisory review process. It 
required banks to have internal systems and models to evaluate their capital 
requirements in parallel to the regulatory framework and integrate the banks’ particular 
risk profile (Balthazar, 2006: 46). Furthermore, the second pillar outlined the principles 
that a bank must follow to make adequate capital provision to cover other risks that are 
not covered under the ambit of the first pillar, including reputational risk, interest rate 
risk, liquidity risk and strategic risk. In addition, according to Balthazar (2006: 46), under 
Pillar 2, regulators were also expected to see that the requirements of Pillar 1 are 
effectively respected, and to evaluate the appropriateness of the internal models set up 
by the banks. If the regulators considered the capital as not being sufficient, they could 
take various actions to remedy the situation. 
The third pillar of the accord focused on market discipline. In essence, the third pillar set 
forth the reporting requirements for market disclosure such as credit risk exposure and 
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credit quality of securitisation holdings. As such, banks were required to build 
comprehensive reports on how they were complying with the accord and also to report 
on their internal risk-management systems. Those reports would have to be published 
at least twice a year. 
The advantages of the Basel II Accord can be enumerated as follows: 
• It offered a somewhat forward-looking risk-sensitive approach to capital 
calculation. 
• The accord also made provision for other risk sources that were not covered by 
the Basel I Accord. 
• It offered more flexibility, as some of the requirements were left to the discretion 
of national regulators. 
• It ensured better recognition of risk-reduction techniques. 
• The accord improved oversight, as it conferred more powers to the national 
regulators as they have the responsibility to evaluate a bank’s capital adequacy 
considering its specific risk profile. 
• It provided detailed mandatory disclosures of risk exposures and risk policies. 
 
The main limitations of the Basel II Accord were as follows: 
• The accord did not capture and make capital provision for all the risks (such as 
liquidity risk) explicitly. 
• Its excessive reliance on external ratings and incorrect internal rating models 
also allowed for artificial reduction of capital requirements and decrease of 
banks’ capacity to withstand systemic crises (Dănilă, 2012: 131). 
 
The limitations of the Basel Accord II highlighted above were laid bare during the course 
of the 2007–2009 GFC. It became imperative, therefore, for the committee to respond to 
the new regulatory challenges facing the banking sector. These efforts culminated into 
the Basel Accord III in 2010, which was to be implemented in phases as from 2013 to 
2019. 
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(c) Basel III 
The Basel III Accord was developed, among other reasons, to reinforce the capital 
requirements in terms of both quality and quantity. The narrative by the Basel 
Committee on Bank Supervision is perhaps instructive and helps interrogate the 
rationale behind the accord. 
One of the main reasons the economic and financial crisis, which began in 2007, 
became so severe was that the banking sectors of many countries had built up 
excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage. This was accompanied by a gradual 
erosion of the level and quality of the capital base. At the same time, many banks 
were holding insufficient liquidity buffers. The banking system therefore was not 
able to absorb the resulting systemic trading and credit losses nor could it cope 
with the reintermediation of large off-balance sheet exposures that had built up in 
the shadow banking system. The crisis was further amplified by a procyclical 
deleveraging process and by the interconnectedness of systemic institutions 
through an array of complex transactions. During the most severe episode of the 
crisis, the market lost confidence in the solvency and liquidity of many banking 
institutions. The weaknesses in the banking sector were rapidly transmitted to the 
rest of the financial system and the real economy, resulting in a massive 
contraction of liquidity and credit availability. Ultimately the public sector had to 
step in with unprecedented injections of liquidity, capital support and guarantees, 
exposing taxpayers to large losses. (BIS, 2010: 1) 
As such, the Basel III Accord was developed to stem this tide. In essence, the 
interventions were centred on enhancing capital requirements. This was buttressed by 
its mandate to reduce procyclicality and promote countercyclicality by introducing capital 
conservation and countercyclical buffers to curtail systemic risk. The other salient 
features of the accord are that firstly, it sought to stem financial leverage by introducing 
a leverage ratio in order to limit a bank’s recourse to debt. Secondly, the accord 
introduced a liquidity coverage ratio that will ensure that banks have sufficient high-
quality liquid assets to cover a 30-day stressed funding scenario.  
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The advantages of the Basel III Accord can be enumerated as follows: 
• It further promotes the financial soundness and stability of banking institutions by 
stipulating higher capital ratios. 
• It enhances coverage of risks such as liquidity and quantifies counterparty credit 
risk. 
• It is forward-looking and addresses risks relevant to bank-specific portfolios and 
the macro-economic environment. 
• The accord embeds stricter data governance and data requirements. 
• It revised the Basel II grey areas on securitisations. 
• The accord sets more conservative market risk requirements. 
• It attempts to lessen the dependency on rating agents. 
 
3.2.2  Deposit insurance 
Deposit insurance schemes are the second instrument used by regulators to foster 
financial stability of banking firms by curtailing the incentive for bank runs to develop. 
Deposit insurance schemes are there to protect depositors against the loss of their 
deposits should their banking institution fail. In essence, deposit insurance guarantees 
that the promised return will be paid to all who withdraw (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983: 
413). Therefore, in the event of the failure of the banking institution, depositors’ loss will 
be partially or fully indemnified. Suffice to highlight that the limit of indemnity depends 
on the insured deposit amount. Further, there are two variants to the deposit insurance 
schemes: They are either compulsory or voluntary. Deposit insurance schemes have 
continued to gain prominence universally. According to the International Association of 
Deposit Insurers (2016), 125 countries worldwide have some form of explicit or implicit 
deposit-protection scheme in place. In practice, this manifests as follows: Bank deposits 
below a certain amount have explicit insurance while bank deposits above that amount 
may enjoy some implicit insurance if the bank is too big to fail (Diamond & Rajan, 2000: 
2455). Against this backdrop the benefits and limitations of deposit insurance schemes 
are now reviewed. 
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The benefits of deposit insurance schemes are great for the economy at large. 
According to Anginer et al. (2014: 313), deposit insurance protects the interests of 
unsophisticated depositors and helps prevent bank runs, which can improve social 
welfare. They further observe that a positive stabilisation effect of deposit insurance is 
naturally more important during economic downturns when contagious bank runs are 
more likely to occur. This viewpoint is bolstered by Chen, Chow and Liu (2014: 13), who 
aver that deposit insurance acts as a financial safety net for preventing bank runs and 
maintaining public confidence. Deposit insurance is a subsidy to banks that could help 
them survive because it enables them to raise funds at close to the risk-free rate and 
improve proﬁtability (Berger & Bouwman, 2013: 150).   
Allen et al. (2011) demonstrate that in some cases, deposit insurance can improve the 
allocation of resources by reducing the use of costly capital. They reason that without 
deposit insurance, limited liability implies that banks must pay a high rate of interest to 
compensate for losses when they default. Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998: 752) 
contend that without any deposit insurance, there is excessive information production by 
depositors and ex-post inefficient bank runs may arise too often, more than that 
required to discipline bank management’s choice of assets. 
The downside of deposit insurance is the inherent moral hazard problem attributable to 
any insurance arrangement. This is a situation whereby the insured (in this case the 
insured bank), having purchased insurance protection, no longer acts as if it were 
uninsured, and becomes reckless in its conduct, thereby magnifying the risk at hand. In 
the present context, this might mean that the bank that has sought deposit-protection 
insurance become reckless in its lending. There is extant literature that explores this 
notion. Among the proponents of this standpoint are Bhattacharya et al. (1998: 755–
456), who posit that deposit insurance engenders two forms of moral hazard. Firstly, it 
induces the insured bank to keep a lower level of cash asset reserves than it would in 
the absence of deposit insurance, as the deposit insurer is available to absorb liquidity 
shocks. The bank may suffer. Secondly, it induces the insured bank to invest in riskier 
assets than it would if it were uninsured. It is also essential that the regulators ensure 
that an appropriate level of coverage is selected. According to Chen et al. (2014: 13), if 
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coverage is too low, it fails to protect small and unsophisticated depositors. They further 
state that problems related to moral hazards are likely to occur if the level of coverage is 
set too high. Their reason for this is because a higher level of coverage provides 
incentives for banks to take greater risks and the potential to lead to an overall rise in 
the level of instability within the financial system. Aside from the moral hazard 
conundrum, there is the issue of mispricing of bank debt; the reasoning being that in the 
absence of deposit-protection insurance, the market will price debt to accurately reflect 
the risk and monitors or imposes risk covenants to control risk. However, in the 
presence of deposit-protection insurance this practice diminishes (Prescott, 2001: 43). 
From the foregoing, the uncontested facts are that the benefits of deposit-protection 
insurance outweigh its limitations. What is required of regulators therefore is to choose 
a deposit-protection insurance scheme that is priced appropriately and that will curtail 
the deviant behaviour of banks. Furthermore, effective regulation requires that 
regulatory authorities achieve the right mix by complementing capital regulation with an 
optimally priced deposit insurance regime.  
3.3  THE REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 
The regulation of insurance companies follows the same pattern as that of banking 
institutions. It is aimed at fostering the financial stability of insurance companies as well 
as instilling market discipline. In insurance one metric that is of greater importance in 
gauging financial stability is the solvency margin. The solvency margin is the amount by 
which the assets exceed the liabilities. The ratio of the solvency margin to the premiums 
or to the volume of underwritings is a generally accepted measure of solvency in non-
life insurance (Gebizlioglu & Dhaene, 2009: 1). The solvency of life insurance 
companies is usually measured by the ratio of solvency margin to the amount of 
technical reserves. The risk capital for an insurer must be sufficient to a high degree of 
confidence in order to cover the unexpected losses stemming especially from the claim 
amounts so that the problem of insolvency is not faced with at all. On the one hand, 
solvency regulation seeks to protect policyholders against the risk that insurers will not 
be able to meet their financial obligations. On the other hand, market regulation 
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attempts to ensure fair and reasonable insurance prices, products and trade prices 
(Klein, 1995: 368). 
The regulation of insurance companies has evolved over the years, focusing on the twin 
objectives of safeguarding the financial stability and instilling market discipline of 
insurance companies. The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA) and International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) bodies have 
been at the forefront of developing standards that are considered to be best practices in 
the regulation of insurance companies. The IAIS was established in 1994 and has 
regulators from more than 140 countries. Its mandate is to develop principles, standards 
and other supporting material for the supervision of the insurance sector and to assist in 
their implementation (IAIS, 2014: 2). The IAIS has developed the Insurance Core 
Principles (ICP), which were implemented in 2011 and provide guidance to regulators 
on enforcing solvency requirements and market conduct. On the other hand, the 
European Commission and later its body EIOPA have developed frameworks that have 
proven to be the mainstay of solvency regulations. These have come to be known as 
Solvency I and Solvency II, respectively. At the core of these standards are capital 
requirements. Capital standards are the linchpin of solvency regulations (Klein, 1995: 
369). This view is buttressed by Mathur (2001: 60), who contends that the purpose of 
solvency regulation, of which capital adequacy is a major component, is to ensure the 
financial soundness of insurers and the need for it generated by costly information and 
agency problems (limited liability diminishes the incentive to maintain safety). The 
standards and ICP are now discussed in turn. 
3.3.1  Solvency regulations 
The solvency regulations were enacted to ensure the financial stability of insurance 
firms. They entail capital adequacy regulations. The European Commission issued the 
first directive (Directive 73/239/EEC) in 1973, which set forth the regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct 
insurance other than life assurance. Directive 73/239/EEC formed the bedrock of the 
Solvency 1 regime. This directive had then been varied by 13 other directives. The 
2007–2009 GFC necessitated that the regulators revisit the regulatory framework of 
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insurance companies. Likewise, the regulators responded with a cocktail of regulatory 
interventions to fortify the financial soundness of insurance companies. It is instructive 
to note that there was a paradigm shift in regulation to that of macro-prudential focus. 
As such, the regulatory responses of the insurance sectors mirrored those of the 
banking sector. The European Commission also led the way and issued Directive 
2009/138/EC in 2009, on the taking up and pursuit of the business of insurance and 
reinsurance, which is the basis of the Solvency II framework.  
(a) Solvency I 
Solvency I was born out of the European Commission Directive 73/239/EEC in 1973. 
According to Swain and Swallow (2015: 142), Solvency I is a simple, rules-based 
regulatory framework that prescribes basic requirements for insurance companies. 
Solvency I was introduced as an interim measure to allow for a more fundamental 
review of the European solvency regime. As such it has some flaws. Chiefly among the 
limitations of Solvency I are the following: 
• It lacked risk-sensitivity. Owing to its simplistic factor-based approach, this did 
not lead to an accurate assessment of each insurer’s risks. 
• It failed to adequately differentiate between the riskiness of different product 
lines. Insurers should have more capital when writing riskier, more volatile 
business, but this was not necessarily the case under Solvency I because of the 
way the capital requirements were calculated (Swain & Swallow, 2015: 142). 
• It did not entail an optimal allocation of capital, i.e. an allocation that is efficient in 
terms of risk and return for shareholders. 
• It took a partial balance sheet approach. The basic European Solvency I capital 
requirements ignored the risks that may crystallise on the asset side of the 
balance sheet. 
 
The above limitations necessitated that the Solvency I framework be reviewed. This led 
to the enactment of the Solvency II regime in 2009. 
 
77 
 
(b)  Solvency II 
The structural weaknesses of Solvency I, which had been laid bare during the 2007–
2009 GFC, necessitated the revision of the framework. Out of this process was born 
Solvency II in 2009 with an implementation date of 2012. The main objectives of 
Solvency II were to ensure better regulation and deeper integration of EU insurance 
market as well as the protection of policyholders and increasing the competitiveness of 
EU insurers (Peleckienė & Peleckis, 2014: 823). The Solvency II framework is 
analogous to the Basel III framework in that it is supported by three pillars (refer to 
Figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2: The three pillars of Solvency II 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
The three pillars of Solvency II can be described as follows: Firstly, Pillar 1 sets out 
quantitative requirements, including the rules to value assets and liabilities (in particular, 
technical provisions), to calculate capital requirements and to identify eligible own funds 
to cover those requirements. Secondly, Pillar 2 focuses on supervisory review. It sets 
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out requirements for risk management, governance, as well as the details of the 
supervisory process with competent authorities. Lastly, Pillar 3 focuses on market 
discipline. Essentially, Pillar 3 addresses transparency, reporting to supervisory 
authorities and disclosure to the public, thereby enhancing market discipline and 
increasing comparability, leading to more competition (European Commission, 2015). 
The salient features of the Solvency II regime are the following: 
• Enhanced quality of capital: The emphasis with the solvency regime is to improve 
the quality of capital. Solvency II takes a cue from the banking sector and classifies 
capital into three tiers. Tier 1 comprises of the highest-quality capital, being equity 
and retained earnings. This should be able to absorb losses on a going-concern 
basis. Tier 2 capital comprises of subordinated debt and is of lower quality that only 
needs to absorb losses on insolvency. Tier 3 capital is the lowest quality of capital 
permitted and has only limited loss-absorbing capacity (Swain & Swallow, 2015: 
144). 
• Forward-looking risk-based capital requirements: Capital requirements under 
Solvency II are forward-looking and economic in that they are to be tailored to the 
specific risks borne by each insurer, allowing an optimal allocation of capital. They 
are defined along a two-step ladder, including the solvency capital requirements and 
the minimum capital requirements, in order to trigger proportionate and timely 
supervisory intervention. The solvency capital requirement is the quantity of capital 
that is intended to provide protection against unexpected losses over the following 
year. The minimum capital requirements denote a level below which policyholders 
would be exposed to an unacceptable level of risk (European Commission, 2015). 
• Improved governance and risk management: Equally key to the Solvency II is good 
governance practices and strong risk management, which are essential aspects of a 
prudential regulatory framework. As such, Solvency II requires insurers to take a 
comprehensive approach to considering their risks through own risk and solvency 
assessment. 
• Market discipline through firm disclosures: Solvency II introduces new reporting and 
disclosure requirements for firms, with the aim of improving the availability of 
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information to the market. Firms will be required to publish a solvency and financial 
condition report annually and disclose additional information privately to regulators. 
In this report, firms need to clearly explain aspects of their approach to Solvency II, 
such as the use of an internal model and any non-compliance with regulatory 
solvency requirements (Swain & Swallow, 2015: 146). 
 
In conclusion, the solvency regulations are macro-prudential regulations that are set to 
secure the insurance industry in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 GFC. It is plausible 
that they seek to enhance the capital requirements, risk management and market 
discipline of insurance firms. To engrain all these imperatives into business practice, the 
IAIS crafted what would be considered the ICP into a code of conduct for application by 
insurance regulators. It is important to note that the ICP framework complements the 
solvency regimen. 
 
3.3.2  Insurance Core Principles    
The ICP were developed by the IAIS and implemented as from 2011. According to the 
IAIS (2015), the ICPs provide a globally accepted framework for the supervision of the 
insurance sector. The ICP material is presented according to a hierarchy of supervisory 
material. The ICP statements are the highest level in the hierarchy and prescribe the 
essential elements that must be present in the supervisory regime in order to promote a 
financially sound insurance sector and provide an adequate level of policyholder 
protection. There are 26 ICPs in the framework. A review of the ICPs that are consistent 
with the three pillars of Solvency II follows. 
Firstly, ICP17 provides for capital adequacy. It makes it incumbent upon the supervisor 
to establish capital adequacy requirements for solvency purposes so that insurers can 
absorb significant unforeseen losses and to provide for degrees of supervisory 
intervention. This is consistent with the first pillar of Solvency II, which focuses on 
quantitative requirements. Secondly, ICP 8 focuses on risk management and internal 
controls. It provides that the supervisor requires an insurer to have, as part of its overall 
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corporate governance framework risk management and internal controls. This is 
consistent with the second pillar of Solvency 2, which focuses on supervisory review. 
Thirdly, ICP 20 provides for public disclosure. It makes it a requirement that insurers 
disclose relevant, comprehensive and adequate information on a timely basis in order to 
give policyholders and market participants a clear view of their business activities, 
performance and financial position. This is expected to enhance market discipline and 
understanding of the risks to which an insurer is exposed and the manner in which 
those risks are managed. This is consistent with the third pillar of the Solvency II 
framework. The other parallels are set out in Table 3.4. Suffice to highlight that the 
Solvency II and ICP frameworks reinforce each other in the regulation of insurance 
companies. 
Table 3.4: Comparison matrix of Solvency II and Insurance Core Principles  
 
SOLVENCY II INSURANCE CORE PRINCIPLES 
Pillar 1: Quantitative requirements 
Capital requirements 
ICP 14: Valuation 
ICP 15: Investment 
ICP 16: Enterprise risk management for 
solvency purposes 
ICP 17: Capital adequacy 
Pillar 2: Supervisory review 
Governance, risk management and 
supervision 
ICP 7: Corporate governance 
ICP 8: Risk management and internal  
controls 
ICP 9: Supervisory review and reporting 
Pillar 3: Market discipline 
Disclosure and transparency 
ICP 19: Conduct of business 
ICP 20: Public disclosure 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
 
3.4 FINANCIAL REGULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Financial regulation in South Africa has evolved over the years from the traditional silo 
approach to the present-day dispensation of macro-prudential regulation (twin-peaks 
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approach). Arguably, financial regulation in South Africa mirrors global best practices. 
According to the IMF (2014: 10), South Africa’s financial sector is large and 
sophisticated. Financial sector assets amount to 298% of the GDP, a ratio exceeding 
that of most emerging market economies. Further, non-banking financial institutions, 
which have grown rapidly in recent years, hold about two-thirds of financial assets – 
also unusually large for an emerging market economy. Botha and Makina (2011: 31) 
contend that the financial services sector of South Africa is well developed, just like 
those in advanced economies, such that regulatory issues are equally important to 
warrant the attention of authorities both nationally and internationally. Botha and Makina 
(2011) further state that internationally, South Africa is a member of the Group of 20 
countries and a member of BIS and has one seat on the Financial Stability Board, which 
coordinates regulation at the international level. These imperatives therefore lead the 
South African regulators to embrace global best practices. 
According to the IMF (2014: 10), the South African financial sector has a high degree of 
concentration and interconnectedness. The top five banks hold 90.5% of banking 
assets, the top five insurers account for 74% of the long-term insurance market, and the 
seven largest fund managers control 60% of unit trust assets. All major banks are 
affiliated with insurance companies through holding companies or direct ownership. 
Bank-affiliated insurers underwrite a substantial proportion of private pension assets, 
and some banks also own fund managers that offer unit trusts. These imperatives 
therefore lay bare the necessity for South African regulators to embrace the twin-peaks 
model in order to best manage systemic risk.  
3.4.1  Banking regulation in South Africa 
The banking sector in South Africa is regulated by a number of statutory bodies. At the 
apex of the regulatory authorities is the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). The 
SARB was established in 1921 and is responsible for ensuring the overall soundness of 
the South African monetary, banking and financial system. This includes specific 
responsibilities for monetary policy, banking supervision and currency (BIS, 2015: 6). 
Besides the SARB, other authorities directly or indirectly involved in banking supervision 
include the FSB, the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) and the National Credit 
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Regulator (NCR), which are each governed by a dedicated Act (IMF, 2010: 6). The FSB 
is responsible for supervising non-banking financial institutions such as insurance 
companies, pension funds, money market funds and stockbrokers. The FIC’s principal 
task is to combat abuse of financial services, while the NCR is principally a consumer-
protection agency. The relevant Acts provide for cooperation between the SARB and 
the other authorities. Table 3.5 summarises the principal Acts that regulate the banking 
sector.  
Table 3.5: Principal Acts in the regulation of South African banks 
Act Main provisions relating to banking 
The Banks Act, 1990 (as 
amended in 2007) 
1. Confers to the SARB bank licensing and supervision authority of 
banks 
2. Conduct of the business of a bank 
3. Prudential requirements 
Banks Amendment Act, 
2013 
1. Provides that a contravention of the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act, 2001, is a cause for suspension or cancellation of 
registration as a bank  
2. Aligns the Banks Act, 1990, with the Companies Act, 2008 
3. Makes provisions to comply with the requirements of the Basel 
Committee of Banking Supervision 
Mutual Banks Act, 1993 
(amended 1999) 
Provides for the regulation and supervision of the activities of juristic 
persons doing business as mutual banks 
Co-operative Banks Act, 
2007 
1. Promotes the development of sustainable and responsible co-
operative banks   
2. Establishes an appropriate regulatory framework and regulatory 
institutions for co-operative banks that protect members of co-
operative banks  
3. Provides for the registration of deposit-taking financial services 
co-operatives as co-operative banks  
4. Provides for the regulation and supervision of co-operative banks  
5. Provides for the establishment of co-operative banks supervisors 
and a development agency for co-operative banks 
Financial Intelligence 
Centre Act, 2001 
Banks are required to : 
1. Report to the FIC cash transactions above a prescribed limit 
2. Report to the FIC electronic transfers of money to or from the 
country above a prescribed limit. 
3. Report to the FIC suspicious and unusual activities conducted by 
a person or business. 
National Credit Act 
(NCA), 2005 
1. Prohibits certain unfair credit and credit-marketing practices 
2. Promotes responsible credit granting and use and prohibits 
reckless credit granting 
Financial Services Board 
Act, 1990 
Provides for the establishment of a board to supervise compliance 
with laws regulating financial institutions and the provision of 
financial services 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
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Notwithstanding, the authorities were planning to adopt a twin-peaks model, which was 
expected to be finalised during 2016, that includes a Prudential Authority and a 
Financial Sector Conduct Authority (BIS, 2015: 6). Subsequently, a bill that provides for 
the adoption of the twin peaks model was passed by the National Assembly and 
National Council of the Provinces in December 2016 and May 2017 respectively. 
According to the IMF (2010: 4), banking supervision in South Africa has been effective 
and has contributed to reducing the impact of the GFC on the financial sector. 
Throughout the crises, the banks have remained profitable and capital adequacy ratios 
have been maintained well above the regulatory minimum. The SARB has timeously 
implemented the requirements of the Basel accords over the years. Suffice to highlight 
that in the South African dispensation, the provisions of the accords need to be first 
codified into law before they can take effect. This has been done by the amendments to 
the Banking Act in 2007 and 2013 to give effect to the provisions of the Basel II and 
Basel III accords, respectively. The provisions of the Basel II Accord were implemented 
as from 1 January 2008, whereas the Basel III provisions were implemented as from 1 
January 2013. 
The South African banking sector was largely unscathed during the 2007–2009 GFC. 
This has been in part attributable to the quality of banking supervision (IMF, 2010: 6). 
This can be closely linked to the regulatory framework adopted by the country. 
According to the National Treasury (2011: 13), a sound framework for financial 
regulation and well-regulated institutions ensured that potential risks were anticipated 
and appropriate action was taken to mitigate them. The same report notes that South 
African regulators have generally not followed a light-touch approach. Sustainable credit 
extension has been possible through effective legislation, such as the NCA (which came 
into effect in 2008), strong regulatory action and good risk-management systems at 
banks. This viewpoint is reinforced by the NCR (2012: 20), which concurs that it is 
widely acclaimed that South Africa was largely insulated from the GFC because of its 
more rigorous regulatory environment, which governs the extension of credit.  
The NCA is acknowledged to have gone a long way in ensuring that South Africa was 
not as seriously affected by global patterns as were many of the world’s leading 
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economies. Figure 3.3 depicts the trends in credit immediately before and after the 
implementation of the NCA in January 2008. The credit advanced by banks in South 
Africa contracted from R102 billion in the last quarter of 2007 to a lowest of R50 billion 
in the second quarter of 2009. Thereafter, credit started to grow steadily to a peak of 
R108 billion in the last quarter of 2011. Thereafter, it fluctuated between this value and 
R121 billion. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Trends in consumer credit in South Africa 
Source: Researcher’s compilation from data obtained from Quantec database 
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roughly 45 800 achieved in the third quarter of 2011 (see Figure 3.4). The foregoing 
gives credence to the notion that perhaps the implementation of the NCA in South 
Africa curtailed the reckless lending practices of banks. Arguably, this in turn insulated 
the South African banking sector from the 2007–2009 GFC. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Trends in total number of mortgages granted in South Africa 
Source: Researcher’s compilation from data obtained from Quantec database. 
 
Notwithstanding that the South African regulators have embraced the Basel capital 
standards, they have not implemented any deposit insurance scheme to date. 
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limited progress has been made in the launching of a deposit insurance scheme in 
South Africa. 
A draft Deposit Insurance Bill has been on the drawing board since 2008. It was 
circulated by the National Treasury to interested parties for comments, but discussions 
between the relevant parties are still ongoing and no timeline for finalisation or public 
consultation of the proposals has been set. The IMF (2014: 7) also reinforces the need 
for regulatory authorities in South Africa to introduce deposit insurance in order to 
reduce systemic liquidity risk. Therefore, it would seem as if the deposit insurance 
scheme is the missing link in banking regulation in South Africa. 
3.4.2 Insurance regulation in South Africa 
The primary board that regulates the insurance sector in South Africa is the FSB. The 
FSB is responsible for promoting the maintenance of a fair, safe and stable insurance 
market for the benefit and protection of policyholders. The FSB supervises and enforces 
insurers’ compliance with the financial soundness, governance and conduct of business 
requirements of the Long-term and Short-term Insurance Acts. Further, the FSB also 
develops regulatory proposals on how these requirements may need to be adapted to 
best meet the objectives of insurance regulation and supervision. Similar to the banking 
dispensation, there are other regulatory authorities that also regulate the insurance 
sector; this includes the SARB and the NCR. 
Principally, the Short-Term Insurance Act of 1998, the Long-Term Insurance Act of 
1998, the Insurance Laws Amendment Act of 2008 and the Companies Act of 2008 
govern the transaction of insurance business in South Africa (Sibindi & Zingwevu, 2015: 
100). Table 3.6 outlines the key statutes that regulate the conduct of insurance business 
in South Africa.  
Insurance regulation in South Africa has evolved over the years and takes its cue from 
global best practices. The insurance industry is also moving towards the twin-peaks 
regulatory regime in tandem with the banking industry. In the aftermath of the 2007–
2009 GFC, far-reaching insurance regulatory reforms have been instituted.  
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Table 3.6: Principal Acts in the regulation of insurance companies 
Act Main provisions relating to insurance 
Long-Term Insurance 
Act (Act 52 of 1998) 
To provide for the registration of long-term insurers, for the 
control of certain activities of long-term insurers and 
intermediaries and for matters connected therewith  
Short-Term Insurance 
Act (Act 53 of 1998) 
 
To provide for the registration of short-term insurers, for the 
control of certain activities of short-term insurers and 
intermediaries and for matters connected therewith 
Insurance Laws 
Amendment Act (Act 27 
of 2008) 
To amend certain provisions relating to the Long-Term 
Insurance Act and the Short-Term Insurance Act 
Financial Advisory and 
Intermediary Services 
Act (Act 37 of 2002) 
 
1. To protect the consumer, the financial services industry 
and all staff employed therein, whether they render advice or 
not 
2. To create a profession within the financial services industry 
3. To regulate the giving of advice 
Financial Services 
Ombudsman Schemes 
Act (Act 37 of 2004) 
1. To provide for the recognition of financial services 
ombudsman schemes 
2. To lay down minimum requirements for ombudsman 
schemes 
3. To promote consumer education with regard to 
ombudsman schemes 
Companies Act (Act 71 
of 2008) 
1. To provide for the incorporation, registration, organisation 
and management of companies, the capitalisation of profit 
companies, and the registration of offices of foreign 
companies carrying on business within South Africa 
2. To define the relationships between companies and their 
respective shareholders or members and directors  
3. To provide for equitable and efficient amalgamations, 
mergers and takeovers of companies 
4. To provide for efficient rescue of financially distressed 
companies  
5. To provide appropriate legal redress for investors and 
third parties with respect to companies 
National Credit Act 
(NCA), 2005 
1. Prohibits certain unfair credit and credit marketing 
practices 
2. Promotes responsible credit granting and use and 
prohibits reckless credit granting 
Financial Services 
Board Act, 1990 
Provides for the establishment of a board to supervise 
compliance with laws regulating financial institutions and the 
provision of financial services 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
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These have been premised on the adoption of the Solvency II provisions as well as the 
ICP framework. In the South African dispensation a derivative framework (analogous to 
Solvency II), called Solvency Assessment and Management (SAM), which is also based 
on three pillars, has been developed since 2011. The SAM framework is being codified 
into law through the amendment of the relevant insurance laws expected to be finalised 
in 2017. The enhanced prudential framework for insurers forms part of the twin-peaks 
reforms, which seek to significantly enhance South Africa’s financial regulatory and 
supervisory framework by enabling a proactive, pre-emptive and risk-based approach to 
regulating and supervising the financial sector (FSB, 2015a: 6). SAM consists of three 
pillars, namely financial soundness, governance and risk management, and disclosure 
requirements. This is illustrated in Figure 3.5.  
 
Figure 3.5: The three pillars of SAM  
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
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The provisions of SAM are intended to enhance the financial soundness and foster the 
market discipline of insurance companies in South Africa. It is envisaged that all the 
provisions of the SAM framework will be implemented in 2017 once the Insurance 
Amendment Bill has been passed into law. In the interim, the FSB has implemented 
some of the reforms through subordinate regulations. For instance, the core provisions 
of Pillar 2 of governance and risk management have been instituted through board 
notice 158 of 2014, which came into effect in April 2015. 
In summary, South Africa embraces best practices in insurance regulation. The South 
African insurance regulatory landscape can be said to be dynamic. As such, the 
researcher’s hunch was that the insurance regulatory imperative would probably have a 
bearing on the capital structure choices of insurance companies. In the next section the 
determinants of banks’ capital structure are discussed. 
3.5  THE DETERMINANTS OF BANKS’ CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Extant studies on capital structure have generally excluded financial firms from their 
analysis. This has been premised on the notion that financial firms have peculiar firm 
characteristics. For instance, in the context of banking institutions, the deposit-taking 
ability sets them apart from other non-financial firms. This ability to generate deposits 
lends them an extra source of finance. The second peculiar feature of banking firms is 
that they are subject to capital regulation, which could also have a bearing on their 
capital structure choices. The standard view is that capital regulation constitutes an 
additional, overriding departure from the M&M irrelevance proposition. Subsequently, it 
has been proven by Gropp and Heider (2010) that there are similarities between the 
capital structures of banks and non-financial firms. Against this backdrop it is imperative 
to examine the capital structure imperatives of banking institutions, paying particular 
regard to bank-level firm characteristics that may impact on the capital structure 
choices. 
3.5.1  Banking regulation 
The regulation of banking firms may promote or curtail banks from operating at their 
desired target capital structure. According to Ahmad and Abbas (2011: 201), following 
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mandatory bank capital standard requirements, banks are involved in both voluntary 
and involuntary capital structure decisions. Ahmad and Abbas (2011) further state that 
voluntary capital structure decisions of banks are considered the same as in non-
financial settings; the same theories and determinants of capital structure are applied to 
decisions relating to capital structure. Involuntary capital structure decisions are 
enforced on the banks by regulatory authorities after deviating from the prescribed and 
adequacy capital requirements as directed by the regulators. The motivation behind the 
holding of buffer capital is one such voluntary capital structure decision by banks, which 
continues to baffle researchers and regulators alike.  
Several reasons have been advanced in attempting to address the rationale behind 
banks keeping buffer capital. Buffer capital may be defined as the amount of capital that 
banks hold in excess of the minimum regulatory capital requirement. Berger et al. 
(1995: 8) contend that banks may hold a substantial buffer of additional capital as 
financial slack so that they can borrow additional funds quickly and cheaply in the event 
of unexpected profitable investment opportunities. Similarly, such a buffer of capital 
protects against costly unexpected shocks to capital if the financial distress costs from 
low capital are substantial and the transactions costs of raising new capital quickly are 
very high. Buffer capital can further act as a cushion, absorbing costly unexpected 
shocks, particularly if the financial distress costs from low capital, and the costs of 
accessing new capital quickly, are high (Jokipii & Milne, 2008: 1441). Proponents of the 
‘buffer capital view’ argue that banks hold capital as a buffer against insolvency. As 
such, banks have an incentive to avoid failure through a variety of means, including 
holding a capital buffer of sufficient size, holding enough liquid assets and engaging in 
risk management (Cebenoyan & Strahan, 2004: 2). The impact of regulation has banks 
holding capital buffers, or discretionary capital, above the regulatory minimum in order 
to avoid the costs associated with having to issue fresh equity at short notice (Gropp & 
Heider, 2010: 595). In essence, by holding capital as a buffer, banks essentially insure 
themselves against costs related to market discipline or supervisory intervention in the 
event of a violation of the requirements. 
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The empirical evidence in support of the buffer capital view has been mixed. In support, 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004: 443), among other scholars, found evidence that for all 
kinds of banks the buffer capital has always been much greater than zero. Gambacorta 
and Mistrulli (2004) reason that this is consistent with the hypothesis that capital is 
difﬁcult to adjust and that banks create a cushion against contingencies. Koziol and 
Lawrenz (2009:871) also found evidence that banks do not hold the minimum capital, 
but have voluntary capital buffers. Harding, Liang and Ross (2013) found evidence that 
there exists an interior optimal capital ratio for banks with deposit insurance, a minimum 
capital ratio and bank franchise value. They reason that banks voluntarily choose to 
hold capital in excess of the required minimum. Allen et al. (2011) and Jacques and 
Nigro (1997) also found evidence that banks will hold buffer capital in excess of 
regulatory requirements. 
There is another strand of literature that does not find support for the buffer view of 
capital. Gropp and Heider (2010: 589) found that high levels of banks’ discretionary 
capital do not appear to be explained by buffers that banks hold to insure against falling 
below the minimum capital requirement. Moreover, banks that would face a lower cost 
of raising equity at short notice (profitable, dividend-paying banks with high market-to-
book ratios) tend to hold significantly more capital. Teixeira et al. (2014: 56) also failed 
to find evidence in support of the buffer view.  
It is also instructive to note that the conservation of buffer capital has been instituted in 
the Basel III Accord, regardless of the unresolved debates. Suffice to conjecture that the 
advantages of banks keeping buffer capital outweigh the disadvantages. According to 
BIS (2010: 9), the purpose of a buffer is to provide capital sufficient for a banking firm to 
withstand downturn events and still remain above its regulatory minimum capital 
requirement.  
As has been demonstrated hitherto, capital requirements and deposit insurance are the 
two regulatory instruments that are in the armoury of the banking regulator that could 
have a bearing on the capital structure choices of banking firms. Gropp and Heider 
(2010: 589) set out to establish whether capital requirements are indeed a first-order 
determinant of banks’ capital structure. They employed cross-section and time-series 
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variation in a sample of large, publicly traded banks spanning 16 countries, namely the 
USA and 15 countries of the EU from 1991 until 2004. They also sought to establish 
whether deposit insurance determines the capital structure of banking firms. To the 
contrary, they established that neither capital regulation nor deposit insurance is a first-
order determinant of the capital structure of banks. They reason that the implication is 
that capital regulation is not binding. They also report similarities in the determinants of 
capital structures of banks and non-financial firms. Teixeira et al. (2014: 34) also set out 
to establish whether regulation is a first-order determinant of bank capital structure. 
They employed panel data of a sample of 560 banks, 379 from the USA and 181 from 
Europe, spanning 23 countries, for the period 2004–2010. They found that the factors 
affecting the capital structure of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms play an important role in explaining 
banks’ capital structure. They reason that this suggests that regulation may not be a 
ﬁrst-order determinant of banks’ share of equity capital. They also document a strong 
similarity in the factors affecting the capital structure of banks and those of non-ﬁnancial 
ﬁrms. 
The foregoing suggests that banking regulation determines capital structure to a certain 
extent. Banking firms would stock up capital motivated by a variety of reasons, chief 
among them being fear of regulatory sanction, as well as the costs associated with 
raising capital at short notice should it fall below the required minimum. However, there 
are studies that have documented that the buffer capital stocked by banking firms is in 
excess and is inexplicable in terms of providing a cushion against the regulatory 
minimum. It has also been demonstrated that capital regulation might not necessarily be 
a first-order determinant of bank capital structure, but of secondary importance. This is 
a test for the efficacy of bank capital regulation. The implication is that the minimum 
capital requirements set for banks may not be binding in such a scenario. The majority 
of the studies also discount the moral hazard hypothesis of deposit insurance – that 
banks would seek to take advantage of mispriced deposit insurance. In addition, deposit 
insurance does not come to the fore as a primary determinant of capital structure.  
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3.5.2  Credit risk management 
Banks manage credit risk in a variety of ways. The principal methods employed by 
banks to manage risks of their loan portfolio include the purchasing of credit derivatives 
as well as securitisation. One strand of literature has explored the relationship between 
risk management and the capital structure of banking institutions. This has been 
premised on the notion that banks that actively manage their credit risk through, for 
instance, the loan sales market (securitisation) are bound to keep lower levels of capital 
as compared to the banks that manage the credit risk passively. The second strand of 
literature advances the risk-absorption hypothesis. Proponents of this view posit that 
bank capital absorbs risk and expands banks’ risk-bearing capacity. 
The first strand of literature focuses on the relationship between credit risk management 
and capital structure choices. Among these studies, Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004: 2), 
using a sample of all domestic commercial banks in the USA, tested whether banks that 
are better able to trade credit risks in the loan sales market experience significant 
benefits. They found evidence that banks that purchase and sell their loans (their proxy 
for banks that use the loan sales market to engage in credit risk management) hold a 
lower level of capital per dollar of assets than banks not engaged in loan buying or 
selling. They also document that banks that operate on both sides of the loan sales 
market also hold less capital than either banks that only sell loans but do not buy them, 
or banks that only buy loans but do not sell them. They reason that this difference is 
important is because it suggests that the active rebalancing of credit risk – buying and 
selling rather than just selling (or buying) – allows banks to alter their capital structure. 
Further, Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) posit that their results also suggest that banks 
use the risk-reducing benefits of risk management to take on more profitable but higher-
risk activities to operate with greater financial leverage. Froot and Stein (1998: 55) 
found that at the same time that banks were investing in illiquid assets, most banks also 
appeared to engage in active risk-management programmes. They postulate that, 
holding fixed its capital structure, there are two broad ways in which a bank can control 
its exposure to risk. Firstly, some risks can be offset simply via hedging transactions in 
the capital market. Secondly, for those risks where direct hedging transactions are not 
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feasible, the other way for the bank to control its exposure is by altering its investment 
policies. Therefore, with illiquid risks, the bank’s capital budgeting and risk-management 
functions become linked. 
The second strand of literature tests the risk-absorption hypothesis. Among these 
studies, Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2015:613) developed a model that demonstrates 
that when banks directly ﬁnance risky investments, they hold a positive amount of equity 
capital as a way to reduce bankruptcy costs and always prefer to diversify, if possible. In 
contrast, when banks provide loans to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms that invest in risky assets, 
diversiﬁcation is not always optimal. Berger and Bouwman (2009: 3784) examined bank 
liquidity creation by employing a sample including almost all commercial banks in the 
USA that were in business during the period 1993–2003. They found that for large 
banks, the relationship between capital and liquidity creation is positive, consistent with 
the expected empirical dominance of the ‘risk-absorption’ effect. In sharp contrast, for 
small banks, the relationship between capital and liquidity creation is negative, 
consistent with the expected dominance of the ‘ﬁnancial fragility crowding out’ effect for 
these institutions. The relationship is not signiﬁcant for medium banks, suggesting that 
the two effects cancel each other out for this size class.  
Credit risk management carries much importance in the formulation of capital structure 
policies of banking organisations. It has been demonstrated that those banking 
institutions that actively manage credit risk will be much inclined to keep lower levels of 
buffer capital in comparison to those who do not actively manage the risk. On the other 
hand, the risk-absorption hypothesis predicts that large banks are most likely to keep 
higher levels of buffer capital in order to be best placed in absorbing more risks, as they 
grow their loan book. 
3.5.3 Regulatory capital arbitrage 
The 2007–2009 GFC were occasioned by high levels of risk taking by financial 
institution players and individuals alike. Arguably, banks assumed high levels of risk, 
made possible by exploiting regulatory capital arbitrage opportunities. According to BIS 
(1999: 21), banks in a number of countries were using securitisation to alter the profile 
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of their book. This may make a bank’s capital ratio look artificially high relative to the 
riskiness of the remaining exposures, and in some cases may be motivated by a desire 
to achieve exactly this. The very broad risk categories in the Basel I Accord gave scope 
for banks to arbitrage between their economic assessment of risk and the regulatory 
capital requirements.  
The motivation behind banks undertaking capital arbitrage is to keep financing costs at 
the lowest. The BIS (1999: 22) perhaps gives a persuasive account about regulatory 
capital arbitrage:  
[R]egulatory capital arbitrage reflects banks’ efforts to keep their funding costs, inclusive 
of equity, as low as possible. As the cost of equity is generally perceived to be much 
greater than the cost of debt, when banks are required to maintain equity cushions 
exceeding what they would otherwise choose, it is natural for banks to view capital 
standards as a form of regulatory taxation… 
 The same report identifies four types of capital arbitrage, which are discussed below.  
(i) Cherry-picking 
This is the oldest form of capital arbitrage. Within a particular risk-weight category, such 
as 100% risk-weighted assets, cherry-picking is the practice of shifting the portfolio’s 
composition towards lower-quality credits. For example, in order to boost its return on 
equity, a bank may decide to originate fewer BBB-rated loans in favour of more BB-
rated loans. In this case, the bank’s total risk-weighted assets and regulatory capital 
ratios would appear unchanged, even as its overall riskiness increased. 
(ii) Securitisation with partial recourse 
For many banks, securitisation is a more cost-effective approach to capital arbitrage 
than traditional cherry-picking. Securitisation involves the sale of assets to a ‘special-
purpose vehicle’ (SPV), which finances this purchase through issuance of asset-backed 
securities to private investors. For bankruptcy, accounting and regulatory purposes, 
SPVs generally are treated as legally separate from the sponsoring bank, and so are 
not consolidated into the sponsor’s financial statements and regulatory reports. In many 
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cases, a bank can treat securitised assets as ‘true sales’ for accounting and regulatory 
purposes, even though the bank retains most of the underlying risks through credit 
enhancements it provides to the asset-backed securities. 
 (iii) Remote origination 
Many banks achieve even lower effective regulatory capital requirements (and therefore 
higher capital ratios) by structuring their securitisation programmes so that credit 
enhancements are treated as ‘direct credit substitutes’, which incur only an 8% capital 
requirement, rather than recourse. This is accomplished simply by having the SPV, 
rather than the bank itself, originate the securitised assets – a process termed ‘remote 
origination’. Even though the bank is exposed to much the same risk as in a traditional 
securitisation, because the bank never formally owns the underlying assets, the credit 
enhancement is treated as a direct credit substitute.  
(iv) Indirect credit enhancements 
Under the Basel I Accord, in some instances it was possible to provide the economic 
equivalent of a credit enhancement in ways that were not recognised as financial 
instruments subject to any formal capital requirement. Investors are often willing to 
accept ‘indirect credit enhancements’, such as early amortisation and fast-payout 
provisions, in lieu of traditional financial guarantees. When this is possible, the use of 
indirect credit enhancements reduces even further a bank’s regulatory capital charges 
against securitised assets, in some cases to zero, thereby increasing the amount of 
capital freed up through securitisation. 
Subsequent to the Basel I Accord, banking regulators have attempted to eliminate the 
capital arbitrage opportunities through the revised Basel accords. For instance, the 
Basel III accord has strengthened the capital treatment for certain complex 
securitisations and also requires banks to conduct more rigorous credit analyses of 
externally rated securitisation exposures. However, it should be pointed out that banks 
are highly innovative and might as well find means to circumvent these requirements in 
quest of making more profits. 
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3.5.4  Standard firm-level determinants of capital structure 
There is a growing body of literature that attests to the fact that standard non-financial 
firms’ determinants of capital structure also carry over to the banking sector. The 
studies that have been conducted in the recent past that corroborated this fact include 
those by Teixeira et al. (2014), Jucá, De Sousa and Fishlow (2012), Ahmad and Abbas 
(2011) and Gropp and Heider (2010). Table 3.7 documents how banks’ financing 
behaviour conforms to the predicted effects of firm leverage. 
Table 3.7: Predicted effects of firm-level determinants on leverage 
Firm-level 
determinant 
Expected sign Empirical evidence from the banking 
firms Pecking order 
theory 
Trade-off 
theory 
Size Positive Positive Positive 
Ahmad and Abbas (2011: 211) 
Baltaci and Ayaydin (2014:46) 
Gropp and Heider (2010: 598) 
Jucá et al. (2012: 23)  
Negative 
Teixeira et al. (2014: 56) 
Profitability Negative Positive Positive 
Teixeira et al. (2014: 56)  
Berger and Di Patti (2006: 21) 
Negative 
Ahmad and Abbas (2011: 211) 
Baltaci and Ayaydin (2014:46) 
Gropp and Heider (2010: 598) 
Jucá et al. (2012: 23) 
Asset tangibility Negative Positive Positive 
Gropp and Heider (2010: 598) 
Jucá et al. (2012: 23) 
Negative 
Teixeiraa et al. (2014) 
Risk Positive Negative Positive 
Teixeira et al. (2014: 56) 
Negative 
Gropp and Heider (2010: 598) 
Jucá et al. (2012: 23) 
Growth Positive Negative Positive 
Ahmad and Abbas (2011: 211)  
Teixeira et al. (2014: 56) 
Negative 
Gropp and Heider (2010: 598) 
Jucá et al. (2012: 23) 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
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From the foregoing it is apparent that the bank financing decision mirrors that of non-
financial firms in many aspects. However, there are bank-specific fixed factors that also 
come into play in the determination of capital structure. These include banking 
regulation, credit risk management and regulatory capital arbitrage opportunities. The 
present study sought to focus more on the bank-specific factors. In the next section the 
determinants of the capital structure of insurance companies are considered. 
3.6  THE DETERMINANTS OF INSURERS’ CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
The insurance sector also deviates from the M&M irrelevance proposition in the same 
fashion as the banking sector. This is principally because insurance companies are 
subject to capital regulation (solvency regulation) and also have available another 
peculiar source of funding in the form of premiums. As such, the imperatives that the 
insurance companies have to grapple with when they formulate their capital structure 
policies include paying regard to solvency and surplus requirements, among other 
issues. This therefore sets apart the insurance industry from other firms. However, as 
has been demonstrable with respect to banking firms, insurance companies’ financing 
behaviour nevertheless mirrors that of non-financial firms. In this section, the key 
metrics in the capital allocation decision of an insurer and the empirical studies that 
have been conducted to study the financing behaviour of insurance companies are 
discussed. 
The key metrics in the capital allocation decision of an insurer are surplus and solvency. 
Surplus is deﬁned as the difference between the value of the assets and the value of 
the liabilities. According to Myers and Read (2001: 545), it is the convention in the 
insurance business to refer to capital as ‘surplus’. They further state that surplus is 
important because more surplus means more collateral for outstanding policies. In 
addition, the function of surplus is to reduce the risk of default to an acceptably low 
level. On the other hand, solvency is defined as the ability of insurers to cover their 
liabilities and meet the financial requirements of doing insurance business. Insolvency 
occurs when the assets of the insurer are insufficient to meet the outstanding claims 
(Sherris, 2006). As such, the determination of economic capital and the allocation of 
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capital to lines of business are important parts of the ﬁnancial and risk management of 
an insurance company. 
There is a growing body of literature that pays particular regard to the determinants of 
the capital structure of insurance companies. Gatzert and Schmeiser (2008: 50) 
investigated the influence of corporate taxes on pricing and capital structure in property-
liability insurance. They found that raising the corporate tax level leads to a higher 
insurance leverage, as premiums increase with the tax rate. They also reason that the 
correlation between the insurer’s assets and liabilities has an effect on initial equity and 
tax payments. In particular, in the case of a negative correlation, more equity capital 
must be raised to maintain the same safety level as in the uncorrelated case, which also 
leads to a higher present value of taxes. 
Ahmed and Shabbir (2014: 172) tested the pecking order theory by employing financial 
data of insurance companies of Pakistan over a five-year period from 2007 to 2011. 
Their empirical results indicate that size, profitability, liquidity, tangibility and risk are 
important determinants of the capital structure of insurance companies of Pakistan. 
Further, they report that Pakistani insurers seem to follow a pecking order pattern of 
financing in terms of profitability, risk, tangibility and liquidity, as all the coefficients are 
negative. However, with regard to size, a positive relationship subsists, which is 
consistent with the trade-off theory.  
Cheng and Weiss (2012: 14) conducted tests of the trade-off and pecking order theories 
within the US property-liability insurance industry. Their sample period for the study, 
1994–2003, coincided with the institution of risk-based capital requirements in this 
industry. They estimated a partial adjustment model to determine whether firms have an 
optimal capital structure and how quickly firms adjust to the optimum when deviations 
from the optimum occur. The results of their research indicate that the trade-off theory 
dominates the pecking order theory for property-liability insurers. Further, their results 
indicate that the speed of adjustment towards the optimum tends to be faster for 
insurers that are marginally less well capitalised (2 < risk-based capital ratio < 3) 
compared to very well-capitalised insurers (risk-based capital ratio > 3). They reason is 
that this is consistent with the idea that capital holding costs might be higher for less 
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well-capitalised firms, providing them with an incentive to adjust towards the optimum 
more quickly. 
 
Ahmed et al. (2010:10) investigated the determinants of capital structure of life 
insurance companies of Pakistan over the period of seven years from 2001 to 2007. 
Their empirical results indicate that size, profitability, liquidity and risk are important 
determinants of capital structure of life insurance companies of Pakistan. In addition, 
they document that life insurance companies follow a pecking order pattern of financing 
in terms of profitability, liquidity and age, as leverage has a negative relationship with 
profitability, liquidity and age. On the other hand, they report a positive relationship 
between leverage and size, which is consistent with the trade-off theory. 
 
The capital structure decision of insurance companies therefore resembles that of non-
financial firms in most respects. Therefore, the standard firm-level determinants of 
capital structure also determine the capital structure of insurance companies. However, 
the points of departure that seem to have a bearing on the insurer’s financing decision 
are solvency regulation and the recourse to an additional source of financing, in the 
form of premiums. As such, this study sought to unravel the relationship between 
insurer financing and solvency regulation. 
 
3.7 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The hypotheses developed for the study were founded on the literature review 
conducted. Hitherto, it has been demonstrated that the standard firm-level determinants 
of capital structure are also reliably important in the determination of the capital 
structure of financial firms. As such, the starting point was to develop the hypotheses 
that relate to the standard firm-level determinants of capital structure.  
The point of departure was that financial firms have peculiar attributes that non-financial 
firms do not have. These are regulation and recourse to other sources of funding such 
as bank deposits and insurance premiums. Therefore, the second set of hypotheses is 
dedicated to probe the relationship between financial firm leverage and financial firms’ 
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FE determinants of leverage. The last set of hypotheses is dedicated to investigate the 
dynamics of capital structure in financial firms. 
3.7.1 Standard firm-level determinants of leverage 
Drawing from existing studies (Al-Najjer & Hussainey, 2011; Frank & Goyal, 2009; 
Gropp & Heider, 2010; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1991; Titman 
& Wessels, 1988, among other studies), there are reliably important factors that have 
been identified that affect firm leverage. These are profitability, asset tangibility 
(collateral), size, market-to-book value (growth) and dividends. The a priori expectation 
is that the financing behaviour of financial firms mirrors that of non-financial firms.  
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant relationship between profitability and financial firm 
leverage. 
This hypothesis was premised on the notion that highly profitable firms are presumed to 
generate retained earnings. As such, according to the pecking order theory they are 
more inclined to fund any value-adding projects firstly out of retained earnings. 
Therefore, the pecking order predicts a negative relationship between profitability and 
firm leverage. Indeed, most empirical studies have confirmed this prediction (see 
Bartoloni, 2013; Booth et al., 2001:117; Rajan & Zingales, 1995: 1457; Shyam-Sunder & 
Myers, 1991: 221, among other studies on non-financial firms). Similarly, studies on 
financial firms have also bolstered this prediction (refer to Ahmad & Abbas, 2011: 211; 
Gropp & Heider, 2010: 598 and Jucá et al., 2012:23, among other studies). 
On the contrary, the trade-off theory predicts a positive association between firm 
profitability and firm leverage. The trade-off theory predicts that highly profitable firms 
are more likely to finance out of debt in order to enjoy the benefits of debt tax-
deductibility. However, this benefit seems to accrue the most to large and very large 
firms, who have generated goodwill on the debt market and as such are rated 
favourably and can access debt at preferential terms. The pecking order prediction 
seems to be the most plausible one and most empirical studies seem to lend credence 
more to the negative prediction. A negative relationship was therefore predicted to 
subsist between profitability and firm leverage.  
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Hypothesis 2: There is a significant relationship between asset tangibility and financial 
firm leverage. 
This hypothesis was formulated based on the assumption that companies with more 
tangible assets have more collateral. As such, they can pledge these assets as 
collateral and hence access the debt markets. The high collateral value of assets 
available to be pledged makes it possible for the firm to finance its operations out of 
more debt. In essence, the risk of lending to firms with higher tangible assets is lower 
and, hence, lenders will demand a lower risk premium. As a consequence of debt 
financing, the firm would be expected to enjoy the benefits of a debt interest tax shield. 
On the one hand, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between asset 
tangibility and firm leverage. Among other studies on financial firms, Gropp and Heider 
(2010: 598) and Jucá et al. (2012: 23) found a positive relationship between asset 
tangibility and firm leverage. Yet, on the other hand, the pecking order theory predicts 
an inverse relationship between asset tangibility and firm leverage. This can be 
attributed to low information asymmetry associated with tangible assets, making equity 
issuances less costly. Empirical support of this prediction can be found in Bradley et al. 
(1984: 874), Ahmad and Abbas (2011: 208) and Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011: 333), 
for instance. Nonetheless, the positive prediction is the most persuasive. The 
researcher reasoned that equity issuance is mainly associated with large firms. As such, 
this prediction may not hold for all categories of firms. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a significant relationship between growth and financial firm 
leverage. 
Arguably, high-growth firms run the risk of bankruptcy if they were to fund their 
operations more out of debt. This is predicted by the trade-off theory, which postulates 
that in the financing continuum, there is an optimum point to which the benefit that 
derives from the debt interest tax shield is maximum, beyond which point the benefit 
diminishes. As such, premised on the trade-off theory, the prediction was that as 
companies grow, they will finance more and more out of equity as opposed to debt. An 
inverse relationship was expected to subsist between leverage and growth. In contrast, 
the pecking order predicts a positive relationship between financial leverage and 
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growth. This is based on the presupposition that firms will observe a hierarchy of 
financing when faced with investment opportunities that are value-adding. As such, they 
will finance first out of retained earnings, followed by debt, before they consider equity. 
The implication is that if that were the case, firm leverage will be positively associated 
with growth. It should be pointed out, however, that the empirical evidence in this regard 
is mixed. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a significant relationship between dividend payout and bank 
leverage. 
This hypothesis is predicated on the notion that the dividend policy sends out signals to 
the market. An increase in dividend payout might send out a signal to the market that 
the future prospects of the firm are bright and conversely a dividend cut might signal 
that the future prospects of a firm are bleak. In the former instance, the firm will receive 
favourable valuation from the equity market, hence making equity issuance the most 
favourable. Therefore, the expectation is that firm leverage is inversely related to 
dividend payout. This has been corroborated by the empirical findings of, among other 
scholars, Antoniou et al. (2008: 80), Frank and Goyal (2009: 1) and Lemma and Negash 
(2014: 81).  
Hypothesis 5: There is a significant relationship between size and financial firm 
leverage. 
The effect of size on financial leverage can be twofold. From the pecking order theory 
vantage point, as firms grow, they are bound to generate more retained earnings. As 
such, they should be in a position to fund their operations more out of retained earnings 
and hence substitute debt. Therefore, a negative relationship is predicted to exist 
between firm leverage and size, whereas the trade-off theory predicts that large firms 
should be highly leveraged as compared to small firms as they stand to enjoy the 
benefits of debt interest tax shields. As such, from the trade-off theory point of view the 
prediction is that firm leverage is positively associated with size. Notwithstanding, 
empirical support for the positive firm leverage and size relationship is overwhelming 
(see for instance Ahmed et al., 2010: 9; Antoniou et al., 2008: 73; Al-Najjar & 
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Hussainey, 2011: 334; Bartoloni, 2013: 142; Lemma & Negash, 2014: 81; and Lim, 
2012: 197, among other scholars). 
Hypothesis 6: The global financial crisis has significant explanatory power in financial 
firm leveraging. 
This hypothesis was based on the notion that there is a significant relationship between 
leverage and the dummy variable representing the 2007–2009 GFC. This hypothesis 
tested how financial firms will adjust their leveraging in the face of business cycles or 
financial crises.  
3.7.2 Banking sector-specific determinants of leverage 
In this section the bank-specific factors that might have a bearing on bank leverage are 
considered. Principally, the bank-specific pertinent features that might affect bank 
financing resulting in them deviating from the M&M irrelevance proposition are 
regulation, risk and deposit taking (third source of financing). 
Hypothesis 7: Credit risk has significant explanatory power in bank leveraging. 
This hypothesis was formulated based on the presupposition that financial firms are 
‘opaque’ organisations. As such, their business activities are not subjected to the same 
level of scrutiny as would be the case with non-financial firms. Arguably, the problem of 
information asymmetry is greatest with financial firms. This is exacerbated by their risk-
bearing role. Inherent to the problem of information asymmetry is the moral hazard 
problem. For instance, this arises where two parties enter into a transaction and the one 
party who has the best information about an asset or risk uses this to the detriment of 
the party who has the least information.  
This phenomenon could manifest itself in the financing behaviour of financial firms. The 
2007–2009 GFC was partly attributed to the bubble burst in the mortgage sector. This 
was occasioned by banks originating sub-prime loans and dumping them on the loan 
sales market. The notion is that banks that actively manage their credit risk will keep low 
levels of capital (see for instance Affinito & Tagliaferri, 2010; Casu et al., 2011; 
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Cebenoyan & Strahan, 2004 and Froot & Stein, 1998). A positive relationship is 
predicted between leverage and credit risk. 
Hypothesis 8: The standard determinants of capital structure have significant 
explanatory power in non-deposit financing. 
This hypothesis was premised on the notion that banks have a third source of financing 
in the form of deposits. It sought to investigate the importance of deposits as a source of 
financing for banks. Essentially, in this hypothesis leverage is decomposed into deposit 
and non-deposit liabilities with a view to determining their relationship with standard-
level determinants of capital structure. This followed the procedure of Gropp and Heider 
(2010: 603). 
Hypothesis 9: The standard determinants of capital structure have significant 
explanatory power in deposit financing. 
This hypothesis was a corollary to the above hypothesis on non-deposit financing. 
Deposit financing is a source of short-term funding for banking institutions. As such, this 
hypothesis tested how deposit leveraging is influenced by firm-level determinants of 
capital structure. 
Hypothesis 10: Bank leveraging is consistent with the buffer view of capital.  
Essentially, this hypothesis posits that banks hold excess levels of capital in line with 
bank intrinsic factors. This is dependent on bank characteristics such as size, growth 
and profitability, among other factors. There is a growing strand of empirical studies that 
have been undertaken and suggest that banks keep buffer (excess) levels of capital 
(refer to, among other scholars, Berger et al., 1995; Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee & 
Öztekin, 2008; Besanko & Kanatas, 1996; Gropp & Heider, 2010).  
Banks are primarily motivated to keep buffer levels of capital for fear of regulatory 
sanction should the capital ratios deviate from the prescribed minimum. Further, they 
may be motivated to keep excess levels of capital if the adjustment costs are 
prohibitive. Possibly the banks could be stoking up capital for bad times to mitigate the 
business cycles. The buffer view may also be explained by information asymmetry that 
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might exist in bank financing. For instance, dividend-paying, high-growth, profitable and 
large banks are rated favourably by the equity market and hence can issue equity at 
short notice. As such, they can hold low levels of capital (Gropp & Heider, 2010: 595). 
Table 3.8 outlines the major predictions of the buffer view of capital. 
Table 3.8: Predicted effects of the buffer view of capital 
Firm-level determinant Predicted effect 
Profitability Positive 
Asset tangibility  No prediction 
Growth Positive 
Dividends Positive 
Size Positive/Negative 
Risk  Negative 
Source: Adapted from Gropp and Heider (2010: 595) 
 
Hypothesis 11: The standard determinants of capital structure have significant 
explanatory power in capital regulation. 
This hypothesis presupposed that there is a significant relationship between capital 
regulation and the standard determinants of capital structure. Quintessentially, this 
hypothesis evaluated the efficacy of regulation. The expectation was that the standard 
determinants of capital structure will be of first-order importance in determining capital 
regulation (see, for instance, Gropp & Heider, 2010: 590).  
3.7.3  Insurance sector-specific determinants of leverage 
The insurance sector shares similarities with the banking sector in that it is subject to 
capital regulation (solvency regulation) and also has a third source of financing in the 
form of premiums. As such, the expectation is that in a world where the M&M 
irrelevance proposition does not hold, insurance companies stand to benefit from their 
capital structure choices. 
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Hypothesis 12: Reinsurance has significant explanatory power in insurer leveraging. 
This hypothesis was predicated on the notion that reinsurance brings about risk 
divesture. As such, the higher the reinsurance cessions, the lower the risk of bankruptcy 
an insurer faces. This results in a favourable credit risk assessment by lenders. 
Consequently, the insurer is able to access more loans from the debt market. A direct 
relationship is predicted to exist between the reinsurance variable and insurer leverage. 
Hypothesis 13: The standard firm-level determinants of capital structure have 
significant explanatory power in the solvency ratio. 
The hypothesis posited that solvency regulation is of first-order importance in the 
determination of the capital structure of an insurance company. If that be the case, the 
standard determinants of capital structure should not offer any significant explanatory 
power in the solvency ratio variable.  
Hypothesis 14: The standard determinants of capital structure have significant 
explanatory power in premium liabilities. 
This hypothesis postulated that insurance companies finance their balance sheet 
growth out of premiums. A fundamental concept in insurance is that of risk pooling and 
diversification. Attendant to this is the generation of capacity to underwrite new 
business. This derives in part from the premium reserves that have been accumulated. 
Taking cognisance of this imperative, this hypothesis decomposes leverage into 
premium and non-premium liabilities. As such, the expectation was that the standard 
determinants of capital structure will be significantly associated with premium leverage 
in the same fashion as predicted by the theories of capital structure. 
Hypothesis 15: The standard determinants of capital structure have significant 
explanatory power in non-premium liabilities. 
Non-premium liabilities (non-premium leverage) are a proxy for long-term debt. This 
hypothesis essentially tested the robustness of the leverage variable by exploring the 
relationship between firm-level determinants of capital structure and the long-term debt 
variable. 
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3.7.4 Dynamics of capital structure choices 
The last hypothesis sought to establish the dynamics in the selection of capital 
structures of both banks and insurance companies. It sought to determine whether 
financial firms exhibit some form of seeking ‘optimality’ in selecting their capital 
structures. Extant studies have been conducted in this regard (see, for instance, Elsas 
et al., 2014: 1380; Flannery & Rangan, 2006: 471; Leary & Roberts, 2005: 2577; 
Mukherjee & Mahakud, 2010: 261 and Öztekin & Flannery, 2012: 108). The majority of 
these studies confirm that firms will actively seek to achieve a target capital structure.  
Hypothesis 16: Financial firms do adjust their capital structure to a target. 
 
3.8  CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the importance of financial regulation was discussed. It was 
demonstrated that financial regulation of both the banking and the insurance sectors is 
essential for the preserving and fostering of financial stability of the financial sector. 
Regulation also provides the safety net to protect the vulnerable members of society. 
The chapter also reviewed the instruments available to the bank supervisory authorities 
in order to regulate the banking industry. These included the bank capital requirements 
that are enshrined in the Basel accords as well as deposit-protection insurance 
schemes. A discussion on the Basel accords followed, with particular regard to their 
advantages and limitations. This was followed by a discussion of deposit insurance 
schemes. Further, the financial regulation of the insurance sector was considered.  
The pertinent issues that were considered include the evolution of the solvency 
standards and ICP. Financial regulation was also discussed in the context of South 
Africa. Suffice to highlight that South Africa has kept abreast with global developments 
and embraces global best practices. Having demonstrated that capital regulation of 
banks and insurance companies represents a primary departure from the M&M 
irrelevance proposition, the determinants of capital structures of banks and insurance 
companies, respectively, were considered. It was also established that there are bank 
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fixed effects as well as insurer fixed effects that influence the capital structure decision. 
It was also demonstrated that the standard capital structure determinants also 
determine the capital structures of banks and insurance companies in the same 
manner. The chapter concluded by developing the hypotheses for this study. The next 
chapter presents and discusses the research methodology employed in the study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins by outlining the empirical framework that underpins this study. The 
empirical framework lays bare the econometric methods that have been employed to 
study capital structure dynamics. Both static and dynamic panel data models have been 
employed in extant studies. Moreover, the empirical framework signposts any caveats 
to consider when utilising various estimation methods employed in this study. As such, 
this informs the methodological choices that drove this research effort. 
The chapter evolves to consider the research design for this study. The population and 
sampling frame is considered in this context. The econometric methods employed in 
this study are then considered. This study employs panel data methods. Further the 
chapter discusses estimation methods and lastly the specification of panel data tests. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 outlines the empirical framework for the 
research. Section 4.3 discusses the research design of this study. Section 4.4 describes 
the estimation methods employed in this study. Section 4.5 outlines the formals tests of 
specification for panel data employed in this study and Section 4.6 concludes the 
chapter.  
4.2  EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section the empirical framework that guided this study is discussed. The 
empirical framework considers the methodological considerations that have informed 
previous studies on capital structure. This is beneficial for the present study in that it 
provided the basis of what proxies to adopt for the various variables under consideration 
as well as alerted of any caveats to consider in this research effort. In essence, the 
empirical framework informed the methodological choices that drove this research 
effort. It sought to appraise what methods have been used hitherto in similar studies in 
order to select the most appropriate method. It is pertinent to highlight that in this study, 
the determinants of capital structure are synonymous with the determinants of leverage. 
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As such, for the purposes of this study, both terms – capital structure and leverage – 
bear the same meaning.  
Principally, dynamic and static econometric models have been employed to analyse the 
financing behaviour of firms. In this section, the methodologies applied in select studies 
of the determinants of capital structure and on the target leverage and speed of 
adjustment are explored. Suffice to highlight that the former category of studies have 
typical embraced the static panel data models, while the latter category of studies have 
employed dynamic panel models. 
4.2.1  The determinants of leverage 
Studies of the determinants of capital structure have invariably used panel data 
techniques of one form or the other to analyse their data. Selected studies are 
documented in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1: Select studies on the determinants of leverage 
Author(s) Estimation method(s) 
Ahmed et al. (2010) Pooled OLS 
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011) FE 
Anarfor (2015) FE 
Antoniou et al. (2008) syst-GMM 
Bartoloni (2013) Pooled OLS, FE, RE and GMM  
Booth et al. (2001) Pooled OLS and FE   
Frank and Goyal (2009) Multivariate regression analysis 
Gropp and Heider (2010) Pooled OLS and FE   
Rajan and Zingales (1995) Tobit model 
Titman and Wessels (1988) Analytical factor model 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
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Static models have often been employed to analyse the relationship between leverage 
and its determinants. In the main, these are the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
model, the fixed effects (FE) model and the random effects (RE) model. Among other 
scholars, Anarfor (2015) and Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011) employed the FE 
estimation method. On the other hand, others studies such as that of Bartoloni (2013), 
Gropp and Heider (2010) and Booth et al. (2001) employed a combination of estimation 
methods and hence in the final analysis made an inference based on the model that 
had the best fit. In this research effort the researcher took his cue from such studies and 
hence employed a combination of estimation techniques to test the relationship 
between leverage and its determinants. 
4.2.2  Target leverage and speed of adjustment 
Extant studies on determining whether there exists a target capital structure that firms 
seek to achieve have typically estimated a partial adjustment model; the reasoning 
being that leverage contemporaneously determines itself. In other words, current 
leverage is partly determined by previous levels. As such, leverage is a dynamic 
variable. Consequently, dynamic models have often been specified to investigate the 
financing behaviour of firms – that is, whether firms seek to achieve a target leverage 
ratio, and if so, what the speed of adjustment towards this leverage ratio is. Table 4.2 
documents some of the studies that have explored the target leverage and the speed of 
adjustment towards the target.  
Table 4.2: Select studies on target leverage and speed of adjustment 
Author(s) Estimation method(s) 
De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) syst-GMM 
Gropp and Heider (2010) Pooled OLS and FE  
Lemma and Negash (2014) syst-GMM 
Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) Pooled OLS, FE and syst-GMM 
Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010) GMM 
Öztekin and Flannery (2011) LSDV and syst-GMM 
Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012) GMM  
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
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The main estimation techniques that have been employed to estimate the relationship 
are the FE, difference generalised method of moments (diff-GMM) and syst-GMM. 
 
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.3.1 Sample description and data sources  
The population for this study comprised of South African insurance companies and 
banking institutions both listed and not listed on the JSE. In the sampling frame the 
researcher considered all the banks and insurance companies with complete data sets 
for the ten-year period running from 2006 to 2015. The Bureau van Dijk Bankscope 
database was used to source the audited financial statements of the banks. The 
financial information for the insurance companies was sourced from the Orbis 
databases and the FSB. 
The banking sample comprised of 16 banks. As such, there were 160 observations for 
the banking sample. The insurance sample comprised of 26 insurance companies. 
There were 260 observations for the insurance companies. The list of the banks and 
insurance companies and their sub-sectors is provided in appendices A and B, 
respectively. 
4.3.2 Variable definition 
Standard corporate finance regression analysis has been employed in extant studies to 
analyse the relationship between capital structure and its determinants. The a priori 
expectations of this relationship were considered in the development of the hypotheses 
for this study. The proxies employed for the dependent variable as well as the 
independent variables in this study are considered next in turn. 
4.3.2.1  Dependent variables 
In this study, three dependent variables were employed to test the relationship between 
leverage and its determinants. The primary dependent variable employed for this study 
was book leverage. The book leverage measure (BLE) is a broad measure of leverage, 
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defined as one minus the ratio of book value of equity to book value of assets.1 This 
follows from Gropp and Heider (2010). Suffice to highlight that many proxies have been 
employed to define the leverage variable. There are three strands of literature in this 
regard. In the first instance, scholars rely on one measure of leverage. In the second 
strand, scholars rely on two measures of leverage, namely book leverage and market 
leverage. In the last strand of literature, scholars rely on the broadest measure of 
leverage and have three proxies for leverage, namely total debt ratio, short-term debt 
ratio and long-term debt ratio. Some of the proxies are enumerated in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3: Proxies used for leverage 
Author(s) Proxy used 
Antoniou et al. 
(2008) 
Book leverage = book value of total debt / book value of total 
assets 
Market leverage = book value of debt / (market value of equity + 
book value of total debt ) 
 
Bartoloni (2013) Leverage = debt ratio = total debt / total assets 
 
Booth et al. 
(2001) 
Leverage defined as: 
1. Total debt ratio = total liabilities/(total liabilities + net worth) 
2. Long-term debt book ratio = (total liabilities – current liabilities) 
/ (total liabilities – current liabilities + net worth) 
 
Frank and Goyal 
(2009) 
Leverage defined as: 
1. TDM = total debt / market value of assets  
2. TDA = total debt / book value of assets  
3. LDM = long-term debt / market value of assets  
4. LDA = long-term debt / book value of assets  
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
The major contestation has been whether to employ book leverage, market leverage or 
both. Notwithstanding that the conundrum remains unresolved, studies that have 
                                                          
1  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑡𝑎 = 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑆𝑎 + 𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑒 
→
𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑡𝑎
𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑡𝑎 = 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑡𝑎 + 𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑡𝑎 
→
𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑎
𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑡𝑎 = 1 − 𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑡𝑎,        ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐵𝐵𝐸 = 1 − 𝐸
𝑇𝑇
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employed both measures demonstrate that the results are robust to either proxy 
adopted. Therefore, the inference is largely the same irrespective of whether book 
leverage or market leverage was employed (see, for instance, Antoniou et al., 2008; 
Frank & Goyal, 2004; Gropp & Heider, 2010; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Rajan & Zingales, 
1995 and Titman & Wessels, 1988, among other scholars). Moreover, the justification 
for using book value leverage is premised on other considerations. Firstly, capital 
regulation of banks is imposed on book values and not market values and hence this 
became the variable of interest for the purposes of this study. Secondly, as the sample 
of financial firms included firms that were not listed on the JSE, there was scant 
availability of market value data.  
Because banks have an additional source of financing, in the form of deposits, in this 
study leverage was also decomposed to analyse the dynamics of deposit financing. The 
secondary measures of leverage employed for the banking sector in this study were 
deposit leverage (deposit liabilities) and non-deposit leverage (non-deposit liabilities). 
Deposit leverage (DEPOSIT) equals the ratio of total deposits to total assets. This is 
consistent with Gropp and Heider (2010: 605). Non-deposit leverage (NON-DEP) is the 
difference between book leverage and deposit leverage. 
For the insurance sector, the researcher also employed secondary measures of 
leverage to estimate the relationship. These were non-premium liabilities (“non-premium 
leverage”) and premium reserves (“premium leverage”). Premium leverage (PRL) 
equals the ratio of total gross provisions to total assets. Non-premium leverage (NON-
PREM) is equal to book leverage minus premium leverage. 
This study also examined the relationship between regulation and the determinants of 
capital structure. In the case of banks, the proxy employed for regulation (Reg) was the 
Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio (T1C), whereas for insurance companies the solvency 
ratio2 (Sol) was employed as the dependent variable.  
                                                          
2 This study employed the actual solvency ratio as the proxy for the regulatory variable. This is 
defined as the ratio of surplus to total assets, that is, (assets minus liabilities) / total assets. 
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Lastly, the study also examined the buffer view of capital in the case of banking firms. 
The dependent variable employed in this regard was the excess of Tier 1 regulatory 
capital ratio over the prescribed Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio (BUFFER).  
4.3.2.2  Independent variables 
The independent variables consist of the firm-level determinants of capital structure as 
well as dummy variables. The firm-level determinants of capital structure that are 
reliably important and were considered for this study are size, growth, asset tangibility, 
profitability, risk and reinsurance. The dummy variables that were employed for this 
study were to capture the effects of the 2007–2009 GFC as well as a dummy variable to 
capture one remaining firm-level determinant of capital structure: dividends. The proxies 
to capture these variables employed in this study are now considered in detail. 
• Size 
To measure size, the researcher employed the natural logarithm of total assets. There 
is a direct relationship between size and the value of assets held. Larger companies are 
expected to have more assets. Most studies on the determinants of capital structure 
have employed this proxy to measure size. Such studies include that of Al-Najjar and 
Hussainey (2011), Antoniou et al. (2008), Booth et al. (2001), Frank and Goyal (2009), 
Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010) and Öztekin and Flannery (2011). Other studies have 
employed the logarithm of sales or net sales to capture the effect of size (see, for 
instance, Barclay & Smith, 2005; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
The researcher was persuaded to employ the total assets variable, as this proxies on 
the one hand both the loan activity and investment activities of banks and on the other 
hand underwriting and investment activities of insurance companies. 
• Growth 
The growth variable is defined as the annual growth rate of total assets. The researcher 
took his cue from Titman and Wessels (1998) and Anarfor (2015), among other 
scholars, in defining growth as such; the reasoning being that the higher the growth 
rate, the higher the growth prospects of the firm. The alternative definition that has also 
been used widely in empirical studies would have been to proxy growth prospects with 
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the market-to-book value ratio (see, among other scholars, Booth et al., 2001; Frank & 
Goyal, 2009 and Teixeira et al., 2014). However, as already pointed out earlier, the 
researcher could not proceed as such due to the scant availability of market value data. 
Moreover, this measure could be inadmissible for some firms in the study sample, as 
they were not listed on the stock exchange.  
• Asset tangibility 
In this study, asset tangibility is defined as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. The 
ratio of fixed assets to total assets expresses the collateral value. Fixed assets offer 
collateral value. If collateral value is high, the firm would be viewed in good light in the 
debt market. As such, it could access loans at concessionary rates. The researcher was 
motivated to employ the fixed assets to total assets ratio as a proxy for asset tangibility, 
as extant studies have also utilised this measure. The empirical studies that have 
employed this measure include that of Rajan and Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal 
(2009), Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010), Öztekin and Flannery (2011) and De Jonghe 
and Öztekin (2015). 
• Profitability 
Various measures have been employed in empirical studies to capture the effect of 
profitability. This is partly because profitability is defined in several ways. In this study 
the researcher employed the return on assets (ROA3) measure as the proxy for 
profitability. Boot et al. (2001) and Anarfor (2015), among other scholars, employed 
ROA as an indicator of profitability in similar studies. In the case of the banking sample, 
this was defined as the return on average assets (ROAA4).  
• Risk 
Risk was defined in two distinct ways for the study sample of financial firms. For the 
banking institutions, the focus was on credit risk. The proxy employed for credit risk was 
the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans. For the insurance sample, the measure 
                                                          
3 𝑅𝑅𝑇 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁
𝑇𝑖𝑁𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑠 
4 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 = 𝑁𝑆𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑆
𝑇𝑣𝑆𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑆 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑡𝑎 
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utilised to capture underwriting risk was the ratio of total underwriting expenses to gross 
premiums written. 
 
• Reinsurance 
The reinsurance variable is the added explanatory variable for the insurance panel. It is 
defined as the one minus the ratio of net premiums to gross premiums (alternatively one 
minus retention ratio). The a priori expectation was that reinsurance brings about the 
diversification of risk. As such, with risk minimised, the insurance company’s credit 
rating improves in the debt market. Debt becomes the favourable financing option. As 
such, a positive relation was predicted to exist between the reinsurance variable and 
leverage. 
• Dummy variables 
The researcher employed two dummy variables in this study. The first one is the dummy 
variable for dividends. The rationale was that the payment of dividend sends out a 
signal to the market and hence can have an impact on bank leverage. It is defined as 1 
when a bank pays out a dividend and 0 when the bank does not declare a dividend. The 
second dummy variable (GFC) was to capture the effects of the 2007–2009 GFC. It will 
be defined as 1 for the years when the financial crisis occurs and 0 otherwise. 
4.3.3 Panel data analysis  
In this thesis the researcher employed panel data econometric analysis to unravel the 
relationship between leverage and its determinants as well as to test whether there is a 
target capital structure towards which financial firms will gravitate.  
Panel data combines cross-section and time-series data. There are several advantages 
that accrue from employing panel data. According to Baltagi (2008: 6–8), the main 
benefits of panel data can be enumerated as follows: 
• Controlling for individual heterogeneity. Panel data suggest that firms, 
individuals or countries are heterogeneous. To the contrary, time-series and 
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cross-sectional studies do not control for heterogeneity and might run the risk 
of obtaining biased results. 
• Panel data give more informative data, more variability, less collinearity 
among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency. 
• Panel data are better able to study the dynamics of adjustment. 
• Panel data are better able to identify and measure effects that are simply not 
detectable in pure cross-section or pure time-series data. 
• Biases resulting from aggregation over firms or individuals may be reduced or 
eliminated. 
• Panel data allow for the construction and the testing of more complicated 
behavioural models than purely cross-sectional or time-series data. 
 
According to Baltagi (2009: 8–10), the limitations of panel data are that it could be 
susceptible to the following: 
• Design and collection problems. These include problems of coverage, non-
response, frequency of interviewing and reference period. 
• Distortion of measurement errors. Measurement errors might arise for 
instance because of faulty responses due to unclear questions, memory 
errors and deliberate distortion of responses. 
• Selectivity problems. These include self-selectivity, non-response and 
attrition. 
• Short time-series dimension. Typical micro panels involve annual data 
covering a short time span for each individual. 
• Cross-section dependence. Macro panels on countries or regions with long 
time series that do not account for cross-country dependence may lead to a 
misleading inference. 
 
Notwithstanding the above limitations of panel data, the benefits of utilising panel data 
far outweigh the potential drawbacks for this study. The main benefits that accrued to 
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this study as a result of utilising panel data were that they control for panel 
heterogeneity of the sample of banks and insurance companies, thereby ensuring that 
the researcher’s inferences were not biased. Panel data also confer more degrees of 
freedom and more efficiency to the analysis as compared to time-series or cross-
sectional studies. Moreover, the panel data techniques enabled the researcher to test 
the dynamic capital structure model in order to establish the speed of adjustment 
towards the target capital structure.  
According to Greene (2012: 385), the general modelling framework for analysing panel 
data can be expressed as following regression model: 
𝑒𝑖,𝑁 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝒛𝑖′𝜶 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁                                                                                                                                                                            (4.1)        = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝑆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁   
where there are K regressors in 𝒙𝑖𝑁, not including a constant term. The heterogeneity or 
individual effect is 𝒛𝑖′𝜶, where 𝒛𝒊 contains a constant term and a set of individual or 
group-specific variables that may be observed.  
Greene (2012: 386–387) further contends that here are four broad categories of panel 
data models. These are pooled regression, FE, RE and random parameters models. 
These can be derived from Equation (4.1). Each model is considered in turn. 
4.3.3.1  Pooled regression 
Pooled models assume that regressors are exogenous. If 𝒛𝒊 contains only a constant 
term, then OLS provides consistent and efficient estimates of the common α and the 
slope vector β. The model is specified as follows: 
𝑒𝑖,𝑁 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁                                                                                                                                                                                (4.2) 
4.3.3.2  Fixed effects 
If 𝒛𝒊 is unobserved but correlated with  𝒙𝑖𝑁 , then the least squares estimator of β is 
biased and inconsistent as a consequence of an omitted variable. The model was 
therefore modified as follows: 
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𝑒𝑖,𝑁 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁                                                                                                                                                                               (4.3) 
where 𝛼𝑖=𝒛𝑖′𝜶 embodies all the observable effects and specifies an estimable 
conditional mean. The FE approach takes 𝛼𝑖 to be a group-specific constant term in the 
regression model. 
4.3.3.3  Random effects 
If the unobserved individual heterogeneity, however formulated, can be assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the included variables, then the model may be formulated as follows: 
𝑒𝑖,𝑁 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁                                                                                                                                                                 (4.4) 
This is a linear regression model with a compound disturbance that may be consistently 
albeit inefficiently estimated by least squares. The RE approach specifies that 𝜇𝑖 is a 
group-specific random element, similar to 𝜀𝑖𝑁, except that for each group there is but a 
single draw that enters the regression identically in each period (Greene, 2012: 387). 
Estimation is then by a feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) estimator (Cameron 
& Trivedi, 2010: 238). The advantages of the RE model is that it yields estimates of all 
coefficients. The drawback is that these estimates are inconsistent if the FE model is 
appropriate. 
4.3.3.4  Random parameters 
The random parameters model can be viewed as a regression model with a random 
constant term. It is specified as follows: 
𝑒𝑖,𝑁 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ (𝜷 + 𝒉𝑖) + (𝛼 + 𝜇𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁         (4.5) 
where 𝒉𝑖 is a random vector that induces the variation of the parameters across 
individuals. It represents a natural extension in which researchers broaden the amount 
of heterogeneity across individuals while retaining some commonalities. 
In this study, the pooled regression, FE and RE models were employed. Post-estimation 
diagnostics test were conducted in order to ensure that the estimated model was robust.  
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4.4  ESTIMATION METHODS 
To examine the relationship between leverage and its determinants, the static panel 
data model was employed. The researcher employed a battery of diagnostics tests to 
ensure that the model was well specified and to ensure that the most appropriate 
estimation technique to run the regression was selected. A dynamic panel data model 
was specified to study the target leverage and determine the speed of adjustment 
towards the target level. The researcher also carried out diagnostics tests in order to 
select the most appropriate model specification and estimation technique. The 
econometric analysis was conducted by employing Stata version 14 software. 
4.4.1  The static panel data model 
A static panel data model was used in three instances in this study. Firstly, the model 
was employed to estimate the relationship between leverage and its determinants. 
Secondly, it was employed to test the relationship between the regulatory variable and 
the determinants of capital structure. Lastly, the static panel data model was used to 
test the buffer view of capital.  
For the banking panel, to test the relationship between leverage and its determinants, 
the static panel data model was specified as follows: 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁                                                                                                                                                                         (4.6) 
where 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁 = leverage (BLE, DEP, NON-DEP) for bank i at time t 
𝒙𝑖,𝑁′  = vectors of explanatory variables (size, profit, growth, asset tangibility, dividend, 
risk and GFC) for bank i at time t 
β = a vector of slope parameters 
𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term that embodies all the observable effects 
εi,t = composite error term that also takes care of other explanatory variables that 
equally determine leverage but were not included in the model 
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To test the relationship between the regulatory variable and the firm-level determinants, 
the static panel data model was specified as follows: 
𝑇1𝐶𝑖,𝑁 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁                                                                                                                                                                         (4.7) 
where 
𝑇1𝐶𝑖,𝑁 = Tier 1 capital regulatory variable for bank i at time t 
𝒙𝑖,𝑁′  = a vector of explanatory variables (size, profit, growth, asset tangibility, dividend, 
risk and GFC) for bank i at time t 
β = a vector of slope parameters 
𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term that embodies all the observable effects 
εi,t = composite error term that also takes care of other explanatory variables that 
equally determine leverage but were not included in the model 
Lastly, to test the relationship between buffer capital and its determinants, the static 
panel data model was specified as follows: 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑁 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁                                                                                                                                                           (4.8) 
where 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑁 = buffer capital for banking firm i at time t 
𝒙𝑖,𝑁′  = a vector of explanatory variables (size, profit, growth, asset tangibility, dividend, 
risk and GFC) for banking firm i at time t 
β = a vector of slope parameters 
𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term that embodies all the observable effects 
εi,t = composite error term that also takes care of other explanatory variables that 
equally determine leverage but were not included in the model 
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For the insurance panel, to test the relationship between leverage and its determinants, 
the static panel data model was specified as follows: 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁                                                                                                                                                                         (4.9) 
where 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁 = leverage (BLE, PREM, NON-PREM) for insurer i at time t 
𝒙𝑖,𝑁′  = vectors of explanatory variables (size, profit, growth, asset tangibility, reinsurance, 
and GFC) for insurer i at time t 
β = a vector of slope parameters 
𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term that embodies all the observable effects 
εi,t = composite error term that also takes care of other explanatory variables that 
equally determine leverage but were not included in the model 
To test the relationship between the regulatory variable and the firm-level determinants, 
the static panel data model was specified as follows: 
𝑆𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑁 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁                                                                                                                                                                      (4.10) 
where 
𝑆𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑁 = solvency ratio for insurer i at time t 
𝒙𝑖,𝑁′  = a vector of explanatory variables (size, profit, growth, asset tangibility, risk, 
reinsurance and GFC) for insurer i at time t 
β = a vector of slope parameters 
𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term that embodies all the observable effects 
εi,t = composite error term that also takes care of other explanatory variables that 
equally determine leverage but were not included in the model. 
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Equations (4.6) (4.7) (4.8) (4.9) and (4.10) were estimated by employing the pooled 
regression model, FE model and the RE model. Having estimated the equations, 
diagnostic tests were conducted on the base models. This enabled the researcher to 
determine whether the model was well specified and to select the most appropriate 
estimator among the pooled OLS, FE and the RE estimators. In the event that cross-
sectional dependence was detected, the FE with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard 
errors estimator was employed. 
4.4.2 The dynamic panel data model 
Extant studies have modelled the target capital structure by employing a partial 
adjustment framework. Among other studies, these include that of Flannery and Rangan 
(2006), Antoniou et al. (2008), Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010), Ramjee and Gwatidzo 
(2012), Lemma and Negash (2014) and De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015). The researcher 
took his cue from such studies and specified a partial adjustment framework in order to 
determine whether there exists a target capital structure as follows: 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁∗ = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝜑𝑖,𝑁            (4.11) 
where 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁∗  = target leverage 
𝒙𝑖,𝑁′  = a vector of explanatory variables (size, profitability, growth, asset tangibility 
dividend, risk, dividend and GFC) for bank i at time t 
or  
𝒙𝑖,𝑁′  = a vector of explanatory variables (size, profitability, growth, asset tangibility, risk, 
reinsurance and GFC) for insurer i at time t 
β = a vector of slope parameters 
𝜑𝑖,𝑁 = disturbance term 
Firms will seek to gravitate to the target capital structure. They could be impeded in 
adjusting to this optimal ratio due to the presence of adjustment costs. Therefore, firms 
would adjust towards their target leverage as follows: 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁 − 𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁−1 = 𝛿(𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁∗ − 𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁−1), with 0 < 𝛿 < 1     (4.12) 
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The parameter 𝛿 is the coefficient of adjustment or the speed of adjustment. The speed 
of adjustment is inversely related to adjustment costs (Ramjee & Gwatidzo, 2010: 58). If 
𝛿=1, the actual change in leverage is equal to the desired and the adjustment is 
transaction cost-free. If 𝛿=0, there is no adjustment in leverage. The absence of 
adjustment is possible when adjustment costs are excessively high or the cost of 
adjustment is significantly higher than the cost of remaining off target (Antoniou et al., 
2008). 
Substituting the equation of target leverage, Equation (4.11), into Equation (4.12) 
yielded the following: 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁−1 + 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝛿𝜷 + 𝛿𝜑𝑖,𝑁       (4.13) 
The dynamic panel data model as specified in Equation (4.13) is fraught with two 
sources of persistence over time. These are autocorrelation due to the presence of the 
lagged dependent variable (𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖𝑁−1) among the regressors as well as the presence of 
individual effects characterising the heterogeneity among the individuals. This renders 
estimation with either OLS or GLS biased and inefficient. Several ways have been 
advanced to mitigate the problems of autocorrelation and heterogeneity. Firstly, 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggest first differencing to get rid of the individual effects 
and then using, for instance, ∆𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁−2 =  (𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁−2−𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁−3) or simply  𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁−2  as an 
instrument for ∆𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁−1. These instruments will not be correlated with the error term as 
long as they are not serially correlated. This instrumental variable estimation method 
leads to consistent but not necessarily efficient estimates of the parameters in the 
model because it does not make use of all the available moment conditions (Baltagi, 
2009: 148). 
Secondly, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a GMM procedure that is more efficient 
than the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator by also differencing the model and using 
instruments in levels. They demonstrate that additional instruments can be obtained in a 
dynamic panel model if one utilises the orthogonality conditions that exist between 
lagged values of the dependent variable and the disturbance term (Baltagi, 2009: 149). 
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This estimation framework is also referred to as the diff-GMM. The differenced dynamic 
model is specified as follows: 
∆𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁 = (1 − 𝛿)∆𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑖,𝑁−1 + ∆(𝒙𝒊,𝒕)′𝛿𝜷 + ∆𝛿𝜑𝑖,𝑁      (4.14) 
The major limitation of a differenced model is that differencing wipes away individual 
effects and hence might result in loss of information. Subsequently, Blundell and Bond 
(1998) proposed a syst-GMM estimator to improve on the work of Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). This was based on the notion of exploiting the 
initial condition in generating efficient estimators of the dynamic panel data model when 
T is small. Arellano and Bover (1995) showed that by adding the original equation in 
levels (for instance Equation 4.11) to the system, additional moment conditions can be 
brought to bear to increase efficiency. Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrated that an 
additional mild stationary restriction on the initial conditions process allows the use of an 
extended syst-GMM estimator. This uses lagged differences of the dependent variable 
as instruments for equations in levels in addition to lagged levels of the dependent 
variable as instruments for equations in first differences. In essence, the syst-GMM 
estimator is more efficient than the diff-GMM estimator.  
To estimate the dynamic model, firstly, initial diagnostics were performed on the base 
pooled OLS, FE and RE models. Subsequently, both the diff-GMM and the syst-GMM 
estimators were employed. The caveat is that the diff-GMM and syst-GMM estimators 
may not be the most efficient estimators taking cognisance of the study sample 
properties. Banks are dependent on one another for funding through the interbank 
market. Similarly, insurance companies are reliant on one another, for instance, for 
facultative reinsurance in order to create underwriting capacity. As such, presumably 
there is cross-section dependence among the banks and insurance companies 
respectively.  
This renders estimation within the framework of GMM inefficient and unreliable. As 
such, two estimators that are cross-sectional dependence-consistent were also 
considered. These were the FGLS (Kmenta, 1986; Parks, 1967) and LSDV (with Kiviet, 
1995 correction) estimators.  
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4.5 FORMAL TESTS OF SPECIFICATION FOR PANEL DATA 
The principal departure of this study from other studies of capital structure is that it 
employed a variety of diagnostic techniques in order to ensure that the results estimated 
were reliable. As such, several tests of specification were conducted to ensure that the 
estimation methods were consistent and yielded reliable estimates of parameters for 
both panels of the financial firms (banks and insurance companies). These tests were 
conducted for both the static model and the dynamic model specification. These are 
considered next in turn. 
4.5.1 Testing the joint validity of fixed effects 
The first test that was applied in this study was that of the poolability of panel data. An 
applied Chow test or F-test to test for the validity of cross-sectional effects was 
employed in this study. The hypotheses in this test were specified as follows: 
H0: 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼𝑖−1 = 0 (no individual effects: same intercept for all cross-sections) 
HA: 𝛼1 ≠ 𝛼2 ≠ 𝛼𝑖−1 ≠ 0 
According to Baltagi (2009: 15), the test statistic is calculated as follows: 
 
𝐵 = (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅−𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅)/(𝑁−1)
𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅/(𝑁𝑇−𝑁−𝐾) ~𝐵(𝑁−1),(𝑁𝑇−𝑁−𝐾)                 (4.12) 
where 
RRSS = restricted residual sum of squares, being that of OLS on the pooled model 
URSS = unrestricted residual sum of squares, being that of the LSDV regression 
The null hypothesis was rejected if F > Fcrit and the conclusion was that fixed effects are 
valid and therefore firms are heterogeneous and should not be pooled. In this case, one 
would reject the pooled OLS estimation framework and proceed to estimate within the 
fixed effects realm. 
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4.5.2 Testing for time (period) effects 
Testing the joint validity of time (period) effects follows the same procedure as for 
testing for the validity of fixed effects. The hypotheses under consideration were: 
H0: 𝜆1 = 𝜆1 = 𝜆𝑖−1 = 0 (no time [period] effects: same intercept for all cross-sections) 
HA: 𝜆1  ≠ 𝜆2 = 𝜆𝑖−1 ≠ 0 
In the case where the null hypothesis was rejected and time effects were found to be 
valid, time dummies were incorporated into the estimated model and the model took a 
two-way form. 
4.5.3  Testing for random effects 
The next test that was considered was the Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier 
(LM) test to test for heteroscedasticity or serial correlation. The null hypothesis was that 
variance of the error term is constant. The alternative hypothesis was that the variance 
of the error term is non-constant. This rendered estimation with OLS inappropriate. In 
this instance the RE were present. 
The hypotheses under consideration were: 
H0: 𝛿µ
2 = 0 (constant variance across firms) 
HA: 𝛿µ2 ≠ 0 
4.5.4  Fixed effects or random effects: Hausman (1978) test of specification 
To discern whether to select the RE model or the FE model, the Hausman test 
specification was employed. Greene (2012: 419) contends that the FE approach has 
one considerable virtue and there is little justification for treating the individual effects as 
uncorrelated with the other regressors, as is assumed in the RE model. As such, the RE 
treatment may suffer from inconsistency due to this correlation between the included 
variables and the random effect. The null hypothesis was that of exogeneity between 
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the regressors and error term. The null hypothesis was rejected in favour of 
endogeneity between the regressors and the error term (FE model). 
The hypotheses being tested were: 
H0: E(µit|Xit) = 0 
HA: E(µit|Xit) ≠ 0 
4.5.5  Test for cross-sectional dependence: Pesaran (2004) CD test 
The cross-sectional dependence test was used to test whether residuals are correlated 
across entities. This may lead to the problem of contemporaneous correlation. 
Therefore, erroneously ignoring possible correlation of regression disturbances over 
time and between subjects can lead to biased statistical inference (Hoechle, 2007: 281). 
The hypotheses tested were: 
H0: 𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑡𝑣�𝜇𝑖𝑁, 𝜇𝑖𝑁� = 0 (residuals across firms are not correlated) 
HA: 𝜌𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 0 
4.5.6 Test for heteroscedasticity: Modified Wald test for group-wise 
heteroscedasticity 
This modified Wald statistic computed in this test was used to establish whether the 
residual in the estimated FE model was homoscedastic. The model was estimated 
assuming homoscedasticity of the residual. In the absence of the same, it rendered the 
estimation biased. The estimation had to be corrected to obtain heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors. 
H0: 𝛿i
2 = 𝛿      for all i (constant variance) 
H0: 𝛿i
2 ≠ 𝛿       for all i 
The next two tests were generated for the GMM estimation. 
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4.5.7  Test for serial correlation 
For consistent estimation, the Arellano Bond estimators require that the error term be 
serially uncorrelated. As such, it is imperative to test for the serial correlation of the error 
term. The null hypothesis was of autocorrelation. In the absence of autocorrelation, this 
had to be rejected in first-differenced errors but was insignificant in higher orders (order 
greater than 2). 
4.5.8  Test for validity of identification restrictions: Sargan test 
The last test considered under the dynamic panel model was the Sargan test, which 
tests for the validity of identification restrictions, for instance whether the model is well 
specified. It also ascertains whether instruments are more than regressors. Diff-GMM 
and syst-GMM can generate instruments prolifically. If instruments outnumber 
regressors, then equations outnumber unknowns and the system cannot be solved. 
This generates a very huge matrix that finite samples cannot estimate. Sargan test 
basically informs whether the estimated model is over-fitted with instruments.  
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter first considered the empirical framework guiding this study. This laid the 
foundation for the methodological choices for this study. In the main these are the 
proxies used for the dependent and independent variables as well as the estimation 
techniques utilised in this study. The research design was discussed next. This 
considered the panel data econometric models employed in this study. The chapter 
then discussed the estimation methods, namely the pooled regression, FE, RE and 
random parameters models. In this study, the static panel model was specified in three 
instances; firstly, to establish the relationship between leverage and its determinants; 
secondly, to test the ‘regulatory view’ of capital structure; and thirdly, to test the ‘buffer 
view’ of bank capital structure. The pooled effects, RE and FE estimators were 
employed to estimate the static models.  
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On the other hand, a partial adjustment framework was specified to determine whether 
there is a target capital structure that financial firms seek. The estimation methods 
under the dynamic panel model considered in this study were then explored. These are 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator (diff-GMM), the Bond and Blundell (1998) 
estimator (syst-GMM). The chapter concludes by considering the formal tests of 
specification conducted in this study. These tests were conducted in order to avoid 
misspecification and hence ensure that the estimated model was robust in order to draw 
reliable inferences. The next chapter presents the empirical results of the banking 
sector. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE BANKING SECTOR 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the empirical results of testing the hypotheses developed in this 
thesis pertaining to the banking sector. Principally there were four main questions being 
resolved. The first question was whether the standard corporate finance view of capital 
structure also carries over to the banking sector. The second question was whether 
bank capital regulation constitutes the sole source of overriding departure from the 
M&M capital structure irrelevance propositions. In essence the purpose of this question 
tested was to establish the efficacy of bank capital regulation. The third central question 
probed whether the buffer view of bank capital subsists. The fourth question probed 
whether banks have a target capital structure which they seek to attain and if so, at 
what speed do they adjust towards this target. 
Panel data econometric techniques were employed to conduct the analysis. On the one 
hand, a static model was specified to estimate the firm-level and bank-specific 
determinants of capital structure. On the other hand, a dynamic model was specified to 
estimate the target capital structure of banks as well as the speed of adjustment. In 
each instance, an attempt was made to select the most robust estimation technique by 
applying a battery of initial diagnostics tests. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 presents the descriptive 
statistics and analyses the trends thereof. Section 5.3 presents and discusses the 
results of testing the relationship between leverage and firm-level determinants of 
capital structure. Section 5.4 reports on the results of the bank-specific determinants of 
capital structure. Section 5.5 presents the tests and analyses the results to establish 
whether banks seek to achieve a target capital structure. Section 5.6 then concludes the 
chapter.  
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5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This section presents the summary statistics of all the variables. The trends of the 
variables over time are also described and analysed. 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 5.1. These are the 
central measures of tendency (mean and median), standard deviation and minimum 
and maximum values for the sample of banking firms under consideration.  
South African banks on average experience a mean year-on-year growth of 15.9% of 
their total assets. They also realise profits with a mean ROA of 1.9%. This is modest in 
comparison to non-financial firms. Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012: 59) in comparison 
report a mean ROA of 17% for their sample of non-financial firms. The mean asset 
tangibility level of banks is 1% of total assets. This implies that on average, 1% of 
banks’ total assets consist of fixed assets. The average size of the bank approximated 
by the natural logarithm of total assets is 10.85. On average, in any given year, 65% of 
the banks pay dividends. 
 
South African banks are highly leveraged in line with global norms. The mean book 
leverage of the banks is close to 86.9% of total assets. This is close to the levels 
reported by Gropp and Heider (2010: 593) in the case of large US and EU banks of 
92.6% of assets. Comparatively, the median book leverage is 91.6%, which is close to 
the levels reported by Gropp and Heider (2010: 593), who report a median book 
leverage of 92.7% for the same sample of banks.  
 
South African banks are highly leveraged in comparison to non-financial firms. Ramjee 
and Gwatidzo (2012: 59) report for a sample of South African non-financial firms a 
mean book leverage of 59% of total assets. On further analysis, South African banks’ 
leveraging exhibits a sustained upward trajectory in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 
GFC.  
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of the variables 
Note: GFC is the dummy variable representing the 2007–2009 GFC. 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Book leverage 
 
0.8696 0.9160  0.1095 0.3800 1.1300 
Deposit leverage 0.7602 0.8225 0.1897 0.0240 
 
0.9547 
Non-deposit 
leverage 
0.1186 0.0907 0.1470 0.0071 0.7826 
Tier 1 capital 0.1637 0.1330 0.1140 -0.2000 1.1311 
 
Buffer capital  0.0957 0.0688 0.1135 -0.2600 1.0561 
 
Growth 
 
0.1592 0.1199 0.1962 -0.5775 1.1195 
Profit 
 
0.0191 0.0134 0.0380 -0.1694 0.2036 
Asset tangibility 
 
0.0102 0.0089 0.0083 0.0005 0.0400 
Risk 
 
0.0528 0.0249 0.0870 -0.0528 0.6878 
Size 
 
10.8500 8.7100 5.0200 6.1800 27.5700 
Dividend 
 
0.6500 1 0.4785 0 1 
GFC 
 
0.3000 0 0.4597 0 1 
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The average book leverage values of South African banks increased from roughly 
87.5% of total assets in 2007 to 88.9% of total assets in 2015. These trends are 
depicted in Figure 5.1.   
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Figure 5.1: Trends in average book leverage of banks 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
 
The book leverage of banks consists of deposit leverage and non-deposit leverage. 
When book leverage is decomposed into these two constituents, it is demonstrable that 
deposit leverage constitutes the bulk of book leverage. On the one hand, mean deposit 
leverage accounts for 76% of total assets. Yet on the other hand, mean non-deposit 
leverage accounts for 11.9% of total assets.  
It is a fallacy that it seems as though banks are financing their balance sheet growth out 
of debt, yet that not is the case. When the liabilities of banks are decomposed, it is 
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demonstrated that bank deposits are the source of their balance sheet growth (refer to 
Figure 5.2, which depicts the trends in bank capital structure). In essence, deposit 
liabilities of banks exhibited a sustained increase from levels of 73.5% of total assets in 
2006 to 80.6% of total assets in 2015. Comparatively, non-deposit leverage decreased 
from a high of 14.5% of total assets in 2007 to a low of 7.9% of total assets in 2014. 
Similarly, equity financing declined from a peak of 13.6% of total assets in 2006 to a low 
of 9.9% of assets in 2015. Therefore, it can be deduced that deposit financing was 
substituting both equity and non-deposit financing for the period under consideration. 
 
Figure 5.2: Trends in bank capital structure 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
The mean Tier 1 regulatory capital for the sample of banks is 16.4% and the median is 
13.3%. This is in excess of the regulatory capital requirements.5 The variation of the 
                                                          
5 The Tier 1 regulatory capital minimum requirements implemented in South Africa was 7.5% leading up 
the implementation of Basel II provisions in 2008. The Tier 1 capital ratio was set at 7%. The ratio was 
further revised with the implementation of Basel III in 2013 to 6%. 
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Tier 1 capital ratio is depicted in Figure 5.3. The mean Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio 
started off at peak levels in 2006 of 20.7%, and then fell during the period 
corresponding to the GFC to a low of 15.6% in 2008, before it steadily increased from 
2009 until it reached a peak of 17.8% in 2010. It then gradually declined as from 2011 to 
a reach a low of 13.8% in 2015. Notwithstanding, the mean Tier 1 regulatory capital 
ratio of banks has remained in excess of the regulatory minimum. This lends credence 
to the buffer view of capital.  
 
Figure 5.3: Trends in average Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
 
Banks seem to store buffer levels of capital. Buffer capital is defined as the excess of 
the actual Tier 1 regulatory capital over the regulated minimum Tier 1 regulatory capital. 
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The variation in this buffer is presented in Figure 5.4. On average, banks have 
maintained buffer capital levels ranging between 7% and 11%. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: The variation of buffer capital 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
 
The average risk experienced by banks is 5.3%. This metric is a measure of credit risk 
and is defined as the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans. The variation of the mean 
risk of banks is depicted in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5: Trends in banks’ credit risk 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
It would seem that the average credit risk of banks receded in 2008. This corresponds 
to the year when the NCA (2005) came into effect. It could be that banks began to 
implement stringent credit risk assessment of individuals before they could grant credit. 
This curbed the increase in impaired loans. However, that trend was reversed in 2009. 
This could be as a result of the effects of the GFC. The credit risk of banks receded in 
2010 before it started to increase and maintained the upward momentum in 2012. 
 
5.3 BANK LEVERAGE AND FIRM-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE 
Having established the trends in key variables, this section entails the analysis of the 
correlations among the key variables. A static model was specified to analyse the 
relationship between leverage and the firm-level determinants of capital structure. Initial 
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diagnostics techniques were conducted in order to select the most appropriate 
estimation technique. Subsequently, the regression was estimated. Robustness checks 
were performed to test whether the relationship between leverage and firm-level 
determinants was sensitive to the alternative definitions of leverage. The main 
dependent variable used in this study was book leverage, which is analogous to the 
total debt ratio. The first alternative definition of leverage was deposits and the other 
alternative definition was non-deposit leverage. 
5.3.1  Correlation analysis of the main variables used for the banking panel 
The correlations of the main variables used in this study are reported in Table 5.2. 
Suffice to highlight that the predictions were in line with the predictions of the major 
capital structure theories. Book leverage was negatively correlated with the growth 
variable and the correlation was statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. 
This is consistent with the predictions of the trade-off theory. Book leverage was also 
inversely correlated with profit and the correlation was highly significant. This can be 
explained premised on the predictions of the pecking order theory. The more profitable 
a bank is, the more likely that it will generate reserves than rely on debt to fund its 
assets. The negative correlation between book leverage was in line with the predictions 
of the trade-off theory. Size was positively correlated with book leverage. This can also 
be justified in terms of the trade-off theory of capital structure. Large banks are highly 
leveraged compared to small banks, the motivation being that they will derive a higher 
debt interest tax shield.  
Further, book leverage was positively associated with dividend. This is rather 
anomalous, as one would expect that a dividend-paying bank will be sending out a 
signal to the market that it is in good financial health and is a going concern. This way, it 
will become favourable in the equity market and hence make equity the more attractive 
option. However, it could be that banks are constrained on the levels of equity they 
should hold, hence they will finance out of deposits and debt regardless. 
The other correlations do not warrant much exploration and were by and large as 
expected. The growth variable was positively associated with the profit variable. This 
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means that high growth opportunities result in banks making more profits. Similarly, 
banks that grow offer more asset tangibility, hence the positive association between 
growth and asset tangibility. The profit variable was also positively related to asset 
tangibility. This implies that profitable banks are in a position to acquire more fixed 
assets. Profit was inversely related to risk. In essence, this implies that profitable banks 
are those who have a good book of business with low credit risk. 
Dividends were positively associated with size. Large banks are more likely to pay 
dividends more often as compared to small banks. Risk was also negatively related to 
asset tangibility. The riskier the credit portfolio of the bank, the less likely the bank is to 
pay a dividend. The intuition is that such a bank has to make more provisions for 
impaired loans.  
Book leverage was positively related with deposit leverage. In fact, deposit leverage 
explained 63.8% variation in book leverage. Non-deposit leverage was inversely 
correlated with deposit leverage and had approximately 84% explanatory power. The 
correlation was highly significant at the 1% level of significance. 
This corroborates the findings that over time, deposit liabilities have been substituting 
debt and equity in bank financing. Deposit leverage was inversely associated with 
growth. The inference is that banks with growth prospects are relying more on long-term 
debt or other sources of non-deposit finance, rather than deposits, to pursue these 
opportunities. Conversely, non-deposit leverage was positively related to growth and the 
correlation was statistically highly significant. 
Deposit leverage was inversely correlated with profit. This is explainable in terms of the 
pecking order theory. Profitable banks are likely to observe the financing hierarchy and 
finance out of retaining earnings before relying on deposits. Conversely, non-deposit 
leverage was positively correlated with profit. Deposit leverage is negatively correlated 
with asset tangibility. The rationale could be that small banks that have less asset 
tangibility rely more on debt financing rather than deposits, as compared to the big 
banks.
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Table 5.2 Correlation matrix for the main variables used for the banking panel 
 Book 
leverage 
 
Deposit 
leverage 
Non-deposit 
leverage 
Growth Profit Asset  Risk Size  Dividend 
Book leverage 
 
1.000         
Deposit leverage 
 
0.638*** 1.000        
Non-deposit 
leverage 
 
-0.108 -0.835*** 1.000       
Growth    
 
-0.113* -0.275*** 0.274*** 1.000 
 
 
     
Profit 
 
 
-0.626*** -0.458*** 0.143* 0.287*** 1.000     
Asset  
 
 
-0.356*** -0.209** 0.015 0.047 0.156* 1.000    
Risk  
 
 
0.127 -0.299*** 0.476*** -0.070 -0.485*** -0.002 1.000   
Size     
 
 
0.253*** 0.013 0.164** -0.099 -0.197** 0.011 0.105 1.000  
Dividend     
 
0.286*** 0.110 0.063 -0.040 0.050 -0.105 -0.148* 0.179** 1.000 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The variables are defined as follows:  
book leverage = 1-(Equity / total assets); growth = growth rate of total assets; profit = ROAA;  
asset tangibility = fixed assets / total assets; risk = impaired loans / gross loans; size = natural logarithm of total assets;  
dividend = dummy variable = (1 when dividend is paid and 0 when dividend is not paid). 
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Further, deposit leverage was negatively related to risk. To the contrary, non-deposit 
leverage is positively correlated with risk. Therefore, with increased credit risk, banks 
will fund their assets using non-deposit liabilities. Non-deposit leverage was positively 
related to size. Large banks are likely to employ debt in their financing predicated upon 
the trade-off theory. 
On examining the correlation matrix, certain trends emerged. Firstly, the correlations 
involving deposit leverage move and are of the same sign as those involving the book 
leverage variable. This demonstrates that they are highly correlated. Secondly, the 
correlations involving non-deposit leverage were of an opposite sign to the ones 
involving the deposit leverage variable. Wherever the correlations were significant, they 
were of an opposite sign. This further demonstrates the substitutability of non-deposit 
liabilities by deposit liabilities. 
 
5.3.2  Estimation framework and empirical results 
The estimation framework to test the relationship between book leverage and capital 
structure was premised on an FE model. Initial diagnostic tests were conducted in order 
to estimate a robust model. Subsequently, the estimation of the model was done and 
the results and inferences thereof are now discussed. 
 
5.3.2.1 Initial diagnostic tests of the regression of book leverage on firm-level 
factors 
A battery of tests was conducted on the pooled OLS, FE and RE models. These 
included the tests for panel heterogeneity (presence of FE), significance of time effects, 
heteroscedasticity, RE, FE versus RE specification and lastly cross-sectional 
dependence. The results of these tests are reported in Table 5.3. Firstly, the researcher 
tested for the joint validity of cross-sectional individual effects. The test confirmed the 
significance of individual effects, as the F-statistic (51.57) was greater than the test 
statistic (4.142). This test confirmed that banks are heterogeneous and that their 
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financing decision is based on bank-specific factors. As such, in the presence of FE, the 
pooled OLS estimation method becomes inconsistent and inefficient.  
The test for the joint validity of time effects also came out in the affirmative. As a 
consequence, the researcher specified a two-way error component to incorporate the 
time effects. The presence of time effects could be explained by the economic shocks 
that have an effect on bank financing. Any leveraging decision is bound to be affected 
by interest rates that are revised from time to time by monetary authorities in line with 
economic shocks. The Breusch-Pagan (1980) LM test confirmed the presence of RE. 
However, the Hausman (1978) specification test result favoured the use of the FE 
estimator over the RE estimator. The researcher also tested for heteroscedasticity of 
the error term and found that it was present.  
 
Lastly, the researcher tested for cross-sectional dependence by applying the Pesaran 
(2004) cross-sectional dependence test on the one-way model. The null hypothesis of 
independence of cross-sections was rejected, as the test statistic was significant at the 
1% level of significance. The correlation coefficient was 0.405. This result confirms the 
cross-sectional dependence among the banking firms, as they depend on one another 
for funding through their interactions in the interbank market. 
 
Subsequently, when the researcher incorporated time effects and estimated a two-way 
model and rerun the test, it became negative. However, the alternative Frees test 
confirmed the presence of the cross-sectional effects for the two-way model. The 
researcher reasons that the incorporation of time effects controls for temporal 
dependence; nonetheless, the problem of spatial dependence remains. As such, the 
researcher employed the FE with the Driscoll and Kray (1998) standard errors 
estimator, which controls for heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence.  
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Table 5.3: Diagnostic tests with book leverage as the dependent variable 
Test Test statistic Critical value Inference 
Joint validity of cross-sectional 
individual effects 
H0 : 𝜶𝟏 =  𝜶𝟐 = ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  =  𝟎 
HA: : 𝜶𝟏 ≠  𝜶𝟐 ≠ ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  ≠  𝟎 
 
F = 51.57 F(0.01,15,137) = 4.142 Cross-sectional specific effects are valid. 
Joint validity of time effects 
H0: 𝝀𝟏 = 𝝀𝟐 = 𝝀𝒏−𝟏 = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝀𝟏  ≠ 𝝀𝟐 ≠ ⋯𝝀𝒏−𝟏 ≠ 𝟎 
F = 4.02 F(0.01,9,129) = 2.548 Time effects are valid. The error term takes a two-way 
error component form. 
Breusch-Pagan (1980) LM test for 
RE  
H0: 𝜹𝛍𝟐 = 𝟎 
HA: 𝜹𝛍𝟐 ≠ 𝟎 
LM = 189.16 χ2(15) = 30.58 There is significant difference in variance across the 
entities. RE are present. 
Hausman (1978) specification test 
H0: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) = 𝟎 
HA: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) ≠ 𝟎 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 = 𝜹 for all i 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 ≠ 𝜹  for all i 
 
Cross-sectional dependence tests 
H0: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝒄𝒄𝒄�𝝁𝒊𝒕,𝝁𝒊𝒕� = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 ≠ 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝟎 
m3 = 41.41 
 
 
 
LM = 5246.6 
χ2(6)= 16.81 
 
 
 
χ2(16)= 31.99 
Regressors not exogenous. Hence the FE specification 
is valid. 
 
 
The variance of the error term is not constant. 
Heteroscedasticity is present. 
Pesaran (2004) CD test:  
(i) One-way model 
 
 
(ii) Two-way model 
 
Frees (1995) test                                       
 
CD = 6.25 
(0.405) 
 
CD= -0.255 
(0.368) 
F = 0.529 
 
p = 0.000 
 
 
p = 0.7989 
 
α = 0.01 : 0.5198 
 
Cross-sections are interdependent. 
 
 
Cross-sections are independent. 
 
Cross-sections are interdependent 
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5.3.2.2 Hypothesis testing and presentation of results 
The regression output is presented in Table 5.4. It reports the pooled OLS and RE 
estimation results simply for comparison. Suffice to highlight that the estimated 
coefficients and signs of the RE and FE estimation outputs are comparable for most of 
the variables. However, the analysis was based on the FE with Driscoll and Kray (1998) 
estimation results for the reasons enunciated previously. The FE model was of good fit 
and well specified. The F-statistic value was 249.03 and was statistically significant at 
the 1% level of significance. The within R-squared correlation was relatively high at 
0.649.  
 
(i) Testing Hypothesis 1: There is a significant relationship between profitability 
and financial firm leverage. 
Highly profitable firms are presumed to generate more retained earnings. As such, 
according to the pecking order theory, they are more inclined to fund any value-adding 
projects firstly out of retained earnings. Therefore, the pecking order predicts a negative 
relationship between profitability and firm leverage. The estimation results confirmed an 
inverse relationship between bank’s book leverage and profitability. All three models 
predicted a negative relationship between bank leverage and profitability (refer to Table 
5.4).  
The FE model predicted that a 1% increase in a bank’s profits will result in a 7.5% 
decrease in a bank’s book leverage. This result was highly significant at the 1% level of 
significance. Therefore, it could be said that bank financing mirrors that of non-financial 
firms, as explained by the pecking order theory. Among other scholars, Ahmad and 
Abbas (2011: 211), Gropp and Heider (2010: 598) and Jucá et al. (2012:23) also found 
an inverse relationship between firm leverage and profitability for their sample of 
financial firms.  
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Table 5.4: Panel regression results with book leverage as the dependent variable 
 Pooled OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects with 
Driscoll and Kray 
(1998) standard 
errors 
Growth 0.061  0.074*** 0.076** (1.28) (2.62 ) (3.19) 
Profit -1.851*** -0.993*** -0.824*** (-5.64) (-11.67)   (-25.84) 
Asset tangibility -2.935** -1.147    -0.205 (-3.19) (-0.82)  (-0.33) 
Risk -0.161** 0.212** 0.297*** (-1.56) (2.29 )  (4.57) 
Size 0.003** 0.007 0.023*** (3.28) (1.52 )   (3.26) 
Dividend 
 
0.048*** -0.007 -0.008 
(3.62) ( -0.77) (-1.10) 
GFC 0.030*** 0.003  -0. 016*** (2.34) (0.2)  (-2.74) 
Constant 0.863*** 0.808***    0.609*** (51.46) (12.53) (6.84) 
Adjusted R2 0.5750 0.6343 0.6490 
F-statistic   249.03*** 
LM-statistic  75910***  
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. Time dummies 
estimated for the FE and RE models are not reported here. The t-statistics for the pooled and FE models 
as well as the z-statistics for the RE model are reported in parentheses.   
The table above shows the results of estimating the following regression for the sample of 16 South 
African banks for the period 2006–2015. 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑆𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑆𝑖,𝑁 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁       
where the dependent variable = book leverage; 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′  = a vector of explanatory variables (size, profitability, 
growth, asset tangibility dividend, risk and GFC) for bank i at time t; β = a vector of slope parameters; 𝛼𝑖= 
group-specific constant term which embodies all the observable effects; εi,t = composite error term that 
also takes care of other explanatory variables that equally determine leverage but were not included in 
the model. 
 
 
 
(ii) Testing Hypothesis 2: There is a significant relationship between asset 
tangibility and financial firm leverage. 
Firms with more tangible assets are presumed to offer more collateral and hence are 
viewed favourable in the debt market. Therefore, the trade-off theory predicts a positive 
relationship between leverage and asset tangibility. On the other hand, the pecking 
order theory predicts a negative relationship between firm leverage and asset tangibility. 
The results of the present study were inconclusive in this regard. The pooled OLS 
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regression predicted a negative and statistically significant relationship between book 
leverage and asset tangibility. Similarly, the RE estimator predicted a negative though 
statistically insignificant association between book leverage and asset tangibility. The 
FE estimator predicted a negative relationship between the book leverage and the asset 
tangibility variables, although statistically insignificant. Therefore, the results point to 
support of the pecking order theory, although not significant in all models despite the 
same sign. As such, the researcher did not find evidence in support of this hypothesis. 
(iii)  Testing Hypothesis 3: There is a significant relationship between growth and 
financial firm leverage.  
The financing patterns of South African banking firms seem to be conforming to the 
prediction of the pecking order theory. The prediction was that firms faced with growth 
prospects will observe a financial hierarchy in financing their operations. The 
presupposition was that given the option between debt and finance, firms will choose 
debt first. Therefore, a direct relationship exists between book leverage and growth 
prospects. All three models predicted a positive relationship between book leverage and 
growth. The FE and RE predictions were statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels 
of significance, respectively. The FE model predicted that a 1% increase in growth 
prospects will result in a 7.6% increase in leverage. The positive prediction is consistent 
with the findings of Ahmed et al. (2010: 10) and Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011: 333), 
among other scholars who considered non-financial firms, as well as Ahmad and Abbas 
(2011: 211) and Teixeira et al. (2014: 56), who studied financial firms. 
 
(iv) Testing Hypothesis 4: There is a significant relationship between dividend 
payout and financial firm leverage. 
An inverse relationship was expected to subsist between book leverage and dividend 
payout. This was premised on the signalling theory. Based on this theory, the payment 
of a dividend sends out a signal to the market that the prospects of the firm are good 
and that it is a going concern. This will make equity the favourable option. To the 
contrary, the pooled OLS estimator predicted a positive relationship that was statistically 
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significant. However, the RE and FE estimators predicted an inverse relationship, 
although it was statistically insignificant at the 10% level of significance. Based on the 
FE estimator, which is the most appropriate, there was an inverse association between 
book leverage and dividends, although not significant. 
 
(v) Testing Hypothesis 5: There is a significant relationship between size and 
financial firm leverage. 
A positive association exists between bank book leverage and size. This prediction was 
consistent among all three estimators, although the RE estimator reported a statistically 
insignificant result. The FE estimator predicted that 1% increase in size will result in a 
2.3% increase in book leverage. This positive association between bank book leverage 
and size is consistent with both the pecking order and trade-off theories prediction that 
large firms should be highly leveraged as compared to small firms. They stand to benefit 
from a debt interest tax shield. As firms grow, they also observe the financing hierarchy 
and would favour debt as opposed to equity. This result corroborates the findings of 
Gropp and Heider (2010: 598). 
 
(vi) Testing Hypothesis 6: The global financial crisis has significant explanatory 
power in financial firm leveraging. 
This hypothesis was based on the notion that there is an inverse relationship between 
leverage and the dummy variable representing the 2007–2009 GFC. This period was 
characterised by banks deleveraging and also strengthening their capital levels through 
the use of either retained earnings or equity issues. During this period, financing out of 
debt instruments became a less favourable option, as compared to financing out of 
retained earnings and equity. 
The researcher found empirical support for this claim in the study results. According to 
the FE estimator results, it can be asserted with 99% confidence that book leverage is 
inversely related to the GFC. 
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(vii) Testing Hypothesis 7: Credit risk has significant explanatory power in bank 
leveraging. 
This hypothesis was predicated based on the notion that there is a positive relationship 
between bank leverage and credit risk. The pecking order theory predicts a positive 
relationship between leverage and risk. With increased credit risk there is bound to be 
increased cash flow volatility. Cash flow volatility implies the volatility of retained 
earnings. Banks are therefore forced to finance out of debt before utilising equity. The 
FE and RE estimators confirmed a direct relationship between bank leverage and credit 
risk. The FE model predicted that a 1% increase in leverage will result in a 33.3% 
increase in book leverage. The relationship was statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance. 
 
In Table 5.5 a comparison of the book leverage regression outcomes of this study with 
the empirical findings of other similar studies tested against the major predictions of 
capital structure theories is conducted. Firstly, it is evident that the financing patterns of 
South African banks mirror that of other financial firms. Secondly, there was no disparity 
observed in the financing patterns of banks and non-financial firms. Lastly, the capital 
structures of South African banks can be best explained by the pecking order theory. 
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Table 5.5: Book leverage: A comparison of predicted versus actual outcomes of the regression 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
 
Variable Prediction Studies of banks Studies of non-financial firms Empirical 
results of 
this study 
Theory 
Gropp 
and 
Heider 
(2010) 
Anarfo 
(2015) 
Gocmen 
and 
Sahin 
(2014) 
Jucá et al. 
(2012) 
 
Ramjee 
and 
Gwatidzo 
(2012 
Frank 
and 
Goyal 
(2009) 
Antoniou et 
al. (2008) 
Growth +/- - - + - + - - + Pecking order 
Profit - - - - - - - - - Pecking order 
Size +/- + + + - + + + + 
Trade-
off or 
pecking 
order 
Asset 
tangibility + + - - + + + + 
+ 
(insignificant) n/a 
Risk - - n/a - - + - + (insignificant) + 
Pecking 
order 
Dividend - - n/a n/a - (insignificant) n/a - 
+ 
(insignificant) 
-
(insignificant) n/a 
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5.3.3  Robustness tests of the dependent variable 
This section reports on robustness checks carried out on the dependent variable used. 
Because book leverage of banks comprises of non-deposit liabilities and deposit 
liabilities, the researcher decomposed it into its constituents. Firstly, the non-deposit 
leverage variable was employed as the alternative definition of the dependent variable. 
Subsequently, the model was specified with deposit leverage as the dependent 
variable. The estimation framework remained the same, that is, initial diagnostic tests 
preceded the final model specification.  
 
The initial diagnostic test results for the non-deposit and deposit leverage regressions 
against the determinants of capital structure are presented in appendices C and D, 
respectively. In both instances, cross-sectional individual effects were detected. Time 
effects were not detected. In each instance, a one-way error component model was 
specified. RE were also detected, confirming the suitability of the RE model over the 
pooled OLS model. Subsequently, when the Hausman (1978) specification test was 
performed, it favoured the use of an FE estimator over the RE estimator in both 
instances.  
 
Heteroscedasticity was detected and cross-sections were deemed to be independent. In 
light of the foregoing, the estimation technique of choice that was selected was the FE 
estimator, which controls for heteroscedasticity. The regression outputs for both models 
are reported in appendices E and F, respectively. The estimated results when the 
alternative measures of leverage were employed are contrasted with the estimated 
results with book leverage as the dependent variable in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6: Robustness checks of the leverage variable  
Dependent 
variable 
Book leverage Non-deposit 
leverage 
Deposit leverage 
Growth 0.076** 0.060** 0.026 
Profit -0.824*** 0.970** -1.601** 
Asset -0.205 -0.786 0.888 
Risk 0.297*** -0.555*** 0.946*** 
Size 0.023** 0.003 0.019 
Dividend -0.008 -0.001 -0.012 
 (*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. 
 
 
(i) Testing Hypothesis 8: The standard determinants of capital structure have 
significant explanatory power in non-deposit financing. 
There are three statistically significant relationships that subsist between non-deposit 
leverage and the firm-level determinants of capital structure, as reported in Table 5.6. 
Firstly, non-deposit liabilities were positively associated with the growth variable. This 
corroborates the findings of Gocmen and Sahin (2014: 62). The FE estimator predicted 
a direct relationship between non-deposit leverage and growth. The result was 
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. The coefficient of the growth 
variable was 0.06. In other words, a 1% increase in growth prospects leads to a 6% 
increase in non-deposit leverage (long-term) debt. This result was similar in sign and 
magnitude to the predicted result when book leverage was used as the dependent 
variable. This demonstrates that banks faced with growth opportunities are inclined to 
finance such prospects using long-term debt. The financing patterns of banks also 
conform to the pecking order theory. 
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Secondly, profit was positively related to non-deposit leverage. The FE estimator 
predicted a positive and statistically significant relationship at the 5% level of 
significance. This is consistent with the findings of Gropp and Heider (2010: 605). 
Arguably, profitable South African banks are more inclined to utilise long-term debt to 
finance their operations in order to enjoy the debt interest tax shield benefit. This is in 
line with the a priori expectations of the trade-off theory.  
Thirdly, the FE estimator predicted that an increase in the credit risk of banks results in 
a decline of their non-deposit leverage levels. The result was statistically significant at 
the 1% level of significance. This could be as a result of banks substituting long-term 
debt in favour of deposit financing in order to hedge cash flow volatility in the short term.  
From the foregoing it can be deduced that the non-deposit leverage variable is robust 
for three out of the four relationships that were predicted when book leverage was used 
as the dependent variable. These are growth, risk and profits. The direction of the 
relationship predicted was only the same for the growth variable and oppositely signed 
for the profits and risk variables. 
(ii) Testing Hypothesis 9: The standard determinants of capital structure have 
significant explanatory power in deposit financing. 
There were only two statistically significant relationships that were predicted by the FE 
estimator. An inverse relationship was predicted to exist between deposit leverage and 
profitability. The result was statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. Gropp 
and Heider (2010: 605) obtained similar results. Therefore, profitable banks are least 
likely to rely on deposits as a source of funding, but will rely on retained earnings and 
then debt as an alternative source of funding.  
There was a positive association between deposit leverage and risk. The relationship 
was highly statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. This implies that at 
higher levels of credit risk, South African banks are forced to finance out of deposits 
rather than long-term debt and equity. Therefore, the researcher found moderate 
support in favour of the hypothesis that standard firm-level determinants have significant 
explanatory power in deposit financing.      
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The results documented in Table 5.6 also demonstrate the effective substitution 
between deposit leverage and non-deposit leverage of banks. This corroborates the 
results of the correlation analysis presented earlier. Whenever the predicted coefficient 
between non-deposit leverage and the explanatory variable was statistically significant, 
it was oppositely signed to the predicted coefficient between deposit leverage and that 
explanatory variable. For instance, the coefficient of non-deposit leverage was positive 
when profit was the regressor, as compared to the negative coefficient of deposit 
leverage when profit was the regressor. 
 
5.4 BANK-SPECIFIC DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
In this section, the bank-specific determinants of capital structure are considered. This 
is done in two steps. Firstly, the researcher tested the buffer view of bank capital by 
considering the correlations between buffer capital and the firm-level factors. 
Subsequently, the researcher estimated an FE model. Secondly, the regulatory view of 
bank capital was tested by considering the correlations between the Tier 1 regulatory 
capital ratio and the firm-level determinants of capital structure considered in this study. 
Subsequently, an FE model was estimated. 
5.4.1  Empirical results of testing the buffer view of bank capital 
The correlations of buffer capital and the firm-level determinants of capital structure are 
documented in Appendix G. Profit was positively correlated with buffer capital. Highly 
profitable banks keep more levels of capital in excess of the regulatory requirement. 
This is consistent with the predictions of the buffer view of capital. Asset tangibility was 
positively correlated with buffer capital. This implies that banks that have more tangible 
assets stock more capital. This is consistent with the buffer view of capital. Lastly, size 
was negatively correlated with buffer capital. Small banks are inclined to keep more 
levels of capital in comparison to large banks. This is because they have not generated 
goodwill to readily shore up capital in the equity or debt markets at short notice, should 
the need arise, as compared to the large banks.  
157 
 
5.4.2  Pre-estimation of buffer capital regression with firm-level factors 
Initial diagnostics tests were conducted in order to correctly specify the model to 
estimate the determinants of buffer capital. The results are reported in Appendix H. The 
diagnostics confirmed the validity of FE, absence of time effects, interdependence of 
cross-sections, presence of RE and heteroscedasticity. In the absence of time effects, a 
one-way model was specified. Subsequently, the FE estimator was applied. However, in 
order to avert estimation inefficiency rendered by the detected cross-sectional 
dependence and heteroscedasticity, estimation was done within the framework of 
Driscoll and Kray (1998). According to Hoechle (2007: 282), the Driscoll and Kray 
(1998) estimator produces heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard 
errors that are robust to general forms of spatial and temporal dependence.  
5.4.3 Estimation results of buffer capital regression with firm-level factors 
Having run the initial diagnostics, the model was estimated. The results of the 
regression of the firm-level determinants of capital structure on buffer capital are 
reported in Table 5.7. These results were premised on testing the hypothesis stated 
below: 
Testing Hypothesis 10: Bank leveraging is consistent with the buffer view of 
capital.  
The estimated results document four statistically significant results. Firstly, bank credit 
risk was negatively related to buffer capital and the result was statistically significant at 
the 1% level of significance. Banks with high credit risk keep low buffer capital in 
comparison to banks with less credit risk. Secondly, size was negatively related to 
buffer capital and the result was statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. 
Arguably, large banks are keeping low levels of capital because of the ease with which 
they can raise capital in the event that they deviate from the prescribed levels. Thirdly, 
the dividends variable was positively related to buffer capital. The relationship was 
statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. Dividend-paying banks are 
keeping high buffer capital levels as compared to non-dividend-paying banks. The 
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researcher reasons that this phenomenon could perhaps be best explained by the 
signalling theory. 
Table 5.7: Panel regression results with buffer capital and Tier 1 capital as the 
dependent variables 
 Dependent variable 
Explanatory 
variable 
Tier 1 capital Buffer capital 
Fixed Effects Driscoll and 
Kray (1998) standard errors  
Fixed Effects Driscoll and Kray 
(1998) standard errors 
Growth -0.141 
(-1.66) 
-0.147 
(-1.70) 
Profit -0.598 
(-1.13) 
-0.585 
(-1.12) 
Asset tangibility 1.628 
(0.64) 
1.731 
(0.68) 
Risk -1.006*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.997*** 
(-4.21) 
Size -0.051*** 
(3.60) 
-0.042** 
(-2.97) 
Dividend 0.077* 
(2.18) 
0.076* 
(2.10) 
GFC -0.023*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.025** 
(-3.09) 
Constant 0.747*** 
(5.00) 
0.584*** 
(3.93) 
Adjusted R2 0.4301 0.4182 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The t-statistics for 
the FE model are reported in parentheses.  
The table above shows the results of estimating the following regression for the sample of 16 South 
African banks for the period 2006–2015. 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑆𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑆𝑖,𝑁 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁       
where the dependent variable = T1C or BUFFER; 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′  = a vector of explanatory variables (size, 
profitability, growth, asset tangibility, dividend, risk and GFC) for bank i at time t; β = a vector of slope 
parameters; 𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term that embodies all the observable effects; εi,t = composite 
error term that also takes care of other explanatory variables that equally determine leverage but were not 
included in the model. 
 
Dividend-paying banks send out the signal that their prospects are good and hence are 
viewed favourably by the debt and equity markets. Therefore, they are able to shore up 
their capital levels with much ease. Lastly, buffer capital was negatively associated with 
159 
 
the GFC dummy variable. This corroborates the findings of Jokipii and Milne (2008: 
1450), who found a negative relationship between buffer capital and cycle.  
Table 5.8 draws comparisons between the predicted and estimated effects of the 
regression when buffer capital was employed as the dependent variable. Suffice to 
highlight that by and large, the financing of South African banks conforms to the buffer 
view of capital, as the predicted results were in line with the estimated results for 
dividends, size and risk. 
Table 5.8: Predicted effect versus estimated effect of firm-level factor on buffer 
capital 
Firm-level determinant Predicted effect Results of this study 
Profitability Positive Insignificant 
Asset tangibility  No prediction n/a 
Growth Positive Insignificant 
Dividends Positive Positive 
Size Positive/Negative Negative 
Risk  Negative Negative 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
 
5.4.4  Empirical results of testing the regulatory view of bank capital 
The correlation matrix of the Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio and firm-level factors is 
documented in Appendix I. The Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio was positively correlated 
with profits. Profitable banks are associated with keeping high levels of capital. Banks 
with high asset tangibility are associated with high Tier 1 regulatory capital ratios.  
Profits were negatively correlated with Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio. This implies that 
highly profitable banks are associated with observing low capital ratios. This could be 
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attributed to profitable banks being able to raise equity capital at short notice should the 
need arise and hence no persuasion to observe high Tier 1 regulatory capital ratios. 
 
5.4.4.1 Pre-estimation of Tier 1 regulatory capital regression on firm-level factors 
Diagnostics tests conducted on the initial estimated models revealed that FE were valid, 
time effects absent, cross-sections interdependent, RE present and heteroscedasticity 
present. In the absence of time effects, a one-way model was specified. Subsequently, 
the FE estimator was applied within the framework of Driscoll and Kray (1998) in order 
to mitigate estimation inefficiency rendered by the detected cross-sectional dependence 
and heteroscedasticity. The results of the diagnostics are reported in Appendix J.  
 
5.4.4.2 Estimation results of the Tier 1 regulatory capital regression on firm-level 
factors 
The estimation output of the regression of Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio and the firm-
level determinants is presented in Table 5.7. The estimation is premised on the 
hypothesis restated below: 
Hypothesis 11: The standard determinants of capital structure have significant 
explanatory power in capital regulation. 
 
Firstly, a negative relationship subsisted between risk and the Tier 1 regulatory capital 
variable. A decrease in credit risk leads to an increase in capital. It could be that 
increased credit risk results in increased volatility of cash flows. This erodes profitability 
and ultimately retained earnings. As a result, the Tier 1 capital ratio falls. Similarly, with 
an increase in portfolio risk, the bank is viewed less favourable by the equity market and 
hence a risk premium is charged, which makes equity a less favourable proposition. 
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Secondly, size was negatively related to the regulatory variable. The relationship was 
statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. These findings are consistent with 
those of Gropp and Heider (2010: 613). Large banks are well diversified and have also 
generated goodwill in the market, which puts them in good stead to raise capital at short 
notice. As such, they might not have any incentive to hold high levels of capital. In 
addition, there is the paradigm that large banks are ‘too big to fail’. Should their capital 
levels be eroded, the regulatory authorities or central government will come to their 
rescue, as witnessed during the 2007–2009 GFC.  
Thirdly, a positive association existed between the regulatory variable and dividends. A 
1% increase in dividends leads to a 7.7% increase in the Tier 1 capital ratio of South 
African banks. Paying out a dividend sends a signal to the equity market that the 
prospects of the bank are good. Arguably, such a bank could access the equity market 
at preferential terms. 
Lastly, a negative relation existed between the Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio and the 
dummy variable representing the 2007–2009 GFC. During the 2007-2009 GFC, the 
capital levels of banks were eroded. This was partly due to a decline in profitability and 
hence retained earnings were curtailed during this period. 
Further, wherever the estimated coefficient is significant, it is of opposite sign to the 
estimated coefficient when book leverage is used as the dependent variable. For 
instance, the coefficient of risk is negative when regressed on the regulatory variable, 
while the coefficient of risk is positive when regressed on book leverage. This 
demonstrates the substitutability of equity capital with debt. 
The foregoing demonstrates that the standard firm-level determinants of capital 
structure have a moderate explanatory power in terms of the regulatory variable. If 
regulation constituted the overriding departure from the M&M irrelevance propositions 
and solely determines capital structure, the firm-level determinants should not offer any 
explanatory power in terms of the regulatory variable. As such, the researcher did not 
find evidence in support of the regulatory view. 
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5.5 TARGET CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND THE SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT 
It is conceivable that banks also seek to achieve a target capital structure in their 
financing in a like fashion to non-financial firms, having established that bank financing 
mirrors that of non-financial firms. As such, this section addresses the question whether 
banks seek to achieve a target capital structure in their financing. Firstly, the 
correlations between the variables are considered in this section. Secondly, the section 
reports on initial diagnostics performed on the partial adjustment model estimated. 
Finally, inferences on a robust model that was estimated are reported. Robustness 
checks were conducted for the alternative definitions of leverage. 
 
5.5.1  Correlation matrix of the main variables with lagged book leverage 
included 
The correlation matrix of book leverage and firm-level determinants of capital structure 
with the inclusion of lagged book leverage is presented in Table 5.9. The lagged book 
leverage variable is highly correlated with book leverage. It explains 95% of the 
variation in book leverage. This demonstrates that leverage is persistent and has 
feedback. Current levels of bank leverage were determined by past levels of leverage. 
The firm-level determinants were correlated with the lagged dependent variable in the 
same manner as they were correlated with the book leverage variable. As such, the 
section does not delve much into these correlations. Suffice to highlight that a negative 
correlation existed between the lagged booked leverage variable and growth, risk, asset 
tangibility and profits. A positive relationship existed between the lagged book leverage 
variable and the size and dividend variables. 
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Table 5.9 Correlation matrix of the main variables with the lagged book leverage included 
 Book  
leverage 
 
Book 
leverage(-1) 
Growth Profit Asset  
tangibility 
Risk Size  Dividend 
Book leverage 
 
1.000 
 
 
       
Book leverage(-1) 
 
0.949*** 1.000 
 
 
      
Growth    
 
-0.201** -0.411*** 1.000 
 
 
     
Profit 
 
-0.629*** -0.519*** 0.411*** 1.000 
 
 
    
Asset tangibility 
 
-0.409*** -0.352*** 0.131 0.261*** 1.000 
 
 
   
Risk  
 
-0.085 -0.170** 0.047 -0.178** 0.123 1.000 
 
 
  
Size     
 
0.290*** 0.288*** -0.127 -0.210*** -0.027 -0.004 1.000 
 
 
 
Dividend     0.280*** 0.358*** -0.069 0.002 -0.143* -0.196** 0.188** 1.000 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The variables are defined as follows:  
book leverage= 1-(Equity / total assets); deposit leverage = total deposits / total assets; non-deposit leverage = book leverage – deposit leverage; 
growth = growth rate of total assets; profit = ROAA; asset tangibility = fixed assets / total assets; risk = impaired loans / gross loans; size = natural 
logarithm of total assets; dividend = dummy variable = (1 when dividend is paid and, 0 when dividend is not paid). 
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5.2  Pre-estimation of the target capital structure regression with book 
leverage as the dependent variable 
In order to estimate a robust model, diagnostic tests were conducted on the initially 
estimated FE and RE model. The tests are reported in Appendix K. The diagnostics 
revealed that the FE were valid and the time effects invalid. Hence, a one-way error 
component model was specified. Further, heteroscedasticity of the error term was 
detected. The Hausman (1978) specification test also revealed that the regressors were 
not exogenous and were correlated with the error term. This is apparent from the 
correlation matrix reported in Table 5.9, as the lagged book leverage variable is highly 
correlated with the firm-level determinants of capital structure. The endogeneity arose 
from the correlation of the residual with the lagged dependent variable, which is referred 
to as Nickel bias. Further, the tests revealed the problem of cross-sectional 
dependence. At the first instance, in order to remedy the above problems, estimation 
was done within the framework of GMM. A one-step diff-GMM and one-step syst-GMM 
estimator was used to estimate the model. However, due to the small sample properties 
of the data employed in this study, caution was exercised in relying solely on these 
GMM estimators, as they performed moderately for small datasets.  
At the second instance, two more estimators were considered. These were the FGLS 
(Kmenta, 1986; Parks, 1967) and the LSDV with Kiviet (1995) correction estimators. 
The FGLS estimator was efficient in the presence of Nickel bias, cross-sectional 
dependence and heteroscedasticity. However, it suffered from small sample bias. The 
best option under the circumstances was to use the LSDV with Kiviet (1995) correction. 
Judson and Owen (1999: 14) demonstrate that the corrected LSDV estimator is suitable 
for studies employing small data sets, as the bias is low. Notwithstanding, the results 
from the four estimators are reported. However, for interpretation purposes, the 
corrected LSDV results are used. 
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5.5.3 Estimation results of target capital structure with book leverage as the 
dependent variable 
The estimation results of the regression to determine the existence of a target capital 
structure are presented in Table 5.10. The estimation is premised on the hypothesis 
restated below: 
Hypothesis 16: Financial firms do adjust their capital structure to a target. 
Table 5.10: Panel regression results to determine target capital structure with 
book leverage as the dependent variable 
 Diff-GMM 
(one-step) 
Syst-GMM 
(one-step) 
FGLS (Kmenta, 
1986; Parks, 
1967) 
LSDV with 
Kiviet (1995) 
correction 
Leverage (-1) 0.554*** 0.524*** 0.790*** 0.558*** (3.88) (3.97) (20.78) (7.98) 
Growth 0.101*** 0.067*** 0.092***  0.080*** (4.36) (3.00) (13.71) (35.86 ) 
Profit -0.706*** -1.045*** -0.762*** -0.677*** (-5.62) (-4.76) (-13.20) (-47.86)   
Asset 
tangibility 
-1.294*** -1.000 -0.273 0.568   
(-2.28) (-1.39) (-0.81) (1.00)  
Risk 0.257*** -0.016 0.071* 0.211*** (4.72) (-0.19) (1.78) (8.47)  
Size 0.007 0.001 -0.003* 0.013*** (0.54) (0.95) (1.86) (19.19 )   
Dividend -0.011 0.021** 0.007*** 0.003 (-1.00) (2.09) (3.48) (0.46) 
GFC 0.013 0.016** 0.006** 0.013***  (2.19) (2.10) (2.08) (23.49)  
AR(1)- statistic -1.75* -1.17   
AR(2)-statistic 0.846 0.965   
Sargan 7.12 27.9**   
LM-statistic   917***  
Number of 
observations 160 160 160 160 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The table above shows the results of estimating the following regression for the 
sample of 16 South African banks for the period 2006–2015. 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑆𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑆𝑖,𝑁 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑆𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑆𝑖,𝑁−1+ 𝛿𝜷𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁       
where the dependent variable = book leverage; Leveragei,t−1 = lagged book leverage;  𝒙𝑖,𝑁′  = a vector of 
explanatory variables (size, profitability, growth, asset tangibility, dividend, risk and GFC) for bank i at 
time t; β = a vector of slope parameters; 𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term that embodies all the 
observable effects; εi,t = composite error term that also takes care of other explanatory variables that 
equally determine leverage but were not included in the model; 𝛿 = the speed of adjustment. 
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The estimation results are consistent among the four estimators. The corrected LSDV 
estimator reported the coefficients conservatively and was used to draw inferences. The 
estimation results further corroborated the results of the estimation of the static model 
that was considered earlier on. The estimation results were equally signed for the 
coefficients of growth, profits, risk, size and the GFC dummy variables. 
The results indicated that South African banks have a target capital structure and adjust 
to this target at a rate of (1- 𝛿 ) = 1- 0.558 = 44.2%. This means that South African 
banks are able to adjust fully towards this target once in every 2.3 years. The results 
bear striking similarity to the study by Gropp and Heider (2010: 608), who found the 
speed of adjustment for their sample of US and EU banks to be 45%. They also reason 
that the fact that banks have high speeds of adjustment towards a target capital 
structure negates the regulatory view of bank capital. Comparatively, for their sample of 
South African non-financial firms, Lemma and Negash (2014: 86) found that their 
adjustment speed is 22.7% with respect to the total debt ratio. This is lower in 
comparison to the banks. 
The speed of adjustment reflects the cost of adjustment. Arguably, the costs of 
adjustment in South Africa are comparable to those of developed countries. Ramjee 
and Gwatidzo (2012: 61) contend that the adjustment costs for South African firms are 
lower than for those in developed economies. Makina and Negash (2005: 145) 
demonstrated that stock market liberalisation brought about a decline in the cost of 
capital of firms in South Africa. As such, banks faced with lower adjustment costs are 
bound to adjust faster.  
5.5.4  Robustness checks of target capital structure 
In this section the robustness checks on the specified model of target capital structure 
with the alternative definitions of the dependent variable employed are discussed. The 
target capital structure regression was estimated with deposit leverage and next in turn 
with non-deposit leverage as the dependent variable. Following the same procedure, 
pre-estimation tests were conducted. The results of these diagnostic tests are reported 
in appendices L and M. Suffice to highlight that the same limitations that were identified 
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when the book leverage was employed as the dependent variable were detected to be 
present. These are heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional dependence and Nickel bias. 
Consequently, estimation was done within the framework of estimators that mitigate 
these ills, namely the syst-GMM, FGLS (Kmenta, 1986; Parks, 1967) and the LSDV with 
Kiviet (1995) correction estimators. The results of the estimation are documented in 
Table 5.10. The corrected LSDV estimator results were used to draw inferences.  
The estimated results for the dynamic model were consistent with those estimated for 
the static model, except that asset tangibility now offered statistically significant 
explanatory power in terms of deposit leverage. There is evidence that South African 
banks seek target deposit leverage. The speed of adjustment towards deposit leverage 
is (1 – δ) = 1 – 0.659 = 34.1%. In essence, this means that the banks can adjust fully 
towards this target once in every 2.9 years. This is slower compared to the speed of 
adjustment with regard to total book leverage. It also demonstrates that the costs of 
adjustment with respect to deposits are relatively higher. The researcher reasoned that 
the implication might be that the bank has to offer high interest rates on customer 
deposits as well as term deposits in order to attract more deposits. 
There was also consistency in estimation output of the target capital structure with non-
deposit leverage as the dependent variable, as presented in Table 5.11. It is trite to 
highlight that the predictions of the FGLS estimator were in tandem with those of the 
corrected LSDV for most of the statistically significant results. There were consistencies 
in the predictions for the lagged non-deposit leverage, growth, profit and asset tangibility 
variables. It is imperative to highlight that the explanatory power of the dynamic model 
seemed to increase in comparison to the static model. Unlike previously, when the static 
model was estimated, in additional the growth and asset tangibility variables now 
offered explanatory power in terms of the non-deposit leverage. Growth was positively 
related to non-deposit leverage. This implies that banks faced with growth prospects will 
finance out of debt. This is consistent with the predictions of the pecking order theory.  
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Table 5.11: Robustness checks of the target capital structure estimation 
 Deposit leverage Non-deposit leverage 
Syst-GMM 
(one-step) 
FGLS (Kmenta, 
1986; Parks, 
1967) 
LSDV with 
Kiviet (1995) 
correction 
Syst-GMM 
(one-step) 
FGLS (Kmenta, 
1986; Parks, 
1967) 
LSDV with 
Kiviet (1995) 
correction 
Leverage (-1) 0.756*** 0.872*** 0.659*** 0.600*** 0.277*** 0.310*** (17.29) (26.41) (551.17) (5.74) (4.47) (3.55) 
Growth 0.004 0.028**  0.017 0.092** 0.089***  0.073*** (0.17) (2.07) (0.92) (2.58) (6.78) (8.75 ) 
Profit -1.511*** -0.938*** -1.442*** 0.998** 0.705*** 1.031*** (-3.37) (-4.93) (-7.51)   (2.80) (3.83) (8.85)   
Asset 
tangibility 
-0.173 -0.135 1.692***   -0.518 -1.730*** -2.04***   
(-0.23) (-0.64) (4.44)  (-0.63) (-4.33) (-8.41)  
Risk -0.172* 0.027 0.428*** 0.422*** 0.577*** -0.425*** (-1.87) (0.29) (3.90)  (6.52) (4.18) (-3.08)  
Size -0.002** -0.002*** 0.014 0.003*** 0.002 -0.011 (-2.92) (-2.95) (0.34)   (3.85) (1.10) (-0.31)   
Dividend 0.017 0.006* 0.015 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 (1.33) (1.74) (1.48) (0.14) (-0.04) (-0.32) 
GFC 0.011 0.005 0.020  0.004 0.021** -0.005 (1.68) (1.61) (0.83)  (0.30) (2.08) (-0.26)  
AR(1)-statistic 0.185   -1.19   
AR(2)-statistic 0.290   0.93   
Sargan 107.65***   105.62***   
LM-statistic  1720***   283.05***  
Number of 
observations 
160 160 160 160 160 160 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
The table above shows the results of estimating the following regression for the sample of 16 South African banks for the period 2006–2015. 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑆𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑆𝑖,𝑁 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑆𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑆𝑖,𝑁−1+ 𝛿𝜷𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁       
where the dependent variable = (non-)deposit leverage; Leveragei,t−1 = lagged (non-)deposit leverage;  𝒙𝑖,𝑁′  = a vector of explanatory variables 
(size, profitability, growth, asset tangibility, dividend, risk and GFC) for bank i at time t; β = a vector of slope parameters; 𝛼𝑖= group-specific 
constant term that embodies all the observable effects; εi,t = composite error term that also takes care of other explanatory variables that equally 
determine leverage but were not included in the model; 𝛿 = the speed of adjustment.
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A negative and statistically significant result was predicted to exist between asset 
tangibility and non-deposit leverage. This again is in synch with the predictions of the 
pecking order theory. The empirical results also suggested that South African banks 
have a target non-deposit leverage ratio which they seek to achieve in their financing. 
They adjust towards this target at an average speed of adjustment of (1 – 𝛿 ) = 1 – 
0.310 = 69%. This means that the banks can fully achieve this target once every 1.4 
years. Comparatively, this demonstrates that banks are able to achieve their target 
long-term debt ratio rapidly as compared to achieving their deposit leverage target ratio. 
This demonstrates that South African banks will employ non-deposit liabilities first as an 
instrument of rapidly adjusting towards their target, should there be a widening leverage 
gap. 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the determinants of bank capital structure and documented the 
empirical results of testing the four main questions relating to the financing behaviour of 
South African banks. Firstly, the standard corporate finance view of bank capital 
structure was tested. A static model was specified to estimate the relationship between 
bank leverage and firm-level determinants. Strong evidence was found in support of this 
school of thought, as the standard firm-level determinants of capital structure offered 
significant explanatory power in terms of the leverage variable. On the one hand, the 
growth opportunities, risk and size variables were found to be positively related to 
leverage. On the other hand, a negative relationship was found to exist between profits 
and bank leverage. This demonstrates that the financing behaviour of South African 
banks is consistent with the predictions of the pecking order theory. The results also 
confirm bank deleveraging during the 2007–2009 GFC, as a negative relationship 
subsisted between leverage and the dummy variable representing the GFC. As such, 
the financing behaviour of South African banks was found to mirror that of non-financial 
firms.  
The second central question that was investigated was whether bank capital regulation 
constitutes the sole source of overriding departure from the M&M capital structure 
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irrelevance propositions. Quintessentially, this was a test of the regulatory view of bank 
capital. To test this question, the Tier 1 capital ratio was regressed on the firm-level 
determinants of capital structure. Very weak support was found in favour of this 
hypothesis. Some of the firm-level determinants of capital structure offered explanatory 
power in terms of the regulatory variable. Had it been that regulation solely determined 
bank capital structure, the explanatory power of the firm-level factors should have been 
curtailed. Moreover, when a dynamic model was estimated to establish whether banks 
seek to achieve a target capital structure in their financing, it was demonstrated that 
indeed banks have a target capital structure which they quest for. This behaviour is 
inconsistent with banks seeking to observe the minimum regulatory requirement. This 
finding demonstrates that at the worst case, bank capital regulation is not binding and 
may be ineffectual. This could be attributable to the bank individual effects. As such, it 
could be prudent for monetary authorities to consider instituting some variant of bank-
specific capital regulations as opposed to sector-wide (one-size-fits-all) capital 
regulations. 
Thirdly, the buffer view of bank capital was tested. The view tested was whether banks 
stock capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. Moderate support was found in 
favour of this school of thought. It was demonstrated that banks keep capital in excess 
of the minimum regulatory requirement. When the buffer capital variable was regressed 
on the firm-level determinants of capital structure, it was found that estimated results 
were consistent with the predictions of the buffer view. Specifically, the dividends 
variable was positively related to buffer capital, while size and risk were negatively 
related to buffer capital. This further diminishes the regulatory view of bank capital.  
Lastly, this research effort probed whether banks seek to achieve a target capital 
structure in their financing and if so, whether they adjust faster comparatively to non-
financial firms. It was established that indeed banks have a target capital structure that 
they seek to achieve in their financing. They adjust faster compared to non-financial 
firms. Further, the speed with which South African banks adjust to attain their target 
level is comparable to that of banks in the developed world and is reflective of the low 
adjustment costs. When leverage was decomposed, it was further demonstrated that 
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the banks adjust faster to cover their non-deposit leverage gap as compared to covering 
their deposit leverage gap. South African banks are inclined to use long-term debt as an 
instrument of adjustment before they turn to deposits. It could be that adjustment costs 
are lower for long-term debt compared to that of deposits. In the next chapter the 
empirical results of the insurance sector are presented and discussed. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE INSURANCE SECTOR 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
The empirical results of testing the hypotheses developed in this thesis pertaining to the 
financing patterns of the insurance sector are presented and discussed in this chapter. 
This study employed a sample of 26 insurance companies (both short-term and long-
term insurers) for the period 2006 to 2015. Three focal questions were investigated. 
Firstly, do the standard firm-level determinants of capital structure explain the financing 
behaviour of insurers? Secondly, does solvency regulation constitute the additional 
source of overriding departure from the M&M capital structure irrelevance propositions? 
The third question probed whether insurance companies have a target capital structure 
which they seek, and if so at what speed do they adjust to this target.  
A static model was specified to estimate the relationship between leverage and the 
determinants of capital structure. Similarly, a static model was employed to estimate the 
relationship between the regulatory variable and the firm-level determinants of capital 
structure. Lastly, a dynamic model was specified to investigate whether insurance 
companies have a target capital structure to which they adjust. In each instance a 
battery of diagnostic tests were implemented for robustness. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 presents the descriptive 
statistics and discusses trends that emerge thereof. Section 6.3 presents and discusses 
the results of testing the relationship between insurer leverage and firm-level 
determinants of capital structure. Section 6.4 reports on the results of testing the 
relationship between solvency and the firm-level determinants of capital structure. 
Section 6.5 presents the tests and analyses the results to establish whether insurance 
companies seek to achieve a target capital structure. Section 6.6 then concludes the 
chapter.  
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6.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The summary statistics of all the variables relating to the sample of insurance 
companies under consideration are presented in this section, as well as the trends of 
the variables over time. 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 6.1. These are the 
central measures of tendency (mean and median), standard deviation and minimum 
and maximum values for the sample of South African insurance firms.  
Table 6.1: Summary statistics of the variables used for the insurance panel 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Book leverage 0.7496 0.7902 0.1997 0.1011 1.0336 
Premium leverage 0.5431 0.5115 0.2227 0.0704 1.0319 
Non-premium 
leverage 
0.2078 0.1939 0.1630 -0.9964 0.7356 
Solvency ratio 0.2503 0.2097 0.1997 -0.0336 0.8988 
Growth 0.1534 0.1211 0.2687 -0.4836 0.8467 
Profit 0.0716 0.0487 0.0827 -0.1471 0.5671 
Asset tangibility 0.0503 0.0277 0.1085 -0.0741 0.8822 
Risk 0.6047 0.7231 0.3035 -0.0071 1.4510 
Size 22.31 21.93 2.02 17.85 27.17 
Reinsurance 0.3610 0.1982 0.3411 0 1 
GFC 0.3000 0 0.4591 0 1 
Note: GFC is the dummy variable representing the 2007–2009 GFC. 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
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On average, South African insurers experience a mean year-on-year growth of 15.3% of 
their total assets. This is comparable to the banking sector, which experienced a growth 
of total assets of roughly 15.9% for the same period. In terms of profitability, South 
African insurers achieved a mean ROA of 7.2%. This is higher than that of the banking 
sector, which achieved a modest average ROA of 1.9% for the same period. The 
average book leverage of insurers was roughly 75% of total assets. This is lower than 
the levels observed for the banking sector, for which this study documents an average 
book leverage of 87%. Notwithstanding, South African insurers are highly leveraged in 
comparison to non-financial firms. Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012: 59) report a mean book 
leverage of 59% of total assets for a sample of South African non-financial firms.  
South African insurers on average held 5% of their assets as fixed assets. The 
underwriting risk level was roughly 60%. As an estimate, this means that the claims 
incurred relative to the gross written premium were 60%. Further, on average, South 
African insurers reinsured 36% of their risks to other insurance companies. The average 
total assets held by the insurance companies were R4.9 billion. The average actual 
solvency ratio of the sample of insurance companies was 25%. The average capital 
adequacy requirement6 ratios for the short-term and long-term insurance companies are 
reported to be 2.3 and 2.6 respectively (FSB, 2015b & 2015c). This implies that the 
average required solvency ratio was 10.87% and 9.62% for short-term and long-term 
insurance companies respectively. Therefore, on average, the excess of the assets 
relative to liabilities over the total assets held by the insurance companies was 25%, 
which exceeded the average regulatory requirement of 10.87% and 9.62% for short-
term and long-term insurance companies respectively. 
The trend in the book leverage metric of the insurance companies is depicted in Figure 
6.1. Suffice to highlight that the average book leverage of insurance companies did not 
vary much from year to year and was maintained in levels ranging from 72% to 78% of 
total capital. 
                                                          
6 Minimum required solvency ratios are calculated based on an individual insurer basis in South Africa.  
𝐶𝑡𝐶𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑒 𝑣𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑣𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑡 =  𝑇𝑖𝑁𝑎𝑇𝑇 𝑠𝑖𝑇𝑠𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑖 𝑚𝑁𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑁𝑟 𝑠𝑖𝑇𝑠𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 =  𝑇𝑖𝑁𝑎𝑇𝑇 𝑠𝑖𝑇𝑠𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑇𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑖 𝑚𝑁𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑁𝑟 𝑠𝑖𝑇𝑠𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑇𝑁𝑖𝑖 
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Figure 6.1: Trends in average book leverage of insurance companies 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
The trends in insurance capital structure with leverage decomposed into ‘premium 
leverage’ (total gross provisions) and ‘non-premium leverage’ are documented in Figure 
6.2. Premium leverage fluctuated narrowly within the 50% to 60% range. What is telling 
is that the premium metric showed a sign of contraction during the period corresponding 
to the 2007–2009 GFC. It declined from a high of around 56% in 2008 to a low of 51% 
in 2012. During this period, non-premium leverage (which is a proxy for long-term debt) 
increased from 21% in 2008 to 25% in 2012. In essence, non-premium leverage 
substituted premium leverage during the same period, as equity did not increase 
proportionately. It could be that South African insurance companies were now turning to 
the debt market to finance their operations, as debt financing became cheaper through 
successive interest rate cuts that were experienced during this period. 
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Figure 6.2: Trends in insurers’ capital structure 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
 
The mean solvency ratio for the sample of insurance companies was 25%. The 
variation of the solvency ratio is depicted in Figure 6.3. The average solvency ratio 
started off at peak levels of 25.9% in 2006 and then fell during the period corresponding 
to the GFC to a low of 23.6% in 2008, before it rebounded in 2009 until it reached a 
peak of 25.7% in 2010. The average ratio then tapered off thereafter before it 
rebounded to reach a level of 26.1% in 2015.  
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Figure 6.3: Trends in average solvency ratio 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
 
6.3 INSURER LEVERAGE AND FIRM-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE 
In this section the relationship between insurer leverage and firm-level determinants of 
capital structure is discussed. The correlations between the variables employed for the 
insurance sector were first considered. Subsequently, a static model was estimated. 
Pre-estimation techniques were employed in order to select the most efficient estimator. 
Robustness checks were performed to test whether the relationship between leverage 
and firm-level determinants was sensitive to the alternative definitions of leverage. 
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6.3.1 Correlation analysis of the main variables employed for the insurance sector 
The correlation matrix depicting the correlations between the main variables employed 
for the insurance sector is reported in Table 6.2. Book leverage was highly positively 
correlated with premium leverage and the result was highly significant. Book leverage 
was also positively correlated with non-premium leverage and the result was statistically 
significant. On the other hand, non-premium leverage was negatively correlated to 
premium leverage. In essence, non-premium leverage acted as a substitute of premium 
leverage. 
The profit variable was negatively correlated with book leverage and the result was 
statistically significant. This result implies that highly profitable insurers are the least 
likely to utilise more of debt as a financing option, as they can tap onto a cheaper 
source of retained earnings. This is in line with the predictions of the pecking order 
theory. The asset tangibility variable was positively correlated with book leverage. The 
reasoning could be that the higher the value of tangible assets at the disposal of the 
insurance company, the more favourable it will become in the debt market, hence it can 
tap more on debt. 
Size was also positively related to book leverage and the result was statistically 
significant. Large insurance companies are more likely to prefer debt finance to equity 
finance in order to benefit from an interest tax shield. This is in line with the predictions 
of the trade-off theory.  
The reinsurance variable positively correlated with book leverage and the result was 
statistically significant. Arguably, reinsurance brings about risk diversification. Hence, 
those insurance companies that reinsure more of their assets can afford to borrow more 
from the debt markets. The correlations between the variables employed for the 
insurance sector were consistent with those of the banking sector reported in the 
previous chapter. Similarly, non-premium leverage seemed to be a substitute of 
premium leverage analogous to the case whereby deposit leverage acted as a 
substitute of non-deposit leverage for the banking sector. The correlations between the 
variables for the insurance sector were also similar to those of the banking sector. 
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Table 6.2: Correlation matrix for the main variables used for the insurance panel 
 Book  
leverage 
 
Premium 
leverage 
Non-
premium 
leverage 
Growth Profit Asset 
tangibility 
Risk Size Reinsurance 
Book leverage 1.000         
Premium leverage 
 
0.702*** 1.000        
Non-premium leverage 
 
0.263*** -0.500*** 1.000       
Growth    
 
0.038 -0.080 0.163*** 1.000 
 
 
     
Profit 
 
 
-0.562*** -0.484*** -0.027 0.103 1.000     
Asset tangibility 
 
 
0.167*** 0.020 0.175*** -0.091 0.023 1.000    
Risk  
 
 
0.110 0.142** -0.066 -0.123** 0.156** -0.001 1.000   
Size     
 
 
0.209*** 0.298*** -0.164** -0.229*** -0.058 0.035 0.592*** 1.000  
Reinsurance  
 
0.155** 0.103* 0.057 0.127* -0.346*** -0.032 -0.730*** -0.606** 1.000 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively.  
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6.3.2 Estimation framework and empirical results 
This section reports on the pre-estimation tests conducted in order to ensure that the 
static model estimated was well specified as well as to select the most appropriate 
estimator to draw inferences. Subsequently, the model was estimated and inferences 
drawn thereof. Robustness checks were also conducted with the decomposition of the 
leverage variable. 
 
6.3.2.1  Diagnostic tests 
A battery of tests was conducted on the pooled OLS, FE and RE models. These 
included the tests for panel heterogeneity (presence of FE), significance of time effects, 
heteroscedasticity, random effects, FE versus RE specification and lastly cross-
sectional dependence. The results of these tests are reported in Table 6.3. The 
researcher first tested for the joint validity of cross-sectional individual effects. The test 
confirmed the significance of individual effects, as the F-statistic (60.41) was highly 
statistically significant. This test confirmed that insurance companies are heterogeneous 
and that their financing decision is based on insurance-specific factors. As such, in the 
presence of FE the pooled OLS estimation method became inconsistent and inefficient.  
The test for the joint validity of time-effects also came out in the affirmative. As a 
consequence, the researcher specified a two-way error component to incorporate the 
time effects. The Breusch-Pagan (1980) LM test confirmed the presence of RE. 
Notwithstanding, the Hausman (1978) specification test, which was used to discern 
which estimator to use between the FE and RE estimators, favoured the use of the FE 
estimator over the RE estimator. The researcher also tested for heteroscedasticity of 
the error term and found that it was present. Lastly, cross-sectional dependence was 
tested by applying the Pesaran (2004) cross-sectional dependence test on the one-way 
model. The null hypothesis of independence of cross-sections was rejected, as the test 
statistic was significant at the 1% level of significance. Subsequently, when the 
researcher incorporated time effects and estimated a two-way model and rerun the test, 
the Pesaran test became negative. 
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Table 6.3: Diagnostic tests with book leverage employed as the dependent 
variable 
Test Test 
statistic 
Critical 
value 
Inference 
Joint validity of cross-
sectional individual 
effects 
H0 : 𝛼1 =  𝛼2 = ⋯  𝛼𝑁−1  =  0 
HA: : 𝛼1 ≠  𝛼2 ≠ ⋯  𝛼𝑁−1  ≠  0 
 
F = 60.41 
 
p = 0.0000 
 
Cross-sectional specific effects 
are valid. 
Joint validity of time 
effects 
H0: 𝜆1 = 𝜆2 = 𝜆𝑖−1 = 0 
HA: 𝜆1  ≠ 𝜆2 ≠ ⋯𝜆𝑖−1 ≠ 0 
F = 7.97 p = 0.0000 
Time effects are valid. The error 
term takes a two-way error 
component form. 
Breusch-Pagan (1980) 
LM test for random 
effects 
 
H0: 𝛿µ
2 = 0 
HA:  𝛿µ2 ≠ 0 
LM=60.41 p = 0.0000 
There is significant difference in 
variance across the entities. RE 
are present. 
Hausman (1978) 
specification test 
 
H0: E(µit|Xit) = 0 
HA: E(µit|Xit) ≠ 0 
m3 = 27.46 
 
p = 0.0001 
 
 
 
Regressors not exogenous. 
Hence the FE specification is 
valid. 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
H0: 𝛿𝑖
2 = 𝛿 for all i 
H0: 𝛿i
2 ≠ 𝛿 for all i 
LM = 
1816.3 p = 0.0000 
The variance of the error term is 
not constant. Heteroscedasticity 
is present. 
Cross-sectional 
dependence tests 
H0: 𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑡𝑣�𝜇𝑖𝑁 , 𝜇𝑖𝑁� =0  
HA: 𝜌𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝜌𝑖𝑖 = 0 
 
Pesaran (2004) CD test:  
 
 
Frees (1995) test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CD = -1.928 
(0.507) 
 
F = 4.654 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p = 0.139 
 
 
α = 0.01: 
0.5198 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-sections are independent. 
 
 
Cross-sections are 
interdependent. 
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However, the alternative Frees test confirmed the presence of cross-sectional 
dependence. As such, reliance was placed on the Frees test, as the a priori expectation 
was that cross-sectional dependence should subsist between insurance companies, as 
they depend on one another indirectly for funding through the use of reinsurance. As a 
consequence of the foregoing, the researcher estimated the model using the FE with 
Driscoll and Kray (1998) estimator, which controls for heteroscedasticity and cross-
sectional dependence. 
6.3.2.2  Estimation results of book leverage regressed on firm-level factors 
The estimation results of the regression of book leverage and firm-level factors are 
reported in Table 6.4. By and large, the results were in synch with those of the banking 
sector reported in the previous chapter. 
(i) Testing Hypothesis 1: There is a significant relationship between profitability 
and financial firm leverage. 
The results validated this hypothesis and documented a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between profitability and book leverage. This is in accordance 
with the predictions of the pecking order theory. The FE estimator predicted that a 1% 
increase in profitability will lead to a 28.8% decline in debt financing utilised by the 
insurance companies. Chipeta and Deressa (2016: 658) also report a negative 
association between leverage and profitability for their sample of companies drawn 
across 12 sub-Saharan African countries. 
(ii) Testing Hypothesis 3: There is a significant relationship between growth and 
financial firm leverage. 
 
The growth variable was positively associated with book leverage and the result was 
statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. All three estimators predicted a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between the growth variable and book 
leverage. High-growth insurance companies are utilising more debt financing, 
conforming to the pecking order theory of financing.  
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Table 6:4 Panel regression results with book leverage as the dependent variable 
 Pooled OLS  Random Effects Fixed Effects 
with Driscoll and 
Kray (1998) 
standard errors 
Growth 0.112*** 0.056*** 0.050*** 
(3.11) (3.49 ) (3.09) 
Profit -1.200*** -0.347*** -0.288*** 
(-9.27) (-5.09)   (-2.93) 
Asset tangibility 0.366*** 0.047    0.010 
(4.24) (0.98)  (0.31) 
Risk 0.213*** 0.139*** 0.171*** 
(4.58) (3.74 )  (4.71) 
Size 0.023*** 0.053*** 0.068*** 
(3.50) (6.72 )   (6.14) 
Reinsurance 0.203*** 0.187*** 0.116*** 
(4.34) ( 4.00) (3.64) 
GFC 0.016 0.031***  0.037*** 
(0.78) (3.51)  (4.14) 
Constant 0.087 -0.579***    -0.910*** 
(0.56) (-3.11) (-4.32) 
Adjusted R2 0.4420 0.3215 0.3397 
F-statistic   3667.94*** 
LM-statistic  112.64***  
 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. Time dummies 
estimated for the FE and RE models are not reported here. The t-statistics for the pooled and FE models 
as well as the z-statistics for the RE model are reported in parentheses.   
The table above shows the results of estimating the following regression for the sample of 26 South 
African insurance companies for the period 2006–2015. 
 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑆𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑆𝑖,𝑁 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑁′ 𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁       
 
where the dependent variable = book leverage; 𝑥𝑖,𝑁′  = a vector of explanatory variables (size, profitability, 
growth, asset tangibility, reinsurance, risk and GFC) for insurer i at time t; β = a vector of slope 
parameters; 
𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term that embodies all the observable effects; εi,t = composite error term that 
also takes care of other explanatory variables that equally determine leverage but were not included in 
the model. 
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(iii) Testing Hypothesis 5: There is a significant relationship between size and 
financial firm leverage. 
A positive relationship was proven between size and book leverage variable. There was 
consistency in the estimation results among the pooled OLS, RE and FE estimators. 
According to the FE estimation results, a 1% increase in size is likely to lead to a 7% 
increase in the use of debt financing. This is in line with the predictions of the trade-off 
theory. Therefore, South African insurance companies exhibit signs of trading off the 
benefits of an interest tax shield to that of bankruptcy in their financing behaviour. 
 
(iv) Testing Hypothesis 6: The global financial crisis has significant explanatory 
power in financial firm leveraging. 
There was a positive association between the GFC and book leverage variables. The 
relationship was highly statistically significant. Unlike banking firms that deleveraged 
during the 2007–2009 GFC, insurance companies seemed to be taking more debt. 
Insurance companies rely less on financial debt as compared to banks. During the 
2007–2009 GFC, the underwriting performance of insurance companies was curtailed 
with a fall in premiums. As such, insurance companies took more of financial debt to 
offset the fall in premiums as a funding source. In essence, debt substituted premium 
leveraging during this period.  
 
(v) Testing Hypothesis 12: Reinsurance has significant explanatory power in 
insurer leveraging. 
 
The reinsurance variable was positively associated with the leverage variable. The 
result was statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. Arguably, reinsurance 
results in risk diversification and hence insurance companies become favourable in the 
debt markets. Consequently, they can absorb more risk and hence can borrow more in 
the debt markets. 
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The empirical results of testing the relationship between the firm-level determinants of 
capital structure and leverage are in synch with the empirical results for the banking 
sector. No disparities were observed in the financing behaviour of insurance companies 
and that of non-financial firms. Similarly, for the insurance sector, their financing 
behaviour can be best interpreted in terms of the pecking order theory.  
 
6.3.2.3  Robustness checks of the dependent variable 
Robustness checks were conducted with alternative definitions of leverage employed. 
Book leverage was decomposed into non-premium leverage (non-premium liabilities) 
and premium leverage (premium liabilities) and each employed as a dependent variable 
in turn. The FE with Driscoll and Kray (1998) standard errors estimator was employed to 
run the regression. The results are documented in Table 6.5. The results validated 
hypotheses 14 and 15 of this study. The estimation results indicated that the leverage 
variable was robust to either alternative definition.  
A number of salient results came to the fore. Firstly, the estimated coefficients with the 
non-premium leverage variable as the dependent variable, wherever the estimated 
coefficient was significant, were equally signed to that of the book leverage estimation. 
On the one hand, the size and growth variables were positively related to the book 
leverage variable and the results were statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance. On the other hand, the asset tangibility variable was negatively associated 
with non-premium leverage. Because the non-premium leverage variable proxies long-
term debt, the implication of the estimated result for the size variable is that large 
insurers are utilising more long-term debt. This is in synch with the predictions of the 
trade-off theory. Conversely, the estimated coefficients for the growth and asset 
tangibility variables are in line with the predictions of the pecking order theory. 
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Table 6.5: Robustness checks of the leverage variable  
Dependent variable Book leverage Non-premium 
leverage 
Premium leverage 
Growth 
0.050*** 0.066** -0.014 
(3.09) (2.06) -(0.30) 
Profit 
-0.288*** -0.027 -0.254** 
(-2.93) (-0.31) -(2.58) 
Asset tangibility 
0.010 -0.255*** 0.271*** 
(0.31) (-5.15) (4.35) 
Risk 
0.171*** 0.112* 0.059 
(4.71) (2.10) (1.41) 
Size 
0.068*** 0.124*** -0.062 
(6.14) (2.56) (-1.26) 
Reinsurance 
0.116*** 0.010 0.099** 
(3.64) (0.27) (2.55) 
 (*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
Secondly, the estimated coefficients when premium leverage was employed as the 
dependent variable were oppositely signed to that of non-premium leverage, whenever 
the coefficient was significant. This demonstrates the substitutability of non-premium 
leverage with premium leverage. The premium leverage variable proxies short-term 
debt. As such, the observed phenomenon is analogous to long-term debt substituting 
short-term debt in the financing of insurance companies. The profit and size variables 
were negatively related to the premium leverage variable, whereas asset tangibility was 
positively related to premium leverage. Therefore, the estimated results suggested that 
large profitable insurance companies will make use of less short-term debt in their 
financing. This conforms to pecking order financing behaviour. 
 
The results discussed in the foregoing demonstrate that the pecking order theory can be 
relied on to explain the financing behaviour of insurance companies. The robustness 
checks also demonstrated that the non-premium leverage ratio was highly correlated to 
the book leverage ratio. Therefore, the estimated results with the non-premium leverage 
variable as the dependent variable were robust to those of the book leverage variable 
regression. The estimated coefficients with the premium leverage as the dependent 
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variable were of the opposite sign. The inference is that the capital structure estimation 
is sensitive to the proxy of leverage employed. In the next section the estimation results 
of solvency and determinants of capital structure are considered. 
 
6.4 SOLVENCY AND DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
In this section the empirical results of estimating the relationship between solvency and 
the determinants of capital structure are discussed. An FE model was specified to 
estimate the regression. The results are reported in Table 6.6. The estimation was 
premised on the hypothesis restated below. 
Testing Hypothesis 13: The standard firm-level determinants of capital structure 
have significant explanatory power in the solvency ratio. 
 
The profit variable was positively related to the solvency variable. The result was 
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. Highly profitable insurance firms 
are holding more capital. This is consistent with the prediction that insurers that are 
more profitable have high capitalisation (De Haan & Kakes, 2010: 1620). Furthermore, 
the risk variable was positively related to the solvency ratio, whereas the reinsurance 
and size variables were negatively related to the solvency ratio. The results were 
statistically significant. This is in line with the a priori expectations. According to De 
Haan and Kakes (2010: 1621), larger insurance companies have more scope for 
diversification than small insurers, hence their total losses are more predictable. As 
such, large firms probably need relatively lower capitalisation to achieve a particular 
level of insolvency risk. The results of the study confirmed this prediction with regard to 
size. 
By the same token, greater use of reinsurance by insurance companies results in the 
lowering of capitalisation required to avert insolvency risk. Therefore, a negative 
relationship was expected to exist between the reinsurance variable and the solvency 
measure. The results of this study also affirmed this prediction. On the other hand, the 
 188 
 
higher the inherent underwriting risk, the higher the capitalisation level of the insurer 
required. The result of this study also corroborated this prediction. 
 
Table 6.6: Panel regression results with solvency ratio as the dependent variable 
Explanatory variable Fixed Effects with Driscoll and Kray 
(1998) standard errors 
Growth 
0.721 
(0.37) 
Profit 
0.350*** 
(5.68) 
Asset tangibility 
0.050 
(0.24) 
Risk 
 0.191*** 
(4.87) 
Size 
-0.064*** 
(-6.31) 
Reinsurance 
-0.097** 
(-3.37) 
GFC 0.039*** 
(3.58) 
Adjusted R2 0.3088 
F-statistic 1838.18*** 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
The coefficient of the GFC dummy variable was positive and statistically significant. The 
implication is that South African insurance companies increased their capital levels 
during the period corresponding to the 2007–2009 GFC. The coefficients for the growth 
and asset tangibility variables were insignificant.  
In view of the foregoing, the researcher found moderate support for the hypothesis that 
the standard firm-level determinants of capital structure have a predictive power on the 
solvency ratio. This finding diminishes the role of solvency regulation as being binding, 
but paints a picture whereby insurance companies are freely determining their solvency 
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ratios to conform to the regulatory minimum. Notwithstanding, it was noted that there 
has been a move towards risk capital-based solvency requirements with the anticipated 
adoption of the SAM regulatory regime in 2017 by the South African insurance industry. 
 
6.5  TARGET CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND THE SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT 
Insurance companies could as well be seeking to achieve capital structure optimality in 
their financing decisions, in the same manner as banks and other non-financial firms. In 
this section the empirical results of the target capital structure estimation are presented. 
The estimation framework involved conducting pre-estimation tests and then estimating 
a robust model. 
6.5.1  Pre-estimation of the target capital structure regression with book 
leverage as the dependent variable 
In order to estimate a robust model, diagnostic tests were conducted on the initially 
estimated FE and RE model. The tests are reported in Table 6.7. The diagnostics 
revealed that the fixed effects and time effects are valid. Subsequently, a two-way error 
component model was specified. Further, heteroscedasticity of the error term was 
detected. The Hausman (1978) specification test also revealed that the regressors were 
not exogenous and favoured the use of an FE over an RE estimator. Cross-sectional 
dependence was also detected, as the Frees test came out positive for the two-way 
model. Endogeneity arose from a dynamic model from the interaction of the lagged 
dependent variable with the error term. 
In the first instance, in order to remedy the above problems, estimation was done with 
the framework of GMM. A one-step diff-GMM was used to estimate the model. 
However, due to the medium-size sample properties of the data employed in this study, 
caution was exercised in relying solely on the GMM estimators, as they perform 
moderately for small to medium datasets. Moreover, they do not control for spatial 
dependence. 
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Table 6.7: Diagnostic tests to estimate a target capital structure for the insurance panel 
Test Test statistic Critical value Inference 
Joint validity of cross-sectional 
individual effects 
H0 : 𝜶𝟏 =  𝜶𝟐 = ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  =  𝟎 
HA: : 𝜶𝟏 ≠  𝜶𝟐 ≠ ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  ≠  𝟎 
 
F = 4.67 p = 0.0000 Cross-sectional specific effects are valid. 
Joint validity of time effects 
H0: 𝝀𝟏 = 𝝀𝟐 = 𝝀𝒏−𝟏 = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝀𝟏  ≠ 𝝀𝟐 ≠ ⋯𝝀𝒏−𝟏 ≠ 𝟎 
 
F = 5.22 p = 0.0000 Time effects are valid. The error term takes a two-way 
error component form. 
Hausman (1978) specification test 
H0: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) = 𝟎 
HA: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) ≠ 𝟎 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 = 𝜹 for all i 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 ≠ 𝜹 for all i 
 
Cross-sectional dependence tests 
H0: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝒄𝒄𝒄�𝝁𝒊𝒕,𝝁𝒊𝒕� = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 ≠ 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝟎 
m3 = 47.63 
 
 
 
LM = 729.37 
p = 0.0000 
 
 
 
p = 0.0000 
Regressors not exogenous.  
 
 
The variance of the error term is not constant. 
Heteroscedasticity is present. 
 
Pesaran (2004) CD test:  
 
One-way model 
 
 
Two-way model 
 
Frees (1995) test  
 
 
 
 
CD = 5.506 
(0.377) 
 
CD = -1.047 
(0.360) 
F = 1.435 
 
 
 
  
p = 0.0000 
 
 
p = 0.2950 
 
α = 0.01: 0.5198 
 
 
 
Cross-sections are interdependent. 
 
 
Cross-sections are independent. 
 
Cross-sections are interdependent. 
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In the second instance, two more estimators were considered. These were the FGLS 
(Kmenta, 1986; Parks, 1967) and the LSDV with Kiviet (1995) correction estimators. 
The FGLS estimator was efficient in the presence of Nickel bias, cross-sectional 
dependence and heteroscedasticity, which are the characteristics of this dataset. 
Notwithstanding, the results from the three estimators are reported. However, for 
interpretation purposes the FGLS (Kmenta, 1986; Parks, 1967) was employed for the 
reasons enunciated above. 
6.5.2 Estimation results of target capital structure with book leverage as the 
dependent variable 
The estimation results of the regression to determine the existence of a target capital 
structure are presented in Table 6.8. The estimation was premised on the hypothesis 
restated below: 
Hypothesis 16: Financial firms do adjust their capital structure to a target. 
The estimation results were consistent among the three estimators. The estimation 
results further corroborated the results of the estimation of the static model that was 
considered earlier on. The estimation results were equally signed for the coefficients of 
growth, profit, size and the GFC dummy variables. The FGLS estimator documented 
that current leverage levels of South African insurance companies were positively 
related to past levels. This relationship indicates that insurance companies have a 
target capital structure towards which they gravitate. The speed of adjustment towards 
this target is at a rate of (1 – 𝛿 ) = 1 – 0.794 = 20.6%. This is slower compared to South 
African banks who adjust towards their target at a rate 44.2%. Moreover, it is marginally 
slower than the speed of adjustment of South African non-financial firms whose speed 
of adjustment relative to the total debt variable is 22.7% (see Lemma & Negash, 2014: 
86). It could be reasoned that the adjustment costs for insurance companies are higher 
as compared to non-financial firms. 
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Table 6.8: Panel regression results to determine target capital structure for 
insurance companies 
 Diff-GMM 
(one-step) 
LSDV with Kiviet 
(1995) 
correction 
FGLS (Kmenta, 
1986; Parks, 1967) 
Leverage (-1) 0.797*** 0.754*** 0.794*** (2.92) (71.75) (15.78) 
Growth 0.043** 0.033*** 0.067*** (2.58) (3.04) (4.90) 
Profit -0.314*** -0.361*** -0.313*** (-3.16) (12.89) (-5.61) 
Asset tangibility 0.012 0.052 0.024 (0.14) (1.12) (0.31) 
Risk 0.029 0.041 0.062 (0.57) (1.40) (0.21) 
Size 0.053* 0.036*** 0.080** (1.89) (8.63) (2.18) 
Reinsurance 0.122*** 0.059 0.041 (3.16) (1.02) (1.03) 
GFC 0.032** 0.028*** 0.008 (2.33) (7.39) (1.09) 
AR(1)-statistic -1.60   
AR(2)-statistic -0.85   
Sargan 31.51   
LM-statistic   550*** 
Number of 
observations 260 260 260 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses 
The table above shows the results of estimating the following regression for the sample of 26 South 
African insurance companies for the period 2006–2015. 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑆𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑆𝑖,𝑁 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑆𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑆𝑖,𝑁−1+ 𝛿𝜷𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁       
where the dependent variable = book leverage; Leveragei,t−1 = lagged book leverage; 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′  = a vector of 
explanatory variables (size, profitability, growth, asset tangibility, reinsurance, risk and GFC) for insurer i 
at time t; β = a vector of slope parameters; 𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term that embodies all the 
observable effects; εi,t = composite error term that also takes care of other explanatory variables that 
equally determine leverage but were not included in the model; 𝛿 = the speed of adjustment. 
 
The empirical results validated the hypothesis that insurance companies have a target 
capital structure which they seek to achieve in their financing behaviour. This 
demonstrates that their financing behaviour mirrors that of non-financial firms. 
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Notwithstanding, they adjust towards their target capital structures at a slower pace 
compared to non-financial firms and banks. 
 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the empirical results of investigating the financing behaviour of 
the insurance sector. This study advances understanding of capital structure in several 
ways. In the first instance, the results are consistent with prior studies with regard to the 
capital structures of insurers mirroring those of non-financial firms. The results 
corroborate the findings of Ahmed et al. (2010), De Haan and Kakes (2010) and Ahmed 
and Shabbir (2014). Evidence was found of insurance firms conforming to the pecking 
order theory in their financing behaviour. Contrary to Cheng and Weiss (2012), who 
found that the trade-off theory dominates the pecking order in explaining insurer 
financing, the current study’s results demonstrate that the converse is true in explaining 
the capital structure of South African insurance companies. In the second instance, this 
study established that the solvency ratio is determined by the firm-level determinants of 
capital structure. As such, this diminishes the role of solvency regulation being a first-
order determinant of an insurer’s capital structure. This is consistent with the findings of 
De Haan and Kakes (2010), who established that solvency regulation was not binding 
by utilising a sample of Dutch insurance companies. 
However, the current study’s results advance the frontier of knowledge in the following 
aspects: Firstly, it was established that insurance companies, unlike banking firms, 
would utilise more debt during an adverse business cycle such as the 2007–2009 GFC. 
Comparatively, insurance companies are constrained and utilise less financial debt, but 
rely more on technical reserves for funding. During the business cycle/financial crisis, 
the underwriting business was curtailed, resulting in a fall in premiums. Holding other 
factors constant, financial debt substituted premium leverage in the short term in the 
capital structure of insurance companies. Secondly, to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, this study is the first study to investigate the existence of a target capital 
structure for insurance companies by taking into cognisance the cross-sectional 
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dependence that exists among insurance companies. It was established that insurance 
companies indeed have a target capital structure which they seek to achieve in their 
financing. They adjust towards this target at a rate of roughly 21%. Comparatively, this 
is lower than that of the banking sector, which adjusts at a speed of 44%. This further 
substantiates the view that insurer financing is less reliant on debt financing compared 
to banks, which are highly geared. 
The next chapter concludes the study and proffers suggestions for future research from 
the gaps that have emerged.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 195 
 
CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
Firm financing is a central theme in corporate finance that continues to attract the 
attention of finance scholars and practitioners. In order to explain the financing patterns 
of firms, capital structure theory has evolved over the years and is firmly anchored on 
the seminal works of M&M (1958, 1963). In their irrelevance propositions, M&M argued 
that firm value is invariant to capital structure and hence capital structure choices of 
firms do not matter. Subsequent studies have proven that capital structure does matter. 
The main theories of capital structure that have been advanced in order to explain firm 
behaviour are the trade-off, pecking order, signalling, market timing, agency cost, free 
cash flow and contracting cost theories.  
Extant empirical studies have been conducted to test these capital structure theories. 
Notwithstanding, until recently these studies have focused exclusively on non-financial 
firms. As such, the impetus behind the current study was to investigate what determines 
the capital structure choices of financial firms on which intensive research is still in its 
infancy so as to contribute to the body of knowledge in this area. South Africa was 
chosen as the country of focus. The motivation for choosing South Africa as a country of 
focus was two-fold. Firstly, it has a developed financial market, notwithstanding that it is 
a developing country, which offers the right conditions for studying capital structure 
dynamics. Secondly, the country has a large insurance sector, so the study was able to 
focus on both the banking and the insurance sectors, as they are closely intertwined 
and also account for the largest proportion of assets of financial firms in South Africa. 
Moreover, banking and insurance companies are peculiar in the sense that they have 
an additional financing instrument available at their disposal in the form of deposits and 
premiums, respectively. 
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The main aim of this study was to establish the factors that determine capital structures 
of South African financial firms. The banking and insurance sectors were used as units 
of study. The research objectives underpinning this study were five-fold. Firstly, the 
study aimed to establish whether the standard firm-level determinants of capital 
structure explain the financial leveraging of South African financial firms. Secondly, the 
study aimed to determine whether South African bank financing conforms to the buffer 
view of bank capital structure. Thirdly, the study evaluated whether capital regulation is 
of first-order importance in the determination of capital structure of financial firms in 
South Africa. Fourthly, the study sought to determine whether South African financial 
firms seek to achieve a target capital structure in their financing behaviour. Fifthly, the 
study sought to determine the speed of adjustment towards the target capital structure 
by South African financial firms. Finally, the study sought to investigate the effect of 
financial crises on the capital structure of financial firms. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 discusses the theoretical 
and empirical insights into capital structure. Section 7.3 summarises the research 
findings of this study. Section 7.4 discusses the contribution of this study. Section 7.5 
provides directions for future research. 
 
7.2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS  
7.2.1 Theoretical insights on capital structure 
A literature review of capital structure theory was conducted in this study, which offered 
insights into how to interpret firm financing behaviour. This helped in the formulation of 
the hypotheses for this study. The starting point was to review the MM irrelevance 
propositions. These were subsequently demonstrated not to hold in a world with 
frictions such as taxes and transactions costs. Further, the main theories of capital 
structure were considered. These are the trade-off, pecking order, signalling, market 
timing, agency cost, free cash flow and contracting cost theories.  
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The trade-off theory advanced by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973: 911) postulates that 
optimal leverage reflects a trade-off between the tax benefits of debt and the 
deadweight costs of bankruptcy. This was aptly formalised by Myers (1984: 576) in his 
static trade-off framework, which postulates that firms set a target debt-to-value ratio 
and gradually move towards it, the same way that firms adjust dividends to move 
towards a target dividend payout ratio. There is substantial empirical evidence in 
support of this theory. 
Myers and Majluf (1984: 219) advanced the pecking order theory, which hypothesises 
that firms will observe a financial hierarchy in their financing. They reason that it is 
generally better to issue safe securities than risky ones. Firms should go to bond 
markets for external capital, but should raise equity by retention if possible. That is, 
external financing using debt is better than financing by equity. In other words, firms will 
first finance out of retained earnings, followed by debt, and would raise equity as a last 
resort. There is compelling empirical evidence to substantiate this theory. 
The signalling theory is an information asymmetry theory of which the origins can be 
traced to the work of Ross (1977). He postulates that if managers possess inside 
information, then the choice of a managerial incentive schedule and of a financial 
structure signals information to the market, and in competitive equilibrium the inferences 
drawn from the signals will be validated (Ross, 1977: 23). There are two main ways in 
which these signals are transmitted to the market: either through the leveraging decision 
or utilising the dividend policy. The empirical evidence in support of this theory is 
moderate. 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) advanced the market timing theory. They reason that capital 
structure evolves as the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. 
In other words, managers only discern between issuing equity and debt as a result of 
market conditions. On the one hand, if the conditions are favourable for the issuance of 
equity over debt, they will float shares, and on the other hand, if the conditions favour 
the debt market, they will borrow to meet the funding requirements of the firm. There is 
strong empirical support of this theory, especially in developed countries characterised 
by well-developed financial markets. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) advanced the agency cost theory. They reasoned that an 
agency conflict between the owner-manager and outside shareholders derives from the 
manager’s tendency to appropriate perquisites out of the firm’s resources for his/her 
own consumption. In essence, managers do not always behave in the best interests of 
their investors and therefore need to be disciplined. Debt serves as a disciplining device 
because default allows creditors the option to force the firm into liquidation. Although 
plausible, this theory has posed some challenges to test empirically.  
The free cash flow theory was advanced by Jensen (1986). He premises this on the 
‘control hypothesis’ notion – that debt can be beneficial in motivating managers and 
their organisations to be efficient. For instance, debt financing constrains the free cash 
flow available to managers, as such debt can be utilised in reducing agency costs of 
free cash flows.   
Myers (1977: 147) advanced the contracting cost theory. He reasons that a firm with 
risky debt outstanding, and which acts in its shareholders’ interest, will follow a different 
decision rule than one which can issue risk-free debt or which issues no debt at all. 
Implicit in Myers’s (1977) hypothesis is the underinvestment problem. Therefore, at 
worst, this agency cost is borne by firms whereby their managers pass on positive NPV 
projects as a consequence of being highly geared. The converse to this problem is that 
of overinvestment, which is occasioned by low gearing. 
Drawing from extant studies on capital structure (Al-Najjer & Hussainey, 2011; Frank & 
Goyal, 2008; Gropp & Heider, 2010; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 
1991; Titman & Wessels, 1988, among other studies), it was established that there are 
reliably important factors that have been identified that affect firm leverage. These are 
profitability, asset tangibility (collateral), size, market-to-book value (growth) and 
dividends.  
Highly profitable firms are presumed to generate retained earnings. As such, according 
to the pecking order theory they are more inclined to fund any value-adding projects 
firstly out of retained earnings. Therefore, the pecking order predicts a negative 
relationship between profitability and firm leverage. In contrast, the trade-off theory 
 199 
 
predicts a positive relationship between firm profitability and firm leverage. The trade-off 
theory predicts that highly profitable firms are more likely to finance out of debt in order 
to enjoy the benefits of debt tax-deductibility. However, this benefit seems to accrue the 
most to large and very large firms, who have generated goodwill on the debt market and 
as such are rated favourably and can access debt at preferential terms. The pecking 
order prediction seems to be the most plausible one and most empirical studies seem to 
lend credence more to its prediction. 
The high collateral value of assets available to be pledged makes it possible for the firm 
to finance its operations out of more debt. In essence, the risk of lending to firms with 
higher tangible assets is lower and, hence, lenders will demand a lower risk premium. 
The trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between asset tangibility and firm 
leverage, whereas the pecking order theory predicts that they are negatively related. 
This can be attributed to low information asymmetry associated with tangible assets, 
making equity issuances less costly. Empirical evidence is mixed. Among other studies 
on financial firms, Gropp and Heider (2010: 598) and Jucá et al. (2012:23) found a 
positive relationship between asset tangibility and firm leverage. Bradley et al. (1984: 
874), Ahmad and Abbas (2011: 208) and Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011: 333) found 
empirical support for the negative relationship between asset tangibility and leverage 
variables. 
Arguably, high-growth firms run the risk of bankruptcy if they were to fund their 
operations more out of debt. This is predicted by the trade-off theory, which postulates 
that in the financing continuum, there is an optimum point to which the benefit that 
derives from a debt interest tax shield is maximum, beyond which point the benefit 
diminishes. As such, premised on the trade-off theory, the prediction is that as 
companies grow, they will finance more and more out of equity as opposed to debt. An 
inverse relationship was expected to subsist between leverage and growth. In contrast, 
the pecking order predicts a positive relationship between financial leverage and 
growth. This is based on the presupposition that firms will observe a hierarchy of 
financing when faced with investment opportunities that are value-adding. As such, they 
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will finance first out of retained earnings, followed by debt, before they consider equity. 
The empirical evidence in this regard, however, is mixed. 
An increase in dividend payout might send out a signal to the market that the future 
prospects of the firm are bright and conversely a dividend cut might signal that the 
future prospects of a company are bleak. In the former instance, the company will 
receive favourable valuation from the equity market, hence making equity issuance the 
most favourable. Therefore, the expectation was that firm leverage is inversely related 
to dividend payout. This has been corroborated by the empirical findings of, among 
other scholars, Antoniou et al. (2008: 80), Frank and Goyal (2009: 1) and Lemma and 
Negash (2014: 81).   
The effect of size on financial leverage can be twofold. From the pecking order theory 
vantage point, as firms grow, they are bound to generate more retained earnings. As 
such, they should be in a position to fund their operations more out of retained earnings 
and hence substitute debt. Therefore, a negative relationship was predicted to exist 
between firm leverage and size, whereas the trade-off theory predicts that large firms 
should be highly leveraged as compared to small firms, as they stand to enjoy the 
benefits of debt interest tax shields. As such, from the trade-off theory point of view the 
prediction is that firm leverage is positively associated with size. Notwithstanding, 
empirical support for the positive firm leverage and size relationship is overwhelming 
(see, for instance, Ahmed et al., 2010: 9; Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2011: 334; Antoniou et 
al., 2008: 73; Bartoloni, 2013: 142; Lemma & Negash, 2014:81; Lim, 2012: 197, among 
other studies). 
Suffice to highlight that in some instances, there is a dichotomy in the predictions by the 
major theories of capital structure. The ‘horse race’ is usually between the pecking order 
theory and the trade-off theory. To reconcile the predictions, it is imperative to highlight 
that the aforementioned theories complement rather than substitute one another in 
explaining the financing behaviour of firms. This study relied mostly on the pecking 
order and trade-off theories in explaining the financing behaviour of financial firms. 
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Extant studies on capital structure have generally excluded financial firms from their 
analysis. This has been premised on the notion that financial firms have peculiar firm 
characteristics. For instance, in the context of banking institutions, the deposit-taking 
ability sets them apart from other non-financial firms. This ability to generate deposits 
lends them an extra source of finance. The second peculiar feature of banking firms is 
that they are subject to capital regulation, which could also have a bearing on their 
capital structure choices. The regulation of banking firms may promote or curtail the 
banks from operating at their desired target capital structure.  
According to Ahmad and Abbas (2011: 201), following mandatory bank capital standard 
requirements, banks are involved in both voluntary and involuntary capital structure 
decisions. The standard view is that capital regulation constitutes an additional, 
overriding departure from the M&M irrelevance proposition. Subsequently, it has been 
proven by Gropp and Heider (2010) that there are similarities between the capital 
structures of banks and non-financial firms. Involuntary capital structure decisions are 
enforced on banks by regulatory authorities after deviating from the prescribed and 
adequacy capital requirements as directed by the regulators. Notwithstanding, there is a 
growing body of empirical studies that relegate capital regulation to be of secondary 
importance in the determination of capital structure. This study also established that 
banks keep buffer levels of capital. This is motivated by the need for financial slack so 
that they can borrow additional funds quickly and cheaply in the event of unexpected 
profitable investment opportunities (Berger et al., 1995: 8). Buffer capital can also 
further act as a cushion, absorbing costly unexpected shocks, particularly if the financial 
distress costs from low capital, and the costs of accessing new capital quickly, are high 
(Jokipii & Milne, 2008: 1441). 
This study established that the insurance sector also deviates from the M&M irrelevance 
proposition in the same fashion as the banking sector. This is principally because 
insurance companies are subject to capital regulation (solvency regulation) and also 
have available another peculiar source of funding in the form of premiums. Solvency 
regulation seeks to protect policyholders against the risk that insurers will not be able to 
meet their financial obligations. As such, the imperatives that the insurance companies 
 202 
 
have to grapple with when they formulate their capital structure policies include paying 
regard to solvency and surplus requirements, among other issues. 
 
7.2.2  Empirical insights on capital structure 
A review of empirical studies on the existence of a target capital structure was 
conducted. Extant studies have been conducted in this regard (see, for instance, Elsas 
et al., 2014: 1380; Flannery & Rangan, 2006: 471; Leary & Roberts, 2005: 2577; 
Mukherjee & Mahakud, 2010: 261; Öztekin & Flannery, 2012: 108). The majority of 
these studies confirm that firms will actively seek to achieve a target capital structure. 
There are a number of factors that might promote or deter firms from achieving this 
target. These are size, adjustment costs and the distance between the observed and 
target leverage.   
This study established that extant studies conducted on capital structure policies of 
firms have sought to test the practical efficacy of the capital structure theories – the 
main ‘contestants’ being the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory. Further, 
these studies have sought to establish the firm-level determinants of capital structure. 
For instance, Titman and Wessels (1988: 2), employed a sample of manufacturing firms 
in the USA found on the Compustat database for the period 1974–1982. Their results 
suggest that firms with unique or specialised products have relatively low debt ratios.   
Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1421) investigated the determinants of capital structure 
choice by analysing the financing decisions of public firms in the major industrialised 
countries. They found that at an aggregate level, firm leverage is fairly similar across the 
G7 countries. In addition, they found that factors identified by previous studies as 
correlated in the cross-section with firm leverage in the United States, are similarly 
correlated in other countries as well. Particularly, they found that profitability and 
market-to-book value have a negative impact on capital structure, whereas asset 
tangibility and firm size have a positive effect on capital structure. 
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The two ‘contestant’ theories of capital structure (pecking order theory and trade-off 
theory) were pitied against each other by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999: 221). They 
examined the financing behaviour of 157 US firms listed on the Compustat database 
(excluding financial firms and regulated utilities) for the period 1971–1989. They found 
that a simple pecking order model explains much more of the time-series variance in 
actual debt ratios than a target adjustment model based on the static trade-off theory. 
This study examined the financing behaviour of firms in both developed and developing 
countries. It was established that the firm financing behaviour in the developing 
countries can be best explained in terms of either the trade-off or perking order theories.  
The empirical evidence in support of the buffer capital view has been mixed. In support, 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004: 443), among other scholars, found evidence that for all 
kinds of banks, the buffer capital has always been much greater than zero. They reason 
that this is consistent with the hypothesis that capital is difﬁcult to adjust and that banks 
create a cushion against contingencies. Koziol and Lawrenz (2009: 871) also found 
evidence that banks do not hold the minimum capital, but have voluntary capital buffers. 
To the contrary, Teixeira et al. (2014: 56), among others scholars, failed to find evidence 
in support of the buffer view.  
This study also established that standard non-financial firms’ determinants of capital 
structure are reliably important in explaining bank capital structure. The studies that 
have been conducted in the recent past that corroborated this fact include that of 
Teixeira et al. (2014), Jucá et al. (2012), Ahmad and Abbas (2011) and Gropp and 
Heider (2010). 
Similarly, with regard to the capital structure of insurance companies, there is growing 
empirical work that demonstrates that the financing of insurers mirrors that of financial 
firms. For example, Ahmed and Shabbir (2014: 172) tested the pecking order theory by 
employing the financial data of insurance companies of Pakistan over a five-year period 
from 2007 to 2011. Their empirical results indicated that size, profitability, liquidity, 
tangibility and risk are important determinants of the capital structure of insurance 
companies of Pakistan. Cheng and Weiss (2012: 14) conducted tests of the trade-off 
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and pecking order theories within the US property-liability insurance industry. Their 
results demonstrate that the trade-off theory dominates the pecking order theory for 
property-liability insurers.   
 
7.3  SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
7.3.1 Summary of methodological approaches 
This study lent itself to panel data techniques. The main benefits that accrue for 
employing panel data techniques are that they combine both time-series and cross-
sectional analyses and that the degrees of freedom increase in tandem. Panel data also 
control for heterogeneity, which was essential in this analysis. The principal departure of 
this study from other similar studies on capital structure is that to ensure that the 
estimated results were reliable, a battery of diagnostic tests were conducted on the 
estimated model.  
Firstly, the applied Chow test was conducted on the pooled model to discern whether 
FE were valid. In all of the specifications this test came out positive, further lending 
credence to the notion that South African banks and insurance companies are 
heterogeneous in their respective panels. As such, the pooled OLS model became 
inconsistent in estimation. Secondly, the study tested for time (period) effects. In the 
event that these were detected, time dummies were added on the model. Time effects 
were detected to be present. These time effects include interest rates and changes in 
regulations, all which have an impact on the leverage decision. Thirdly, the Breusch-
Pagan (1980) LM test was conducted to establish whether RE were present. If RE were 
detected, the Hausman (1978) specification test was employed to discern which 
estimator to use between the RE and FE estimators.  
Fourthly, the modified Wald test was utilised to test for group-wise heteroscedasticity. It 
was found to be present in most cases; if not corrected for, it could have led to the 
standard errors being biased. Lastly, tests were conducted for cross-sectional 
dependence using the Pesaran (2004) CD test as well as the Frees (1995) test. It was 
 205 
 
established to be present in nearly all cases. It is imperative to highlight that this is one 
of tests that has been excluded most in previous studies on capital structures of 
financial firms. Cross-sectional dependence emanates from banking and insurance 
companies depending on one another for funding. On the one hand, banks rely on one 
another for funding through their activities in the interbank market. On the other hand, 
insurers for instance rely on one another through their interactions in the reinsurance 
market. As such, it became imperative for this study to employ estimators that correct 
for these attributes. 
Static panel data models were specified to test the standard corporate finance view, the 
regulatory view of capital structure for both banks and insurance companies as well as 
the buffer view of bank capital structure. The FE with Driscoll and Kray (1998) standard 
errors estimator, which controls for cross-sectional dependence and heteroscedasticity, 
was utilised to estimate the models. 
To study whether financial firms seek a target capital structure in their financing, 
dynamic models were specified for banks and insurance companies respectively. The 
one-step diff-GMM, one-step syst-GMM, LSDV with Kiviet (1995) correction and FGLS 
(Parks-Kmenta) estimators were employed to estimate the model. Depending on the 
characteristics of the data set, either the LSDV with Kiviet (1995) correction or the FGLS 
(Parks-Kmenta) estimators, which are heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional 
dependence-consistent, were used to estimate the dynamic model. 
 
7.3.2  Summary of empirical findings 
7.3.2.1 The standard corporate finance view of financial firm capital structure 
The results of this study demonstrate that the financing behaviour of financial firms 
mirrors that of non-financial firms. This corroborates the findings of Gropp and Heider 
(2010), Ahmad and Abbas (2011) and Jucá et al. (2012), among other scholars. The 
‘standard corporate finance view’ of bank capital structure was tested. Strong evidence 
was found in support of this school of thought, as the standard firm-level determinants 
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of capital structure offered significant explanatory power in terms of the leverage 
variable. On the one hand, the growth opportunities, risk and size variables were found 
to be positively related to leverage. On the other hand, a negative relationship was 
found to exist between profits and bank leverage. This demonstrates that the financing 
behaviour of South African banks is consistent with the pecking order theory. 
Similarly, for the insurance sector, strong evidence was found that validates the 
hypothesis that the firm-level determinants of capital structure have a predictive power 
in insurer leveraging. On the one hand, the growth, size, asset tangibility and 
reinsurance variables were found to be positively related to leverage. On the other 
hand, a negative relationship was found to exist between profits and insurer leverage. 
The findings also demonstrate that the pecking order theory can be relied upon the 
most in explaining the capital structure of South African insurance companies.  
The salient feature of the estimated results of the banking sector and insurance sector 
is that they bear striking uniformity. As such, this study validates the generalisation that 
the financing behaviour of financial firms mirrors that of non-financial firms. 
The other significance of the ‘standard corporate finance view’ finding is that it relegates 
capital regulation to be of secondary importance in the determination of the capital 
structure of financial firms. 
7.3.2.2    The regulatory view of financial firm capital structure 
This study also examined the efficacy of capital regulation of financial firms. Gropp and 
Heider (2010) and De Haan and Kakes (2010) provide evidence that capital regulation 
is not binding for banks and insurance companies respectively. In the first instance, to 
test the ‘regulatory view’ of bank capital, the Tier 1 capital ratio was regressed on the 
firm-level determinants of capital structure. Very weak support was found in favour of 
this hypothesis. Some of the firm-level determinants of capital structure offered 
explanatory power in terms of the regulatory variable. Had it been than regulation solely 
determined bank capital structure, the explanatory power of the firm-level factors should 
have been curtailed. Moreover, when a dynamic model was estimated to establish 
whether banks seek to achieve a target capital structure in their financing, it was 
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demonstrated that indeed banks have a target capital structure which they quest for. 
This behaviour is inconsistent with banks seeking to observe the minimum regulatory 
requirement. This finding demonstrates that at the worst case, bank capital regulation is 
not binding and may be ineffectual. This could be attributable to bank individual effects. 
As such, it could be prudent for monetary authorities to consider instituting some variant 
of bank-specific capital regulations as opposed to sector-wide (one-size-fits-all) capital 
regulations. 
In the second instance, for the panel of insurance companies, the interaction between 
the solvency regulatory variable and the firm-level determinants of capital structure was 
examined. It was established that the firm-level determinants of capital structure 
moderately predict the solvency ratio. On the one hand, the profit variable was found to 
be positively related to the solvency variable. The result is consistent with the notion 
that highly profitable insurance firms are holding more capital. This is consistent with the 
prediction that highly profitable insurance companies have high capitalisation. On the 
other hand, the reinsurance and size variables were found to be negatively related to 
the solvency ratio. Because the firm-level determinants offer explanatory power in terms 
of the solvency variable, it implies that insurance companies are conforming to solvency 
levels attributable to their own characteristics and that solvency regulation might not be 
binding. Noteworthy is that there is a move towards a risk-based capital standard with 
the implementation of the SAM regime, namely to determine the solvency requirements 
of South African insurers expected to be finalised in 2017.  
7.3.2.3    The buffer view of bank capital structure 
The ‘buffer view’ of bank capital was also tested in this study. There is growing strand of 
empirical studies that have been undertaken and suggest that banks keep buffer 
(excess) levels of capital (refer to, among other studies, that of Berger et al., 1995; 
Berger et al., 2008; Besanko & Kanatas, 1996; Gropp & Heider, 2010 and Moyo, 2016). 
The view being tested was whether banks stock capital in excess of the regulatory 
minimum. Moderate support was found in favour of this hypothesis. It was demonstrated 
that South African banks keep capital in excess of the minimum regulatory requirement. 
When the buffer capital variable was regressed on the firm-level determinants of capital 
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structure, it was found that estimated results were consistent with the predictions of the 
buffer view. Specifically, the dividends variable was positively related to buffer capital, 
while size and risk were negatively related to buffer capital. This further diminishes the 
regulatory view of bank capital.  
The implication of this finding is that South African banks are financial sound. 
Notwithstanding, it would be prudent for regulatory authorities to expedite the institution 
of deposit-protection insurance to increase the safety nets available for depositors.  
7.3.2.4    Target capital structure and speed of adjustment 
This study also sought to establish whether financial firms seek a target capital structure 
in their financing behaviour. Unlike previous studies on financial firm capital structure, 
this study estimated the true speed of adjustment by utilising FGLS (Parks-Kmenta) and 
LSDV with Kiviet (1995) correction estimators, which are most suitable to estimate 
capital structure partial adjustment models in the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
cross-sectional dependence. For the banking panel, it was demonstrated that banks 
have a target capital structure that they seek to achieve in their financing and adjust 
towards this target faster compared to non-financial firms. It was found that the speed of 
adjustment of South African banks is 44% (half-life of 2.3 years) with respect to total 
debt. Further, the speed with which South African banks adjust to attain their target level 
is comparable to that of banks in the developed world and is reflective of low adjustment 
costs. When leverage was decomposed, it was further demonstrated that banks adjust 
faster to cover their non-deposit leverage gap as compared to covering their deposit 
leverage gap. South African banks are inclined to use long-term debt as an instrument 
of adjustment before they turn to deposits. It could be that adjustment costs are lower 
for long-term debt compared to that of deposits.  
Similarly, for the insurance panel, it was established that insurance companies have a 
target capital structure which they quest for. South African insurance companies adjust 
at a lower rate comparable to the banking sector. They adjust at a rate of 21% (half-life 
of 4.76 years). This could be attributable to the heterogeneity of the balance sheets of 
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the banking and insurance panels. In essence, the profile of their liabilities is different 
from one another. 
This finding is also inconsistent with capital regulation being of first-order importance in 
the determination of the capital structure of financial firms. It also leads to the 
generalisation that financial firms seek to achieve optimality in their financing behaviour 
in the same manner as non-financial firms. 
7.3.2.5    The impact of business cycles on financial firm capital structure 
The impact of the 2007–2009 GFC was severe on most economies of the world. The 
study sought to establish how the financing behaviour of the financial sector was 
impacted during this period. The results of this study revealed that banks deleveraged 
during the 2007–2009 GFC. Therefore, banks scaled down on debt. Bank lending was 
constrained during this period. To the contrary, insurance companies took more debt 
capital during the 2007–2009 GFC. This was occasioned by the fall of premium volumes 
during this period. As such, the profitability of insurance was curtailed. 
7.4  CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
The study contributes to the body of knowledge in five major ways. Firstly, it adds to the 
literature on capital structure of financial firms, which area has not been extensively and 
conclusively studied. Using a different environment, it validates the ‘standard corporate 
finance view’ of capital structure as has been observed in the few studies on financial 
firms. Secondly, it validates the ‘buffer view’ of capital structures of financial firms, which 
has taken prominence since the last GFC. Thirdly, it did not find compelling evidence in 
support of the ‘regulatory view’ of capital structures of financial firms and this relegates 
regulation to be of secondary importance in financial firm financing decisions. Fourthly, 
the study recognises that banks and insurance companies are fundamentally different 
with regard to capital structure and regulation and so warrant separate treatment in 
studies. This is in contrast with recent studies that do not recognise the heterogeneity of 
the two types of firms (see, for instance, Moyo, 2016). Fifthly, this study complements 
the existing studies that have sought to examine the impact of business cycles/financial 
crises on the financing behaviour by focusing on financial firms. Confirming the 
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fundamental differences between banks and insurance companies, the study observed 
that financial crises have a negative impact on capital structures of banks (meaning that 
they deleverage during crises). In contrast, financial crises have a positive impact on 
capital structures of insurance companies (meaning, unlike banks, they leverage during 
crises). 
 
7.5  DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study has opened areas of research in a number of ways. Firstly, as this study only 
focused on the financing behaviour of South African banks and insurance companies, 
future studies could also extend the analysis to include other sectors of the financial 
sector, such as asset-management firms, medical aid schemes and pension funds. 
Moreover, such a study could be extended to be a panel study covering other 
developing countries. 
Secondly, this study was undertaken during a transition period when Basel III and SAM 
capital regulation standards were being implemented. Future studies could examine the 
impact of the implementation of these capital standards on the financing patterns of 
banks and insurance companies respectively. It could be that in future, the capital 
regulations will become binding. 
Thirdly, this study occurred at a time when South Africa’s credit rating was downgraded. 
This could impact the credit rating of the financial institutions themselves. This will 
increase the cost of capital for financial firms. As such, future studies could explore the 
relationship between credit rating and the capital structures of financial firms. 
Fourthly, further research could be done to unravel the relationship between bank 
lending and business cycles/GFC in the context of South Africa. Alternatively, another 
research pathway would be to investigate the impact of the implementation of the NCA 
and bank lending in South Africa. 
Fifthly, attendant to the institution of the twin-peaks regulatory framework in South Africa 
is the issue of cost. For instance, in the insurance industry they have to grapple with the 
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instituted market conduct requirement of ‘Treating our Customers Fairly’ as well as 
compliance with the FAIS Act, among other legislation. Arguably, the cost of compliance 
with these regulatory requirements will cascade down to the capital structure of 
insurance companies. As such, future studies could seek to examine whether the 
implementation of the twin-peaks regulatory model had an effect on insurer capital 
structure. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Sample of banks 
Name of bank Specialisation Total assets 
in 2015 
(R’mil) 
Net income 
in 2015 
(R’mil) 
World 
rank 
Country 
rank 
1 ABSA Bank Limited Commercial 
bank 
936 141 10,047 350 3 
2 African Bank 
Limited 
Commercial 
bank 
50 679 (7 212) 2 430 8 
3 Albaraka Bank 
Limited 
Islamic bank 4 814 40 7 456 18 
4 Bidvest Bank 
Limited 
Investment 
bank 
6 201 263 6 800 17 
5 First Rand Bank 
Limited 
Commercial 
bank 
851 200 12 750 270 2 
6 GBS Mutual Bank Commercial 
bank 
1 085 8 12 726 24 
7 Grindrod Bank 
Limited 
Commercial 
bank 
9 256 105 5 441 12 
8 Habib Overseas 
Bank Limited 
Commercial 
bank 
1 207 16 12 284 23 
9 HBZ Bank Limited Commercial 
bank 
2 475 38 8 253 19 
10 Investec Bank 
Limited 
Investment 
bank 
332 706 3 128 682 5 
11 Mercantile Bank 
Limited 
Commercial 
bank 
9 640 140 6 206 15 
12 Nedbank Limited Commercial 
bank 
319 135 757 377 4 
 
13 Real People 
Investments 
Holdings Pty. 
Limited 
Investment 
bank 
3 755 (333) 8 506 20 
14 Sasfin Bank Limited Commercial 
bank 
8 429 137 5 861 14 
15 South African Bank 
of Athens Limited 
Commercial 
bank 
2 284 (58) 10 084 21 
16 Standard Bank of 
South Africa 
Limited 
Commercial 
bank 
1 276 953 12 479 266 1 
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Appendix B: Sample of insurance companies 
Name of insurance company Specialisation 
1 African Reinsurance Corporation Reinsurance company 
2 AIG South Africa Limited Short-term insurance company 
3 Allianz Insurance Limited Short-term insurance company 
4 Clientele Limited  Long-term insurance company 
5 
Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation of Africa 
Limited 
Short-term insurance company 
6 Discovery Life Limited Long-term insurance company 
7 
Export Credit Insurance Corporation of South 
Africa Limited  
Short-term insurance company 
8 
Federated Employers Mutual Assurance Company 
Limited 
Short-term insurance company 
9 General Re Africa Limited Reinsurance 
10 Guardrisk Insurance Company Limited Short-term insurance company 
11 HDI-GERLING Insurance of South Africa Short-term insurance company 
12 Hollard Insurance Company Limited Short-term insurance company 
13 Hollard Life Assurance Company Limited Long-term insurance company 
14 Liberty Holdings Limited Long-term insurance company 
15 Lion of Africa Insurance Company Limited Short-term insurance company 
16 Munich Reinsurance Company of Africa Limited Reinsurance 
17 New National Assurance Company Limited Short-term insurance company 
18 Old Mutual Life Assurance Company Limited Long-term insurance company 
19 Professional Provident Society Long-term insurance company 
20 Regent Insurance Company Limited Short-term insurance company 
21 Regent Life Assurance Company Limited Long-term insurance company 
22 Renasa Insurance Company Limited Short-term insurance company 
23 Sanlam Life Insurance Limited Long-term insurance company 
24 Santam Limited Short-term insurance company 
25 Sasria Limited Short-term insurance company 
26 Zurich Insurance Company South Africa Limited Short-term insurance company 
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Appendix C: Diagnostic tests to select a robust model with non-deposit leverage employed as the dependent 
variable 
Test Test statistic Critical value Inference 
Joint validity of cross-sectional 
individual effects 
H0 : 𝜶𝟏 =  𝜶𝟐 = ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  =  𝟎 
HA: : 𝜶𝟏 ≠  𝜶𝟐 ≠ ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  ≠  𝟎 
 
F = 43.17 F(0.01,14,128) = 2.224 Cross-sectional specific effects are valid. 
Joint validity of time effects 
H0: 𝝀𝟏 = 𝝀𝟐 = 𝝀𝒏−𝟏 = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝀𝟏  ≠ 𝝀𝟐 ≠ ⋯𝝀𝒏−𝟏 ≠ 𝟎 
F = 0.62 F(0.01,9,120) = 2.559 Time effects are invalid. The error term takes a one-way 
error component form. 
Breusch-Pagan (1980) LM test for 
random effects  
H0: 𝜹𝛍𝟐 = 𝟎 
HA: 𝜹𝛍𝟐 ≠ 𝟎 
 
LM = 60.8 p = 0.0000 There is significant difference in variance across the 
entities. RE are present. 
Hausman (1978) specification test 
H0: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) = 𝟎 
HA: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) ≠ 𝟎 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 = 𝜹 for all i 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 ≠ 𝜹 for all i 
 
Cross-sectional dependence tests 
H0: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝒄𝒄𝒄�𝝁𝒊𝒕,𝝁𝒊𝒕� = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 ≠ 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝟎 
 
m3 = 64.81 
 
 
 
LM = 7187 
p = 0.0000 
 
 
 
p = 0.0000 
Regressors not exogenous. Hence the FE specification 
is valid. 
 
 
The variance of the error term is not constant. 
Heteroscedasticity is present. 
Pesaran (2004) CD test: CD = -1.134 
(0.342) 
 
 
p = 0.2566 
 
 
 
Cross-sections are independent. 
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Appendix D: Diagnostic tests to select a robust model with deposit leverage employed as the dependent variable 
Test Test statistic Critical value Inference 
Joint validity of cross-sectional 
individual effects 
H0 : 𝜶𝟏 =  𝜶𝟐 = ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  =  𝟎 
HA: : 𝜶𝟏 ≠  𝜶𝟐 ≠ ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  ≠  𝟎 
 
F = 38.57 F(0.01,14,128) = 2.224 
 
Cross-sectional specific effects are valid. 
Joint validity of time effects 
H0: 𝝀𝟏 = 𝝀𝟐 = 𝝀𝒏−𝟏 = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝀𝟏  ≠ 𝝀𝟐 ≠ ⋯𝝀𝒏−𝟏 ≠ 𝟎 
F = 1.52 F(0.01,9,120) = 2.559 Time effects are invalid. The error term takes a one-way 
error component form. 
Breusch-Pagan (1980) LM test for 
random effects  
H0: 𝜹𝛍𝟐 = 𝟎 
HA: 𝜹𝛍𝟐 ≠ 𝟎 
 
LM = 24.43 χ2(14) = 29.14 There is no significant difference in variance across the 
entities. RE are absent. 
Hausman (1978) specification test 
H0: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) = 𝟎 
HA: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) ≠ 𝟎 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 = 𝜹 for all i 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 ≠ 𝜹 for all i 
 
Cross-sectional dependence tests 
H0: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝒄𝒄𝒄�𝝁𝒊𝒕,𝝁𝒊𝒕� = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 ≠ 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝟎 
m3 = 83.5 
 
 
 
LM = 27309  
χ2(6)= 0.873 
 
 
 
χ2(15)= 30.58 
Regressors not exogenous. Hence the FE specification 
is valid. 
 
 
The variance of the error term is not constant. 
Heteroscedasticity is present. 
 
Pesaran (2004) CD test: 
 
CD = 0.500 
(0.374) 
 
p = 0.6171 
 
 
 
 
Cross-sections are independent. 
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Appendix E: Panel regression results with non-deposit leverage as the dependent 
variable 
 Pooled OLS Random Effects 
 
Fixed Effects 
Growth 0.170*** 
(3.03) 
0.085** 
(2.20) 
 0.060** 
(2.51) 
Profit 2.165*** 
(4.44) 
1.425*** 
(3.67)   
0.970** 
(2.69) 
Asset  -1.049 
(-1.86) 
-0.753 
(-0.90)  
-0.786 
(-0.62) 
Risk 1.415*** 
(3.61) 
-0.053 
(-0.67)  
- 0.555*** 
(-9.00) 
Size  0.005*** 
(3.60) 
0.006** 
(2.41)   
0.003 
(0.29) 
Dividend  0.036* 
(1.91) 
0.003 
(0.11) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
GFC  0.008 
(0.50) 
0.005    
(0.53)  
0.006 
(0.53) 
Constant -0.075 
(-3.24) 
 
 0.015 
(0.33) 
0.078 
(0.47) 
R-squared 0.5045 0.5021 0.5670 
F-statistic   37.01*** 
LM-statistic  610.07***  
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The t-statistics for 
the pooled and FE model as well as the z-statistics for the RE model are reported in parentheses. 
The table above shows the results of estimating the following regression for the sample of 16 South 
African banks for the period 2006–2015. 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑆𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑆𝑖,𝑁 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁       
where the dependent variable = non-deposit leverage; 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′  = a vector of explanatory variables (size, 
profitability, growth, asset tangibility dividend, risk and GFC) for bank i at time t; β = a vector of slope 
parameters; 𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term that embodies all the observable effects; εi,t = composite 
error term that also takes care of other explanatory variables that equally determine leverage but were not 
included in the model. 
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Appendix F: Panel regression results with deposit leverage as the dependent  
Variable 
 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The t-statistics for 
the pooled and FE model as well as the z-statistics for the RE model are reported in parentheses.  
The table above shows the results of estimating the following regression for the sample of 16 South 
African banks for the period 2006–2015. 
 
𝐵𝑆𝑣𝑆𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑆𝑖,𝑁 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′ 𝜷 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑁       
 
where the dependent variable = book leverage; 𝒙𝑖,𝑁′  = a vector of explanatory variables (size, profitability, 
growth, asset tangibility, dividend, risk and GFC) for bank i at time t; β = a vector of slope parameters; 
𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term that embodies all the observable effects; εi,t = composite error term that 
also takes care of other explanatory variables that equally determine leverage but were not included in 
the model. 
 
 
 
 
 Pooled OLS Random Effects 
 
Fixed Effects 
Growth -0.113 
(-1.62) 
-0.027 
(-0.52 ) 
0.026 
(1.16) 
Profit -4.601*** 
(-6.98) 
-2.878*** 
(-8.86) 
-1.601** 
(-3.85) 
Asset  -1.989* 
(-1.77) 
-1.243 
(-0.62) 
0.888 
(0.67) 
Risk -1.672*** 
(-3.75) 
-0.089 
(-1.04 
0.946*** 
(9.47) 
Size -0.003* 
(-1.80) 
-0.003 
(-0.73) 
0.019 
(0.73) 
Dividend 0.021 
(0.99) 
0.004 
(0.14) 
-0.012 
(-0.55) 
GFC 0.024 
(1.20) 
0.013 
(0.90) 
0.010 
(0.92) 
Constant 0.957*** 
(35.29) 
0.85*** 
(13.32) 
0.527 
(1.74) 
Adjusted R2 0.5934  0.6841 
F-statistic   76.34*** 
LM-statistic  244.27***  
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Appendix G: Correlation matrix of buffer capital and the main variables used in this study  
 Buffer capital 
 
Growth Profit Asset  Risk Size  Dividend 
Buffer capital 
   
 
1.000  
 
     
Growth    
 
 
-0.068 1.000      
Profit 
 
 
 0.284*** 0.411*** 1.000     
Asset  
 
 
0.157** 0.131 0.261*** 1.000    
Risk  
 
 
-0.001 0.047 -0.178** 0.123 1.000   
Size     
 
 
-0.284*** -0.127 -0.209*** -0.027 -0.004 1.000  
Dividend     
 
0.052 -0.069 0.002 -0.143* -0.196** 0.188** 1.000 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The variables are defined as follows:  
buffer capital = Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio – prescribed Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio; growth = growth rate of total assets; profit = ROAA; asset 
tangibility = fixed assets / total assets; risk = impaired loans / gross loans; size = natural logarithm of total assets; dividend = dummy variable = (1 
when dividend is paid and 0 when dividend is not paid). 
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Appendix H: Diagnostic tests with buffer capital employed as the dependent variable 
Test Test statistic Critical value Inference 
Joint validity of cross-sectional 
individual effects 
H0 : 𝜶𝟏 =  𝜶𝟐 = ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  =  𝟎 
HA: : 𝜶𝟏 ≠  𝜶𝟐 ≠ ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  ≠  𝟎 
 
F = 9.55 F(0.01,15,137) = 4.142 Cross-sectional specific effects are valid. 
Joint validity of time effects 
H0: 𝝀𝟏 = 𝝀𝟐 = 𝝀𝒏−𝟏 = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝀𝟏  ≠ 𝝀𝟐 ≠ ⋯𝝀𝒏−𝟏 ≠ 𝟎 
F = 0.62 F(0.01,9,129) = 2.548 Time effects are invalid. The error term takes a one-way 
error component form. 
Breusch-Pagan (1980) LM test for 
random effects  
H0: 𝜹𝛍𝟐 = 𝟎 
HA: 𝜹𝛍𝟐 ≠ 𝟎 
 
LM = 12.23 χ2(15) = 5.23 There is significant difference in variance across the 
entities. RE are present. 
Hausman (1978) specification test 
H0: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) = 𝟎 
HA: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) ≠ 𝟎 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 = 𝜹 for all i 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 ≠ 𝜹 for all i 
 
Cross-sectional dependence tests 
H0: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝒄𝒄𝒄�𝝁𝒊𝒕,𝝁𝒊𝒕� = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 ≠ 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝟎 
m3 = 70.17 
 
 
 
LM = 2768.28  
χ2(6)= 0.873 
 
 
 
χ2(16)= 31.99 
Regressors not exogenous. Hence the FE specification 
is valid. 
 
 
The variance of the error term is not constant. 
Heteroscedasticity is present. 
(i) Pesaran (2004) CD test: 
 
 
(ii) Frees (2004) test:  
 
CD = 2.847 
(0.430) 
 
FRE = 1.620 
p = 0.0044 
 
 
Q(0.01) = 0.5198 
Cross-sections are interdependent. 
 
 
Cross-sections are interdependent. 
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Appendix I: Correlational analysis of Tier 1 capital and the firm-level explanatory variables 
 Tier 1 capital 
 
Growth Profit Asset Risk Size  Dividend 
Tier 1 capital 
 
   
1.000       
Growth    
 
 
-0.055 1.000      
Profit 
 
 
 0.301*** 0.411*** 1.000     
Asset 
 
 
0.164** 0.131* 0.261*** 1.000    
Risk  
 
 
-0.007 0.047 -0.178** 0.123 1.000   
Size     
 
 
-0.287*** -0.127 -0.209*** -0.027 -0.004 1.000  
Dividend     
 
0.059 -0.069 0.002 -0.143* -0.196** 0.188** 1.000 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The variables are defined as follows:  
Tier 1 capital = Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio; growth = growth rate of total assets; profit = ROAA; asset tangibility = fixed assets / total assets; risk 
= impaired loans / gross loans; size = natural logarithm of total assets; dividend = dummy variable = (1 when dividend is paid and 0 when dividend 
is not paid). 
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Appendix J: Diagnostic tests to estimate a robust model with Tier 1 capital ratio employed as the dependent 
variable 
Test Test statistic Critical value Inference 
Joint validity of cross-sectional 
individual effects 
H0 : 𝜶𝟏 =  𝜶𝟐 = ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  =  𝟎 
HA: : 𝜶𝟏 ≠  𝜶𝟐 ≠ ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  ≠  𝟎 
 
F = 9.75 F(0.01,15,137) = 4.142 Cross-sectional specific effects are valid. 
Joint validity of time effects 
H0: 𝝀𝟏 = 𝝀𝟐 = 𝝀𝒏−𝟏 = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝀𝟏  ≠ 𝝀𝟐 ≠ ⋯𝝀𝒏−𝟏 ≠ 𝟎 
F = 0.50 F(0.01,9,129) = 2.548 Time effects are invalid. The error term takes a one-way 
error component form. 
Breusch-Pagan (1980) LM test for 
random effects  
H0: 𝜹𝛍𝟐 = 𝟎 
HA: 𝜹𝛍𝟐 ≠ 𝟎 
 
LM = 11.75 χ2(15) = 5.23 There is significant difference in variance across the 
entities. RE are present. 
Hausman (1978) specification test 
H0: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) = 𝟎 
HA: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) ≠ 𝟎 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 = 𝜹 for all i 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 ≠ 𝜹 for all i 
 
Cross-sectional dependence tests 
H0: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝒄𝒄𝒄�𝝁𝒊𝒕,𝝁𝒊𝒕� = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 ≠ 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝟎 
m3 = 70.72 
 
 
 
LM = 8842.4 
χ2(6)= 0.873 
 
 
 
χ2(16)= 31.99 
Regressors not exogenous. Hence the FE specification 
is valid. 
 
 
The variance of the error term is not constant. 
Heteroscedasticity is present. 
(iii) Pesaran (2004) CD test: 
 
 
(iv) Frees (2004) test:  
 
CD = 2.316 
(0.407) 
 
FRE = 1.255 
p = 0.0205 
 
 
Q(0.01) = 0.5198 
Cross-sections are interdependent. 
 
 
Cross-sections are interdependent. 
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Appendix K: Diagnostic tests to estimate target capital structure with book leverage as the dependent variable 
Test Test statistic Critical value Inference 
Joint validity of cross-sectional 
individual effects 
H0 : 𝜶𝟏 =  𝜶𝟐 = ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  =  𝟎 
HA: : 𝜶𝟏 ≠  𝜶𝟐 ≠ ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  ≠  𝟎 
 
F = 5.08 F(0.01,15,137) = 2.192 Cross-sectional specific effects are valid. 
Joint validity of time effects 
H0: 𝝀𝟏 = 𝝀𝟐 = 𝝀𝒏−𝟏 = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝀𝟏  ≠ 𝝀𝟐 ≠ ⋯𝝀𝒏−𝟏 ≠ 𝟎 
F = 1.51 F(0.01,8,113) = 2.673 Time effects are invalid. The error term takes a one-way 
error component form. 
Hausman (1978) specification test 
H0: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) = 𝟎 
HA: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) ≠ 𝟎 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 = 𝜹 for all i 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 ≠ 𝜹 for all i 
 
Cross-sectional dependence tests 
H0: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝒄𝒄𝒄�𝝁𝒊𝒕,𝝁𝒊𝒕� = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 ≠ 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝟎 
m3 = 44.30 
 
 
 
LM = 2206 
p = 0.0000 
 
 
 
p = 0.0000 
Regressors not exogenous.  
 
 
The variance of the error term is not constant. 
Heteroscedasticity is present. 
 
Pesaran (2004) CD test:  
 
 
CD = 2.428 
(0.405) 
 
 
 
p = 0.015 
 
Cross-sections are interdependent. 
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Appendix L: Diagnostic tests to estimate a target capital structure with deposit leverage employed as the 
dependent variable 
Test Test statistic Critical value Inference 
Joint validity of cross-sectional 
individual effects 
H0 : 𝜶𝟏 =  𝜶𝟐 = ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  =  𝟎 
HA: : 𝜶𝟏 ≠  𝜶𝟐 ≠ ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  ≠  𝟎 
 
F = 2.89 F(0.01,15,137) = 2.245 Cross-sectional specific effects are valid. 
Joint validity of time effects 
H0: 𝝀𝟏 = 𝝀𝟐 = 𝝀𝒏−𝟏 = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝀𝟏  ≠ 𝝀𝟐 ≠ ⋯𝝀𝒏−𝟏 ≠ 𝟎 
F = 1.14 F(0.01,8,105) = 2.685 Time effects are invalid. The error term takes a one-way 
error component form. 
Hausman (1978) specification test 
H0: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) = 𝟎 
HA: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) ≠ 𝟎 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 = 𝜹 for all i 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 ≠ 𝜹 for all i 
 
Cross-sectional dependence tests 
H0: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝒄𝒄𝒄�𝝁𝒊𝒕,𝝁𝒊𝒕� = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 ≠ 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝟎 
m3 = 30.15 
 
 
 
LM = 288.12 
p = 0.0001 
 
 
 
p = 0000 
Regressors not exogenous.  
 
 
The variance of the error term is not constant. 
Heteroscedasticity is present. 
 
Pesaran (2004) CD test:  
 
CD = 0.243 
(0.405) 
 
 
p = 0.8080 
 
Cross-sections are independent. 
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Appendix M: Diagnostic tests of target capital structure estimation with non-deposit leverage employed as the 
dependent variable. 
Test Test statistic Critical value Inference 
Joint validity of cross-sectional 
individual effects 
H0 : 𝜶𝟏 =  𝜶𝟐 = ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  =  𝟎 
HA: : 𝜶𝟏 ≠  𝜶𝟐 ≠ ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  ≠  𝟎 
 
F = 4.80 F(0.01,15,137) = 2.245 Cross-sectional specific effects are valid. 
Joint validity of time effects 
H0: 𝝀𝟏 = 𝝀𝟐 = 𝝀𝒏−𝟏 = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝀𝟏  ≠ 𝝀𝟐 ≠ ⋯𝝀𝒏−𝟏 ≠ 𝟎 
F = 0.76 F(0.01,8,113) = 2.685 Time effects are invalid. The error term takes a one-way 
error component form. 
Hausman (1978) specification test 
H0: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) = 𝟎 
HA: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐢|𝐗𝐢𝐢) ≠ 𝟎 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 = 𝜹 for all i 
H0: 𝜹𝐢𝟐 ≠ 𝜹 for all i 
 
Cross-sectional dependence tests 
H0: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝒄𝒄𝒄�𝝁𝒊𝒕,𝝁𝒊𝒕� = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝆𝒊𝒊 ≠ 𝝆𝒊𝒊 = 𝟎 
m3 = 85.69 
 
 
 
 
LM = 1310 
p = 0.000 
 
 
 
 
p = 0.000 
Regressors not exogenous.  
 
 
 
 
The variance of the error term is not constant. 
Heteroscedasticity is present. 
 
Pesaran (2004) CD test:  
 
 
CD = -0.881 
(0.347) 
 
 
 
p = 0.378 
 
Cross-sections are independent. 
    
 
 
